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ABSTRACT 
The utopian idealization of a rational order of things as it has been expressed by 
Modem Movement architecture can be exposed due to the openness in the principles of 
knowledge intrinsic in the isolation of reason from metaphysics accomplished by Moder- 
nity. In fact, the development of criticism and theory in architecture constitutes an expres- 
sion of the Modem situation. 
This thesis aims to a critique of Modem Movement architecture in the light of Classi- 
cal architecture. The issue of political knowledge as it stands within the historicity of each 
architecture is established as the context through which Classical and Modem Movement 
architectures are approached and related to each other. 
" Classical architecture enjoyed existence within the universal and immutable, semi- 
human and semi-divine order of the polls. Metaphysics embraced reason, while living in 
the polls essentially implied reasoned interaction between the citizens on this ground. The 
autonomy as well as the unity of architecture within itself and with the environment were 
attained due to the metaphysical origin, the idea or eidos of a work. At this level, morality, 
reason and aesthetics were inseparable. 
Through the centuries, however, the Classical notion of reason underwent a process 
of secularization which resulted in the quantification of all knowledge as far as the domain 
of the political is concerned. Hence, in the Modern era, the autonomy of architecture far 
from being manifested through the potentiality of a work for an infinite number of distinct 
corporeal expressions inherent in its eidos, is defined in the sphere of the aesthetic through 
the notion of "aesthetic disinterestedness". "Aesthetic disinterestedness" implies the separa- 
tion of the aesthetic from morality and reason in any sense, and is related to human 
psychology. At the same time, unity, instead of deriving from the essence, originates in 
the supra-quantitative factors which determine interaction in the political field. As a result, 
autonomy and unity are mutually exclusive by definition. Modem Movement architecture 
illustrates clearly this situation. 
iv 
The attempt of the Modem Movement architects to attribute aesthetic significance to 
rational schemes while satisfying social imperatives for function and economy was stimu- 
lated by the Modem belief in the universality of reason. In these terms, architecture lost its 
ontological status, while the development of theory and criticism has continuously 
increased. However, creation as such cannot be subject to criticism and ultimately it is 
evaluated in pragmatic terms. 
V 
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1. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM 
Contemporary architecture enjoys much greater freedom than it ever did in the past, 
not only in the field of practice but in the field of theory as well. This freedom, however, 
seems to be a source of confusion for man as a socio-historical being in general and for 
the architect in particular. The identification of the fundamental issues which underlie the 
present situation constitutes a decisive step towards a responsible attitude towards the 
future facing architecture today. More than this, a theoretical investigation of the subject is 
an imperative and unavoidable task within the context of secularization of all knowledge 
and the rejection of metaphysics bequeathed to us by Modernity. 
Indeed, as we are going to discuss extensively in this thesis, it was this shift in 
human knowledge from metaphysical to secular that disengaged architecture from its own 
self and from the world. We shall attempt to approach the two critical points of the adven- 
tures of knowledge within the so called Western world, with a focus on architecture. In 
Greek fact, aiming at a critique of the Modem Movement architecture, Classicalrarchitecture will 
be used as a standpoint. After Classical times, it was in the Modem era that reason was 
established as the universal and timeless source of knowledge. The meaning of reason, 
however, is quite different in the two eras. 
In Classical times, reason was not conceived as separate from metaphysics. The idea 
or eidos of a thing, its absolute and immutable essence, indicates what the thing is, and 
constitutes the beginning and end of any reasoned approach to it within the polis. The 
autonomy as well as the unity of Classical architecture are defined in these terms. 
In the Modem era, metaphysics has been rejected in favour of man's desire to gain 
full control over his knowledge. As a result, the ontological question turns into the explora- 
tion of the psychology of the human subject, while supra-empirical factors such as econ- 
omy determine the issue of unity within the human environment. Architecture does not 
anymore exist sui generis but gains autonomy through the aesthetic manipulation of its 
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form according to the personal visions of the architect. Furthermore, unity as much within 
architecture as in relation to its socio-political milieu is defined in quantitative terms. 
An exposition of this situation of architecture is undertaken in this thesis. Both Clas- 
sical and Modem Movement architecture are considered here within the political processes 
of their times. It is far from the scope of this thesis to suggest a retrogression to the past. It 
is rather an attempt to elucidate the present as a derivative of that past. 
2. THE NOTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A POLITICAL BEING 
AS THE BASIS OF THE RESEARCH 
The Classical and Modem eras each indicate a decisive moment in the historical 
development of man as an individual. The Classical individual originated in the invasion of 
logic into myth and religion but never arrived at a complete emancipation from its past, 
while Modem man conceived of morality and religion as separate from truth and decided 
to find the order of the world by his own means. In both cases, personal will as the expres- 
sion of individual liberty and reason as the objective measure of everything in existence 
were established as the two main forces with which the individual identified itself in 
society and the world. Nevertheless, there is a profound difference underlying the notions 
of the Classical and the Modem individual. 
The Greek way of thinking was comprehensive and all-inclusive, based . 
on a priori 
structures established as the beginning of thought. Reason was bound by universal stan- 
dards that were unquestionably good and true. Thus individuality was always actively 
related to the world. In fact, it was in the public domain within the polis where the indivi- 
dual gained its existence. In the realm . of the polls, politeuesthai, which means "take part 
in communal life", simply means living, while Aristotle defines man as zoon politikon, 
"political animal", in order to differentiate him from the animals. Politeuesthai essentially 
consists in reasoned interaction between free and equal citizens on the metaphysical ground 
provided by the very notion of the polls. The order of the universe, cosmos, was a projec- 
tion of the political order. Within this milieu, architecture gained individual liberty and was 
integrated with its context due to its foundation on the metaphysical order which ruled 
everything in the polls. 
As far as the Modem individual is concerned, autonomy stands for isolation and 
self-reference. The Modem way of thinking lacked any supra-human basis as generator of 
the formative forces that govern thought. In this respect, reason - as Heidegger expresses it 
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in "The Origin of the Work of Art" - "having meanwhile become ratio, was misinterpreted 
as being rational". Thus quantitative values were established in order to form the objective 
ground necessary for the relation of the individual to the fellow men and the world. Here, 
not only did the public realm cease to bear the meaning of the political anymore but it is 
hard to draw any distinction between the private and the public sphere. Both have been 
substituted for "society" which - as Hannah Arendt argues - rather indicates a kind of "col- 
lective housekeeping". Within this framework, politics is just one system that regulates the 
boundaries and rules of all the other systems in the community. Of course, this has noth- 
ing to do with political interaction and it is certainly not what essentially differentiates man 
from animals in Aristotle's sense. 
In this context, Modem architecture could express personal images but, first of all, 
had to be the carrier of a pragmatic meaning in order that it be acceptable to every indivi- 
dual. As a consequence, Modem Movement architecture seems to become the last resort of 
idealism; and the rational principle of order through a peculiar merging with subjective 
aesthetics is transformed into ontological assertion. 
3. ARTICULATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of six chapters: chapters One and Two constitute Part I which 
deals with Classical architecture, while chapters Three, Four, and Five form Part II which 
refers to Modem Movement architecture; part III, which includes chapter Six, concludes 
the thesis. 
Chapter One approaches the order of the Classical city-state, the justice of the polis, 
which, founded on theos and logos claims universality in the pursuit of establishing indivi- 
dual freedom and equality among the citizens. Individual freedom is achieved first, through 
a causal way of thinking, and, gradually, equality is reached in order to form the necessary 
ground for the very essence of the polls, political dialectics, to operate. 
Chapter Two investigates the origin or the being of the Classical temple considered as 
the symbol of the polis. The main current tendencies which attempt to interpret the com- 
ing into being of the Classical temple are criticized first. They are made mainly by 
archaeologists, who seek to explain the genesis of the temple on the basis of practical and 
technical requirements. They fail to consider architecture adequately in terms of its 
politico-cultural milieu. Next, an account is given of the metaphysical nature of the notion 
of origin in Classical times, as it is expressed through the philosophy of Plato and 
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Aristotle. In this respect, the relation of the particular temples to the eidos, the coming into 
being of the work in relation to the architect, as well as the social dimension of the temple, 
are discussed. The latter in particular is considered on two levels of interpretation: it is 
argued to be fundamentally religious in so far as the temple is considered as the symbol of 
the mythical Mycenaean past, and essentially political to the extent that the temple consti- 
tutes the symbol of the polis as a semi-divine, semi-human entity. Within this context, 
aesthetic pleasure derives from the essential unity between morality and politics. 
Chapter Three presents a concise account of the transformation of the Classical notion 
of reason from metaphysical into secular through the centuries up to the Modem times and 
of Modem politics in this respect. Politics, from reasoned interaction between equal and 
free citizens, turns out to be defined in quantitative terms. Political interaction is motivated 
by supra-empirical factors such as economy. Morality, separated from politics, stands for 
the freedom of the individual in the private domain. 
Chapter Four introduces the Modem concept of the autonomy of art. Through a pro- 
cess whose origins can be identified in the Renaissance, the autonomy of the aesthetic from 
reason and morality, as well as from any self-referred or practical interest, is accomplished 
and takes its definite expression in Kant's philosophy. The work is detached from its meta- 
physical foundation; instead, it originates in human psychology. As a consequence, the dis- 
tinction between art and non-art, and the principles of art -criticism are undecidable. 
Chapter Five provides a critical examination of Modem Movement architecture on the 
basis of the previous discussion. It is argued that Modern Movement architecture emerges 
from two, mutually exclusive principles: on the one hand aesthetics, through which it 
claims autonomy, and on the other hand economy, as a means of integration into the 
socio-political context of Modernity. Both constitute expressions of the secularization of 
knowledge in the Modem era. As a result, the autonomy of architecture, far from deriving 
from the eldos, is bound to the subjectivity of the artist through a universal aesthetic that 
derives from intellectual schemes and treats form alone at the expense of the whole work. 
Rationalization, instead of expressing the potentiality of the work for infinitely repeated 
distinct corporeal manifestations, results in typification of form. 
Chapter Six, concluding, restates the principles of existence of architecture in the 
Classical and the Modem political context. The merit of Modem Movement architecture as 
a life process is questioned. Furthermore, the value and limits of theory and criticism in 
the architectonic creations of the two eras are discussed. Creation as such cannot be subject 







THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY AND THE GENESIS 
OF THE POLIS AS A METAPHYSICAL ENTITY 
1.1. THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE JUSTICE 
OF THE POLIS 
The division of ancient Greece into innumerable small city-states was the result of a 
long anterior process. The term polls or ptoliethron that designated the city and the state in 
Classical times, was, in the Mycenean age, applied to the acropolis, while the whole inha- 
bited area around it was the astu (1). The acropolis is referred to in the Homeric poems as 
"sacred"' and "bright", for it included the sanctuary and the palace(2). As the astu was 
developing with the growth of agriculture and trade, the difference between polls and astu 
gradually disappeared(3). In the later Homeric verses both terms were used almost indistin- 
guishably to designate the whole of the city(4). 
From a purely theoretical aspect, Aristotle in the Politics looks at the city-state as the 
end-product of a natural perfecting process(5). His interpretation of the growth of society 
is teleological: man, who can begin to develop only in the family, can come to full matu- 
rity only in the polls. Aristotle calls him "a political animal by nature". This view is con- 
sistent with his "theory of Forms": Form is potentially present before the progress begins; 
by the attainment of the "appropriate form" which in this case is the city-state, human 
society as an entity and man as individual reach their fulfilment(6). 
. It is generally accepted that the genesis of the city-state in Greece in the eighth cen- 
tury B. C. (7), , as well as its gradual strengthening during the three following centuries is 
fundamentally related to the freedom of the individual; city-state and individual freedom 
were mutually supportive and progressed side by side during Classical antiquity(8). 
The conception of man as a citizen originated in the Greek colonies of Ionia, in the 
coastal strip of Asia Minor(9). The extraordinary mixture of immigrant bands coming from 
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all over Greece and representing all Greek tribes, stimulated the process towards the attain- 
ment of individual freedom to take place early and easily. The colonies of the Greeks, so 
various in their origin, lost the stabilizing force of tradition much more easily than the 
cities in the mainland. On the other hand, this heterogenity of co-existing elements made 
the need for more complex political institutions urgent. Lacking the firmer cultural frame- 
work of the mainland Greek cities, however, the Ionian colonies never managed to co- 
ordinate the energies of their individual citizens and use them in order to strengthen their 
own power. The Ionian contribution to the concept of polls was that it set the individual 
free, in spiritual and political life(10). 
The process towards achieving individual freedom in Ionia was interrelated with and 
fundamentally supported by the new cultural and economic conditions which emerged there 
due to the development of commerce and navigation in contrast to the agrarian civilization 
of the native lands of the immigrants(11). This resulted in the strengthening of man's 
attempt to approach the world by means of the human intellect on the one hand and the 
demand for a new social order on the other. 
Sailing epics such as the voyage of the Argonauts and the odyssey with their 
wonderful stories about the many distant nations visited, praised the adventurous spirit and 
versatility displayed by the Greeks in- these new conditions of life. Individual initiative, 
wide vision and independent criticism were the chief characteristics of the new type of per- 
sonality developed by the sailors of Ionia(12). It is very significant that the new "cult of 
individuality" as it is first raised in Ionian poetry, is not expressed in the modem° manner 
as the subjective, private experience of an individual. On the contrary, as in the poems of 
Archilochous, for example, personal emotions have nothing purely subjective in them. The 
whole intelligible and in this sense objective world and its laws are represented in their 
expression. The individual tries to discover his own inner laws by being actively related to 
both, the natural and the political world(13). The notion of justice plays a decisive role in 
this process. '' 
Within the new socio-cultural milieu, political struggles began. The people demanded 
written laws. The word justice, dike, became the war-cry of the class-conflict, and the 
supreme virtue in, the newly born city-state(14). Etymologically, the word dike belongs to 
Greek legal terminology and means due share, judgement and penalty. It is no less old 
than the word themis that also means justice, and signified the fundamental rules of public 
law in the oldest days. Homer usually uses themis in order to describe justice: Zeus gave 
the Homeric kings "the sceptre and themis". Themis is confined rather to an inevitable 
authority of justice imposed on the common people from above; while dike means the legal 
enforceability of justice, equality in front of the law, and is seen as the very essence of the 
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freedom of the individual(15). 
Simultaneous with the struggle for justice in the political field - and actually inspired 
by it - was the praise of justice in the cosmos by the early Greek philosophers. Gregory 
Vlastos, in exploring the notions of equality and justice in the early Greek cosmolo- 
gies(16), states that the early Greek notion of justice was applied far beyond the bounds of 
politics and morals. Cosmic justice was conceived by the founders of Greek scientific 
thought as a harmonious association of nature, ordered by equality. The functions and attri- 
butes of the ancient gods were transferred to nature (physis). The order of nature is main- 
tained because it is an order of equals. The conception of the main components of the 
Universe as equals was an old tradition in popular cosmology as we can deduce from the 
poems of Homer and Hesiod. In these poems, equality is a non-rational concept, for the 
determining agency of the relation of the equals remains hidden from human reason. 
Through the adventurous spirit of the Ionian philosophers physis was detached from the 
personal control of supernatural beings. Its order was deducible from its own intelligible 
properties(17). Equality was the essence of this transformation "for it meant the abolition 
of distinctions between two grades of being - divine and mortal, lordly and subservient, 
noble and mean, of higher and lower honour. It was the ending of these distinctions that 
made nature autonomous and therefore completely and unexceptionally "just""(18). 
In the context of polls nevertheless, the conception of justice as a cosmic power is 
not of a major importance(19). Certainly justice is a divine power, but it is also a human 
device that applies solely to the acts and relations of conscious beings within the social 
order. Solon, the Athenian legislator, considered the operation of justice in this way. In 
contrast to the Homeric and Hesiodic justice of "religious pollution", which lies beyond the 
understanding of the ordinary man, Solonian justice is intelligible in principle, but without 
losing its old divinity(20). This divinity however, as is clear from Solon's fragment 4, is 
described strictly through the observable consequences of human acts within the communal 
realm: the vindication of justice comes "like an inescapable plague upon the whole polls; 
swiftly the polls falls into evil bondage; bondage stirs up strife and slumbering war, war 
destroys many in the beauty of their youth"(21). 
Beyond that, Solon's reason is not based on the dialectic relation of pairs of equals - 
as in the pre-Socratics - but on a causal relation. So, for him the sea is not double-natured, 
capriciously shifting from one mood to its opposite (as Semonides of Amorgous had pic- 
tured it); Change is not arbitrary and disturbance is not the natural, "just" state of the sea: 
"if someone does not move it, it is the justest of all things"(22). 
In the human field, Solon thinks of harmony as a relation between unequals in terms 
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of social causality., The common peace and the common freedom are the two basic ideas of 
this relation(23). Their preservation makes justice a matter of common concern as the 
causal conception of justice in terms of the human intellect forms the unavoidable precon- 
dition of individual` freedom, and thus opens the horizon for, the public universe of 
discourse to operate. 
1.2. DIVINE AND HUMAN LAW: A TWO-FOLD CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 
IN THE POLLS 
Y- Considering old and new beliefs as they appear in the law of the Classical city-state, 
one can discern two main, apparently irreconcilable aspects. 
On the one hand, old elements were incorporated in the new law of the polls, as 
existing customs were formulated in parallel with new ordinances, by the first legisla- 
tors(24). The divine nature ascribed to the nomos is therefore partly justified by this double 
origin. Nomos is a man-made, written law. It bore the name of its author. Solon's " law, 
Cleisthenes's law. It could be incorporated in the body of legislation only if the, people had 
voted for it. The nomos was the common measure which procured the greatest sum of 
equality and the greatest sum of individual liberty(25). It not only protected the citizens 
one against the other, but also defended the rights of individuals against the power of the 
state. and the power of the- state, against the excesses of individuals. -Aristotle declared: 
"there is no order outside the law"(26). 
On the other hand, the old, sacred thesmol and the new nomos persisted side by side. 
Although logically incompatible and often contradicting each other, the two laws appeared 
to harmonize tolerably well . 
in practice.. Thesmoi were introduced into the dike of the city 
as the new face of the ancient themis. - Thesmoi were rules of an essentially religious 
nature, imposed by the gods, for eternity. As such, they are sacred and immutable. They 
dealt with religious and criminal. matters, political relationships etc., serving as ritual 
prescriptions and legislative enactments. They were transmitted from generation to genera- 
tion by oral tradition. Due to their transcendental authority, thesmoi offered no justification 
for their content, and any alteration of them was prohibited. The old belief in the superna- 
tural power of thesmoi remained, throughout the Classical age, particularly attached to 
criminal law(27). 
In opposition to thesmoi, nomos had no absolute value; it was a relative and conven- 
tional thing, subject to change each time the need was manifested. In practice nevertheless, 
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the nomoi altered only slightly, because a religious power was ascribed to them. The nomoi 
for the Athenians of the fifth century implied the laws of Draco (621/20), Solon (594/3), 
and Cleisthenes (50817). The Assembly of the People, Ecclesia, did not take to itself the 
right of formally abolishing these laws and making new ones, but, evading this principle, it 
invented the necessary forms for legislating by decree (psephisma) (28). Usually, occa- 
sional measures were taken by means of decrees; some decrees nevertheless had the power 
of a law. 
The precautions taken in the fourth century when the Athenians appointed a commis- 
sion to renew the principal laws of Draco, are characteristic of the sacred power of the 
nomoi and their harmonization with the public will: "The author of this sacrilegious and 
revolutionary proposal must purify himself of the curse of the gods and the punishment of 
men which the change of nomos brings upon himself, and appear at the People's Assembly 
as beseecher, seeking for grace in advance, which can be rendered by a complete Assem- 
bly only, through a secret voting and with a minimum majority of six thousand"(29). 
The sacred nature of the human law can be attributed partly to a bequest by the 
divine laws of the past centuries and partly to the universality of reason as an objective, 
all-comprehensive measure of judgement in the common experience of the polis. Aristotle, 
discussing in the Politics this double nature of nomos, stated: "He therefore that recom- 
mends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that god (theos) and reason (nous) 
alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also; (... ) 
Therefore the law is wisdom without desire"(30). Emotion has nothing to do with the 
nomos which has to secure the reign of reason. 
Heraclitus, attributing to the law a sacred character, declared: "The people ought to 
fight for the law as for the walls of their city"(31); evoking that beyond the visible ele- 
ments of a city there is, invisible, the nomos, the essence of the polls, which provides it 
with a supranatural power and relates it to the gods. This divine nature of the human law 
in the Classical city-state, appears dramatically personalized by Socrates in Plato's Crito 
(32). As Socrates poses it, the nomoi are the quintessence of the polls. He who violates 
the law destroys the idea of the polls. Every citizen is beholden to the laws for his birth 
and education. It is his duty to execute its orders even though he believes that they are 
unjust, unless by legitimate means polls is induced to change its decision. He is free other- 
wise to renounce his civic rights and leave. Socrates, choosing to die although he knew 
that the nomos in his case was wrong, attributed the greatest respect to the polls and its 
suprahuman nature. 
To use Jaeger's words, "the polis was a universal with a religious basis. (... ) the new 
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arete (excellence) of the polis is an expression of a change in Greek religious ideals. The 
polls has become the epitome of all things human and divine"(33). Nomos was the order 
inherent in polis' own nature, which was all-sufficient into itself. 
1.3. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AS THE MOTIVE POWER 
IN POLITICAL DIALECTICS 
In the mid-fifth century B. C., the concept of polls reached its most perfect actual 
form in the Athenian city-state. At that time, the public or political life of the Athenians 
was characterized by the. maximum amount of equality among the citizens, harmonized 
with the maximum amount of individual liberty. This form of political justice was achieved 
gradually. First Solon established the foundations for individual freedom(34). He abolished 
the enslavement of a debtor because he was not in a position to pay his debts. So in no 
way could a citizen become a slave any more. By other classes of reforms, he rendered the 
land owners free to bequeath land outside the genos in the absence of legitimate male 
issue, and greatly reduced the father's ancient power of life and death over his children. By 
the diminution of the power of the noble families, through these and other measures, Solon 
came very close to establishing liberty on equal terms for all. In his politeia, eunomie 
(good distribution of justice) is the resultant of two opposing tendencies: the one, the 
rational dike of the polls, as the radical principle of the reconstruction of the Athenian 
institutions; and the other, the suprarational moira of private wealth, as the restraining prin- 
ciple of his conservatism. Property is the absolute, god-given precondition of political jus- 
tice: he fixed political inequalities according to four income classes(35). 
About a century later, by Cleisthenes' reforms, political justice is emancipated from 
property, and isonomia (equality in front of the law) became a common possession. All 
citizens have the same rights. Everyone can enter the Assembly (Ecclesia) to speak and to 
vote. Every citizen can present himself as a candidate for the Council (Boule) and the other 
offices, or sit in the Helaea as judge with age the only qualification. Everyone by turn is 
compelled to obey and permitted to command(36). 
This special relationship between action and being together in the polls, that belongs 
to every individual, gave man "besides his private life, a sort of second life, his bios poli- 
tikos. Now every citizen belongs to two orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinc- 
tion in his life between what is his own (idion) and what is communal (koinon)" (37). 
However, the early translation of Aristotle's noon politikon by animal socialis, already 
found in Seneca, which became the standard translation in Western thought through 
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Thomas Aquinas, betrays that the original Greek understanding of politics had already been 
lost(38). Aristotle's intention was not simply to indicate the natural, merely social compan- 
ionship of the human species, because this is something human life shares with animal life 
and for this reason alone it could not be fundamentally human(39). 
In the polls, freedom was exclusively located in the political realm, from which 
everything merely necessary was strictly excluded. The mastering of the necessities of life 
which ruled over the household organization was a condition for political freedom but not 
an essential constituent of public life. The household organization was primarily a prepoliti- 
cal phenomenon, whose power was reduced by the rise of the city-state. In no case did 
politics exist as a means to protect society as in the Modem society of jobholders, for 
example. In Modem times, freedom is located in the realm of the social and in this sense it 
requires and justifies the restraint of political authority(40). What the Modems call 
"society" could be described as "the collective of families economically organized into the 
facsimile of one super-human family", and "its political form of organization is called 
nation"(41). 
In contrast to the notions of intimacy and intersubjectivity which designate modem 
man as individual, in Classical Greece political life existed for the sake of the individual. 
In the polls, dealing with the communal things, someone could distinguish himself from all 
others through unique deeds or words. Isonomia was the condition for this liberty. In the 
Athenian democracy of the fifth century, freedom and equality appear as the two principal 
forces which describe the relation of the individual to the community. The interplay aimed 
at a common agreement of equal citizens, stimulated by individual initiative on the ground 
of the stability provided by nomos, underlies the experience of progress in the political 
realm of the city-state. The freedom of the individual is the reciprocal power that mobilizes 
and modifies the communal will without being a compulsion originating externally to the 
political community. It is immanent in it, deducible from it, and manifested through politi- 
cal reasoning. Persuasion through speech is the main form of expression of individual 
liberty in the realm of polls. The Aristotelian definition of man as "a zoon logon ekhon", 
[an animal capable of speech (logos)] reflects the fact that man can exist as a man and so 
gain "the possibility of immortalizing"(42) only by taking part in political life. 
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1.4. POLITICAL ARETE AS THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE 
The polis was, in the eyes of its citizens, the only place where life was worth living. 
Politeuesthai literally meant "take part in political life"; besides that, it simply meant "to 
live"(43); for the two meanings were one and the same. It was compulsory for every 
citizen to take an active part in the public life of the polis. Legislative, judicial, and execu- 
tive power were under the control of the Assembly of the citizens(44). The due use of this 
power called for professional knowledge and opened the way to political philosophizing. 
In the early city-state however, obedience to the law, ethos, was a far more important 
qualification for an ordinary citizen than knowledge of the administration and the aims of 
the state; in the sense that politics had never been considered to be a principally intellectual 
problem(45). 
The distinction between what could and what could not be an object of knowledge 
originated in Ionia where in the sixth century Xenophanes declared that "no man has ever 
had, or ever will have, sure knowledge about the gods; even if he should have the chance 
to hit on the exact truth, he cannot know that he has done so, though we can all have our 
opinions"(46). Though the question of "personal" or "private" religions raised here seems 
to anticipate the Modem conception of individualism rather than the Classical one, the dis- 
tinction between what is knowable and what is not became a main issue in fifth century 
philosophical thought. 
In the early philosophers, as well as in Socrates and Plato, the question about the 
right way to live was never dissociated from the metaphysical question about being. Aristo- 
tle first, in his classification of sciences (epistemai) differentiated the question of being as 
such from all the other branches of knowledge: the question of being became the theme of 
the "first philosophy", and established the basic conceptual framework for all the other 
branches of theoretical knowledge(47). 
The assertion that political arete must be emancipated from tradition and constitute an 
object of knowledge was first raised by the Sophists in the fifth century(48). Protagoras in 
particular, the first professional educator of politics and citizenship, gave wide publicity to 
the view that "arete' (political excellency) is teachable". Protagoras believed that by criticis- 
ing the traditions, and modernizing the laws, the rising generation of Greek statesmen 
could acquire a new "art of living", higher than ever. The material and spiritual flowering 
of Athens at that time, culminating in the Periclean achievements, had cultivated the belief 
that progress was inevitable. The Sophists' attempt to teach political arete was a direct 
reflection of this situation. 
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-Plato, in the dialogue Protagoras, developing the moral theme of acquisition of vir- 
tue, arete, describes a philosophical debate between Socrates and Protagoras that took place 
in 432 B. C. "Good" means for both "pleasant for the individual", "not according to the 
operation of the actual pleasure of the moment, but'owing to the later results in disease and 
in other ills"(49), and is not distinguished from the "profitable" or the "useful"(50). They 
both agree, against the common opinion of their time, "that whoever learns what is good 
and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge 
(episteme) bids, and that intelligence (phronesis) is asufficient succour for mankind"(51). 
Socrates then proves that arete, is knowledge, so it is teachable, while Protagoras agrees 
with his reasoning.. 
Independently of where their purely logical argument led them however, each kept 
his Own reservations about the relation between arete and episteme: Protagoras believes 
that theta can be taught not by' an intellectual discipline but through habituation, "cultiva- 
tion in virtue" "from earliest childhood"(52). Socrates, in opposition to Protagoras, doubts 
whether arete can be taught at all, while he believes that arete (justice, temperance, and 
courage) is episteme. Most probably, this contradiction emerges from Socrates' belief that 
arete must be the outcome of a dynamic attitude of the human mind trying to comprehend 
man and nature; in this sense, the acquisition of arete depends rather upon one's own self 
than on teaching by others(53). 
In this dialogue, Socrates as well as Protagoras, dismisses the role of emotion in 
determining human behaviour. An immediate pleasure or pain can lead to false decisions, 
analogous with the errors of visual perspective. This view however has nothing to share 
with the opinion generally held by the common Athenian of that time. "Most people" says 
Socrates, think that knowledge "is no strong or guiding or governing thing; it is not 
regarded as anything of that kind, but people think'that, while a man often has knowledge 
in him, he is not governed by it, but by something else - now by passion, now by pleasure, 
now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear, their feeling about knowledge is just 
what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by any other force"(54). 
Plato in his last' work, Laws . (357/47), reconstructing the early city-state, proposes 
political and ethical reformations. Dealing with (political) arete, he revives the world of 
Protagoras by refusing to separate the pleasant from the' just(55). Political education is 
training in arete from childhood; "devoid of reason (nous) and justice (dike), it would term 
vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name "education" "(56). Reason (nous) is 
for Plato the supreme divinity, the ruler of the universe, and, law (nomos) the dispensation 
of reason. In the Platonic state therefore, political arete is not a special' branch of 
knowledge - as it was in Protagoras - but the metaphysical understanding of universal 
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questions. 
Born in the golden age of Athens and educated in a social circle of intellectuals, Plato 
adopted the belief that "virtue", arete, consisted essentially in a technique of rational liv- 
ing(57). The tragic fate to which imperial Athens was led however by the principle of 
rational self-interest after the Peloponnesial wars, as well as the Socratic flouting of that 
principle at the expense of death, compelled Plato to transform the meaning of his sys- 
tematic and argumentative way of thinking by giving a place to intuitive knowledge. 
Reason and justice conceived as common principles of the universe, the city-state and 
the human soul, reveal the attempt of Plato to redefine human existence in terms of a 
universal language. The breaking down of the self-sufficiency of the individual on the 
ground of knowledge (episteme), marked the end of the Classical age in Greece. Simul- 
taneously, the excesses of individualism destroyed democracy and the city-state. 
1.5. CONCLUSIONS 
To sum up what we have tried to show in this chapter, the polis can be described as 
an entity ordered by its own inherent law - political law. It was formed gradually, on the 
basis of tradition. The genesis of the polis is fundamentally related to the freedom of the 
individual. The notion of individual freedom, which can be traced back to Ionia in the 
eighth century, resulted in the search for "objectivity" in the political and natural world. 
Man tries to comprehend the order of nature and the human state in intelligible terms, 
deducible from their own inner properties. Justice based on equality is conceived as the 
order of the polls, with cosmological extensions through the work of the early Greek philo- 
sophers. A dialectical relation of equals was first applied to the relation of the universal 
bodies and elements by the philosophers, while in the human field, Solon through a causal 
way of thinking emancipates man as individual. 
The justice of the polis appears as a semi-human, semi-divine creation. As a whole it 
is sacred, with very little possibility of change. In fact, changes are common but in the 
form of provisional measures (decrees). The present is" conceived as a prolongation of the 
past rather than an anticipation of the future. Old and new laws, in force, side-by-side, 
were often contradictory but harmonized tolerably well in practice. Justice regulates the 
appropriate distribution of specific equalities and freedoms in a context which is slowly but 
continually changing. This context is the communal realm of the polls, the political realm. 
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Equality in the political realm is gained gradually, through a process of rationalization 
of the law. This equality among the constituents of the state formed the necessary ground 
for a dialectical process to operate. Individual freedom, coming in the political field from 
within, stimulates this process. Through this, polis is subject to change. Political philo- 
sophising has to become a common possession for providing the individual with the max- 
imum dynamic, self-controlled attitude - within the limits of its nature - in order to partici- 
pate through his best intelligible self in political decisions. This special way of governing 
the state was the highest standard for human life and coincided with the divine government 
of the universe. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE AS A SYMBOL OF THE SPIRIT 
OF THE POLIS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Man's attempt to comprehend the world and his own self on the basis of nature's 
inner properties, as it was first expressed in early Greek poetry and philosophy, marked the 
end of the dark transitional period from the prepolitical, monarchical social organization of 
Mycenean times to the political, democratically oriented organization of historical Greece. 
The genesis of the polls at that time, coincided approximately with the appearance of the 
Classical temple, as is evident mainly from archaeological research. 
In the architectural context of the polls, throughout the Classical period and at least 
until the Hellenistic and Roman age, the temple of the patron god appears to occupy the 
most prominent place. In the city of Athens, for instance, in the fifth century, the 
Parthenon - the temple of Athena - overlooked the whole city and dominated the agora, 
the place of political congregations of the citizens. Public buildings of a secular character 
were not yet much developed(1). Moreover, all forms of public life were in a very close 
association with the religious places: the agora was a sacred place and most of the reli- 
gious buildings were placed there; the theatre in most times belonged to a sanctuary of 
Dionysos, the gymnasia were attached to various shrines. Chapels and religious symbols 
were placed everywhere, on roads, in court-yards, in front of house-doors, in public places 
and on the orchestra of the theatres. In fact there was no clear line between religious and 
secular in Classical architecture(2). Precise demarcation of the sacred parts of the city was 
alien to the Classical conception of political and religious life as interrelated fields epitom- 
ized in the divinity of the polis itself. 
Every city was dedicated to a god. The temple of this god in almost all cases was 
built in the place in which the religious and administrative centre in the Bronze age had 
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been; the megaron of the Mycenaean palace is generally considered its architectural prede- 
cessor(3). This fact by no means indicates that the principal symbol of the old world was 
transformed to the symbol of the new one as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the 
latter, it rather expresses the unity and continuity between the two worlds. Moreover, there 
is no archaeological evidence that a Bronze age building was used to serve the cult from 
the eighth century onwards(4). The high respect given to the authority of tradition, and the 
still living religious feeling, are the main reasons for which the temple, obviously a reli- 
gious building, became the symbol of a politically oriented society. Otherwise it would 
appear more natural that the most prominent and sacred place of the Mycenean age should 
be occupied by the prytaneion, the House of the Premiers of the city. Actually, the old, 
principally religious, and the new, principally political, social order in Classical Greece, 
considered as absolutes, seem mutually exclusive. In the case of the polls however, their 
fusion and ultimate harmony proved possible. 
It is this ultimate, ideal harmony that the Classical temple manifests: the harmony 
between God and Reason, between intuitive and argumentative knowledge as they had 
been expressed in the justice and the political life of the city(5), find their resolution in the 
form of the temple. The main constituents of the cultural realm of the polis, like the two- 
fold conception of justice- as a semi-human, semi-divine creation; the dialectical relation 
between equal individuals in the political field of the polls; and the desire for a dynamic 
attitude of the human mind towards political philosophizing, were all manifested in the 
temple. 
This chapter deals with the way in which the cultural identity of the polis was mir- 
rored in the form of the temple. The process of evolution of the form of the temple is 
investigated through its religious and political levels of meaning as well as the interaction 
between them(6). This investigation provides the basis for a discussion of the dialectical 
interplay between the temple's essential autonomy and the freedom of the individual artist, 
in Classical times. A critical presentation of the major current approaches towards the 
problem of the genesis of the temple, will be given first. 
2.2. CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE COMING INTO BEING 
OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE AND THEIR CRITICISM 
The most widely accepted current approaches as far as the coming into being of the 
Classical temple is concerned, seem to be those adopted mainly by archaeologists, on an 
empirical ground. We will use the term "empirical" to indicate them in the discussion 
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which will follow. 
- Empirical approaches attempt to explain the genesis and evolution of the temple as a 
consequence . of changes 
in the practical aim which the temple serves, or of technical 
changes, like changes in the building material. They do not claim to be exhaustive and sys- 
tematic studies of the subject, but simple conjectures deducable from archaeological 
findings and, not in contradiction of the literary evidence. 
We will exemplify these approaches by a brief account of the writings of A. W. 
Lawrence on the birth of the Classical temple(7). According to Lawrence, on a technical 
level the earliest temples were much inferior to the Bronze age megaron. Their walls con- 
sisted of sun-dried brick raised upon a rubble base and strengthened with a timber frame; 
they were of the same construction as the megaron, but thinner. The most important diver- 
gence from Bronze age precedents was the addition of a verandah around the cella; no 
Bronze age building has been found completely surrounded in that manner. Only the court- 
yard of many palaces had been lined about with verandas. The surrounding verandah as 
Lawrence proposes, had a practical purpose: namely, to protect the mud walls from the 
rain. When in the seventh century the entire structural and ornamental system made of 
wood and mud, was translated into cut stone and roofing tiles, the Classical temple took 
birth. The surrounding wooden verandah was replaced by a stone colonade, although the 
. walls of the cella 
being of stone no longer needed a shelter. 
Stone-building techniques may have been adopted from Egypt, Lawrence continues, 
but a compelling reason for the use of stone was provided by the invention of roofing 
tiles(8),. which were much heavier than the modem ones. Another result of the use of 
roofing tiles was the rectangular plan, since a rectangular roof is most easily tiled. The 
gable created at the end constituted the pediment, which is probably an innovation of the 
stone temple. .- 
As far as the proportions and measurements of the columns and the other members of 
the temple are concerned (as Lawrence attempts to explain in a similar way), the stone 
temple in the beginning followed the measurements of its wooden predecessor, but soon it 
was realized that when building in stone, the greater weight and the lack of tensile strength 
demanded thicker proportions. When more experience had been gained, the proportions 
became more slender, with aesthetic improvements. After constant progress, marble came 
into use whenever financially possible and its capacity for sharp definition and polished 
surface was fully exploited by the architects of the late fifth century. 
Lawrence, thinking on an empirical basis, seems to ground his arguments on a deduc- 
tive method according to which protection from the rain always leads to the constriction of 
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a surrounding portico; a heavier roof to the replacement of mud walls by stone ones; grow- 
ing technical skill to specific aesthetic improvements. His underlying assumption is that the 
form of the temple and the way it evolves is principally the outcome of technical and prac- 
tical requirements and that these 'requirements have only one solution. Nevertheless, 
differences of form - such as as those between the Classical and the Byzantine Greek tem- 
ple for instance - could not be explained in this way, in isolation from their socio-cultural 
context. It is obvious that the empirical qualities most needed for observation in the field, 
such as the kind of wall probably required in order to support a certain roof, tend to have 
counter-balancing deficiencies when they are applied to more general theoretical issues, 
such as the coming into being of a particular artifact. 
The fragility of the arguments of this kind of approach has led some archaeologists to 
look for some historical dimensions beyond the merely empirical in order to conceive how 
the Classical temple was born. J. J. Coulton, for instance, stresses the fact that during the 
three centuries of the Dark age the monumental architecture of the Bronze age had been 
dead and the building techniques lost(9). He proposes that the monumental effect as well 
as the surrounding portico of the Classical temple are a Bronze age revival based on sur- 
viving ruins and on oral tradition. The portico especially, he says, might be the result of a 
"misinterpretation" of the Homeric descriptions of the courtyards of Mycenean palaces(10). 
Thus he originates Classical architecture in a romantic attitude of the eighth century Greeks 
towards a mighty past, and - more or less - upon a misinterpretation of that past. 
Misinterpretation of a heroic past or not, the form of the Classical temple remained 
almost unchanged from the eighth century down to the Hellenistic age. If we accept that 
every age in history is characterized by its dominant spirit, and the Classical temple is the 
material manifestation of the dominant spirit of the Classical age, anyone who attempts to 
explain the matter must take into account that any theoretical formulation about the identity 
of the temple raises a major issue concerning the identity of the whole period. The way in 
which the Classical age interpreted the past was, most probably, different from the way in 
which the past conceived its own self, due to the very reason that each age is characterized 
by its own modes of existence. Possibly the Classical temple was an interpretation of the 
past as it was viewed at the dawning of the new age; but this in no case indicates a mor- 
phological misinterpretation or false copying of modes of the past as Coulton suggests. 
The archaeologists, through a narrow perspective based upon technical and practical 
developments, describe the formation of the Classical temple as the most natural and self- 
evident thing that could have happened with given materials, climatic conditions and techn- 
ical skills. Even Coulton's attempt to introduce a historical dimension proves limited 
within the empirical orientation of the archaeologists. 
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The inadequacy of any of these approaches to deal with the form of the temple has 
been viewed here as a result of two factors: first, a refusal to consider architecture in terms 
of its cultural and political milieu; and second, a failure to interpret the Classical temple 
with regard to the autonomy of architecture as an independent and distinct cultural entity. 
The approach adopted in this thesis is to consider Classical architecture as an organic 
part of certain cultural processes within Classical society. Religion, philosophy, law and 
politics as well as the way they interrelate and evolve, will constitute the frame within 
which the formation of the temple will be investigated. Thus the spirit of the Classical age, 
its Zeitgeist, will be explored in its multiple aspects, with the central issue an enquiry into 
its embodiment in architecture. 
The unique way in which these cultural processes interacted with each other to give 
birth to the Classical temple, define the autonomy of the temple in relation to them. This 
autonomy is the very essence of the temple. Furthermore, each Classical temple is ,a 
separate, distinct interpretation of its eidos by an individual artist carrier of cultural values 
in the realm of the polis. Every new temple will here be considered to constitute a 
transformation into the structure of its eidos; in the sense that with every new temple the 
eidos becomes suddenly and as a whole something else which is also lasting and true. This 
interplay between the eidos of the temple and the artist, in which the artist participates as a 
representative of the social state each time, indicates the absolute autonomy of the notion 
of eidos in the Classical temple. The approach to the form of the Classical temple proposed 
through this thesis, is built up in relation to this hypothesis. 
2.3. IDEA OR EIDOS AS THE ORIGIN AND THE BEING OF THE CLASSICAL 
TEMPLE 
2.3.1. THE METAPHYSICAL CHARACTER OF THE NOTION OF ORIGIN IN 
CLASSICAL TIMES AND OUR SHIFT 'TO THE QUESTION OF MEANING 
Setting out to approach the spirit of the Classical age as it is embodied in the temple, 
we are first confronted with the question of the origin of the temple. We shall start our 
investigation with an enquiry into the origin of art in Classical times. For the Classical 
age, as we are going to argue here, the role of art as the procedure that brings the work 
into being is minor in contrast with the emphasis it has been given in Modem times, with 
their focus on the role of the artist. What matters in a Classical work of art is the two ends 
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of the artistic production: the essence of the particular work as its origin, and the outcome, 
the work as such. The eternal character of Classical culture is as significant in its art and 
philosophy as is the scientific conception of time as the fourth dimension for Modernity. 
We shall try to illustrate briefly this distinction. It is extensively discussed in Part 
Two of this thesis, by a reference to the Modem attitude, through the way Heidegger treats 
the problem of the origin of the work of art. The word origin is used by Heidegger in the 
sense that: "Origin is the source of the nature in which the being of an entity is present"; 
or, elsewhere: 'To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out 
of the source of its nature in a founding leap - this is what the word origin means"(11). 
Exploring the origin of the work of art in an essay with the same title, he points out that 
the origin of a work of art, the source of its essence, is the essence of art itself, is art. For 
Heidegger, art is by nature an origin of the establishment of truth, truth taken in the sense 
of the revelation of the being of what is. So art is "a distinctive way in which truth comes 
into being, that is becomes historical"(12). The revelation of truth according to Heidegger 
is achieved through the strife (Riss) between artist and work, or content and material of a 
concrete work of art. In this way, the ontological level although departing from a meta- 
physical standpoint, is gradually moving closer to empirical reality. 
Adopting the conception of truth as historical and thus strictly interrelated with a par- 
ticular culture, we will proceed to the investigation of the way in which the problem of the 
origin of the work of art has been treated throughout the Classical age. We assume that the 
ontology of art throughout the Classical period is, in a general sense, as it was conceived 
by Plato and Aristotle. Interconnected with the question about knowledge of the true nature 
of things, it became a main theme in the philosophical thinking of Plato and Aristotle. 
Plato and Aristotle both agree that man cannot have knowledge of particular things, 
unless they "contain" - for Aristotle - or "exist in virtue of their relation to" - for Plato - 
something universal, some one and unchangeable entity(13). The words idea and eidos 
have been used indifferently by Plato and later by Aristotle in order to denote such enti- 
ties(14), which constitute the causes both of existence and of generation of the particular 
things(15). 
Plato conceived of the ideas as eternally existing in the realm of invariable generali- 
ties beyond the sensible things. They are the objective principles of the cosmic nature. 
Beauty, Truth and Goodness, ultimately fused into One - Goodness - constitute the meta- 
physical Platonic reality; Beauty is a moral rather than an aesthetic virtue. The relation of 
this reality to the sensible world appears in Plato's works in two ways, which, however, 
contradict each other. 
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In the Cratylus, the Republic and the Laws, the sensible world, and art in particular, 
are related in an antithetical sense to the world of ideas through mimesis (imitation). 
Everything sensible is a mirror image of an idea, a mimema; and while the one is relative 
and perishable, the other is absolute, everlasting and true. 
In other works, for instance in Ion, Phaedrus and Symposium, the relation between 
the actual and ideal world appears as a synthesis which takes place on the transcendent 
plane of the ideas. In the Symposium, man partakes of the idea of Beauty and of God 
through eros, and desires full knowledge of it, achieved through an ultimate fusion, 
mathexis (participation). And as Aristotle states in the Metaphysics, Plato held that all sen- 
sible things exist by participation (kata methexin) in the ideas (6). The revelation of the 
Idea through participation, is the outcome of a strife of reason. 
In the case either of imitation or of participation, the Platonic idea maintains a tran- 
scendent standpoint, in the sense that the true being of things is something outside and 
beyond the sensible world. There are some instances in the Symposium though, at which 
this qualitative distance seems well bridged on a very human level; man partakes of the 
Idea by virtue of the perpetual process of change he is undergoing: 
Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute 
unity: a man is called the same, and yet ..., 
he is undergoing a perpetual process 
of loss and reparation ... Which is true not only of the body, but also of the 
soul ...; and equally true for knowledge ... 
And in this way, Socrates, the mortal 
body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality(17); 
The character of knowledge as a perpetual process is basic in Plato's investigation of 
truth throughout his work and interrelated with the fact that he finally never arrives at 
definitions, although this is what he seems to aim at. It seems that the Idea is an origina- 
tive source that stimulates a constant "feast of thought"(18) rather than an end to be 
gained. 
In the philosophical thought of Aristotle however, quite the opposite happens. He 
accuses Plato that by indulging in "empty phrases and poetic metaphors"(19), he indeed 
says nothing about what individual things really are, what constitutes their substantiality, 
and declares: "The process of evolution is for the sake of the thing finally evolved, and not 
this for the sake of the process"(20). The notion of enteleheia underlies this concept: every 
individual thing carries its principles within itself, within its substance. The principle of 
form - idea or eidos is absolute and eternal, and it generates each particular in a way simi- 
lar to that in which the seed produces natural formations: 
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(... ) all- artificial things are generated either from something which bears the 
same name as themselves [e. g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is gen- 
erated by mind; for the art is the form (eidos)], or from something which con- 
tains some part; that is if the generation is not accidental; for the direct and 
independent cause of the production is a part of the product. (... ) And it is the 
same with natural formations as it is with the products of art. For the seed pro- 
duces just as do those things which function by art. It contains the form (eidos) 
potentially, and that from which the seed comes has in some sense the same 
name as the product ... (21). 
. Eidos or essence carried 
from one individual to another of the same species through 
reproduction, is not generated. What is generated is the substance, the individual concrete 
whole that is called after its eidos (22). The role of the mind of the artist in the generation 
will be explored in part 2.3.3. of this chapter. The combination of eidos with matter, or 
of actual form with potential form, results in the substance, the particular thing(23). Nei- 
ther form, nor matter as conceived by Aristotle exists in the corporeal world alone; both 
derive from the sphere of inner perception(14). Moreover matter does not exist at any 
stage _ of a generation as entirely undifferentiated; through successive stages of 
differentiation, to each of which there is a corresponding form, the final, individual sub- 
stance emerges. 
Idea or eldos, whether in Plato's or Aristotle's sense, taken as the origin and the 
essence of the temple, constitute metaphysical boundaries, absolute pre-suppositions in any 
discussion of the problem of origin; for, as Aristotle poses it, they indicate "the ultimate 
subject, which cannot be further predicated of something else"(25). The absolute autonomy 
of the notion of idea or eidos from man and the sensible world consists in its universal and 
immutable character. 
Nevertheless, as Aristotle suggests, this autonomous existence is approachable by us 
only through its corporeal expressions. And to go even further, the idea or eidos of the 
temple being interdependent with its actual manifestations, is essencially historical: it 
appears within a particular culture at a particular time. Thus it must be grasped within its 
own historicity(26). 
The Classical temple originates in myth and has been introduced into the corporeal 
world by the gods.. The very autonomy of its essence lies in the fact that however much it 
is changed through its particular sensible manifestations it remains itself. Despite the abso- 
lute character of its essence nevertheless, this essence, the idea or eidos, could only be 
grasped through the meaning of the particular temples as a fusion of their past and present 
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within their historical context, as a fusion of religious tradition and political life within the 
city-state. 
The discussion about meaning presupposes the corporeal existence of the particular 
work. As such, the function of interpretation is always posterior to the generic func- 
tion(27). Yet, this meaning is bound to be relative to our contemporary world view as it is 
represented by the author of this thesis, inevitably as a contemporary interpreter. Other- 
wise, the question about meaning would be senseless. The relativity of our knowledge, 
rather than making the notion of truth irrelevant, guarantees - as Gadamer argues departing 
from Heidegger - the truth of the interpretation(28). The truth as it is understood here is 
approachable not through scientific method but through phenomenological understand- 
ing(29), conceived as historically conditioned and thus objective and true(30). The dialec- 
tic between the "prejudices" of the interpreter due to his own historicity and the "openness" 
of the subject-matter in the sense of allowing it to speak for itself, allows distorting preju- 
dices to be discovered and objectivity to be arrived at(31). 
In the next three parts of this enquiry, the relation of the idea or eidos to the particu- 
lar work, the artist and the social milieu will be explored, and illuminated by reference to 
contemporary to the temple theory. Thus a descriptive approach to the intrinsic features of 
the idea or eidos will be taken. Moreover, this approach will be limited to the relation of 
the idea or eidos to the individual works, the artist and the social milieu, since the risk of 
falling into arbitrary aesthetic abstractions is always there due to the metaphysical nature of 
the problem. Taking this investigation as a guiding conceptual framework, we will proceed 
to the meaning of the idea or eidos (genus) of the Classical temple with reference to the 
religious and political dimensions of the polls. The unity of the aesthetic with the religious 
and political dimensions of the temple is considered as given ipso facto, as will become 
clear from our discussion of the role of the artist and the society in artistic creation in the 
Classical era (in parts 2.3.3. and 2.3.4. of this chapter). 
2.3.2. RELATION OF THE PARTICULAR TEMPLES TO THE IDEA OR EIDOS 
2.3.2.1. RELATION OF THE PARTICULARS TO THE IDEA OR EIDOS: 
A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
The relation of the particular to the universal taken as "imitation" in the Platonic 
sense, indicates a development of the particular towards its idea. As far as the idea, the 
absolute and immutable essence of any particular within a species, exists apart from its 
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particulars, it is not affected by this development. Thus, the particulars of the temple, for 
instance, can change, while their essence remains itself and separate. This change is an 
upward process, a perpetual approach to the idea. It seems, however, that a counter- 
process, away from the idea is also implied in the Platonic conception of imitation. 
On the other hand, the Platonic concept of "participation" of sensible things in the 
Idea is based upon the assumption that some kind of participation in the Idea exists from 
the beginning and motivates a desire for full participation(32). In this case, an evolution of 
the particulars towards full communion with the Idea occurs; the Idea remains itself, but it 
can - partially though and incompletely - be identified within its particulars. The degree of 
participation varies from one particular to another. So we could say that a particular temple 
has a being in itself, in virtue of its participation in the One, the divine being, the idea; 
yet, it evolves towards full participation. 
Aristotle, declaring that he cannot see any difference between "imitation" and "parti- 
cipation"(33) - as far as in both cases the idea remains on a transcendent plane -, proceeds 
to the restoration of the particular as an ipso facto carrier of the eidos. Eidos is identified 
with essence: "By eldos I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance"(34). 
As with the Platonic idea, Aristotle's eidos maintains an absolute, unchangeable 
nature. But it is closer to the sensible world, in the sense that it does not exist apart from 
its particulars. That which causes the individual differences between particulars is not 
change within the eidos, but the potentiality for endless corporeal manifestations inherent in 
it. No kind of evolution is indicated by Aristotle's conception of the relation between par- 
ticulars within an eidos; at least no more , 
than that suggested by reproduction through 
seeds, if any. He is finally obliged by the sensible reality however, to admit stages of 
development towards a final eidos; each stage of this process is characterized by its own 
eidos (35). The continuity of the processes is maintained by an eternal and immutable 
cause, the Prime Mover(36). This multitude of Bide with no clearly discerned boundaries 
between them (as we shall see in detail with the case of the temple(37)), seems to us to be 
a weak point in Aristotle's theory, in contrast to Plato who overcomes it through the con- 
ception of the idea as a transcedental entity. Applying Aristotle's conception to the temple 
however, we can generally say that each temple carries its eidos, its being within itself. 
This eidos is the same in all temples of the same stage of evolution; every variation 
between particular temples is potentially inherent in their eldos. 
The finite nature of the particulars caused their principles, the ideas, to be connected 
with numbers. Plato's and Aristotle's arguments about the relation of ideas to numbers ori- 
ginate in the Pythagorean principle of Unity and the Dyad, or Limit and Unlimited. The 
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all-embracing principle of Unity must be limited in order to be reproduced in the individual 
nature. This is why the Pythagorean principle of goodness and order was identified with 
Limit, as contrasted with the principle of disorder, the Unlimited. Order consisted in "har- 
monic" numerical ratios defining the analogy between whole and parts. So every particular 
thing derives from the action of Limit upon the 'Unlimited, which produces a harmony' 
essentially numerical. In this sense the Pythagorean numbers are the primary reality and 
things themselves are numbers(38). 
The identification of measure and proportion with the essence of things, or with 
beauty and truth, or with the Idea of the Good, is basic to the Platonic conception of the 
ideas and their relation to the sensible world: "... for measure and proportion are every- 
where identified with beauty and virtue ... Then 
if we cannot catch the good with the aid of 
one idea, let us run it down to three - beauty, proportion, truth"(39). We can assume then 
that measure in the temple is related directly to its essence in the sense of imitation: it imi- 
tates beauty and truth. Moreover, for Plato the art of measurement is universal and has to 
do with all things. The artist has first to see the unity of all things and then go on with the 
differences, which make distinct classes. The art of measurement consists of two parts: 
numerical measure (number, length, depth ... ) and moral measure 
(the mean, (... ) and the 
due, and, in short, a mean or standard removed from the extremes)(40). 
Aristotle says that Plato distinguishes between "causative numbers" which are intelli- 
gible and cause being and generation, and "sensible numbers" which exist in the corporeal 
world(41). It is obvious that, due to the transcendent character of the ideas, "causative 
numbers" cannot exist as such in the corporeal world; only sensible imitations of them, as 
imitations of the ideas they are identified with. In this sense a multiplicity of sensible 
things can be produced by the same causative numbers(42). 
Plato had conceived of mathematical numbers in a different sense as well; he 
assumed them to exist intermediately between ideas and sensible things(43). ý Aristotle sug- 
gests that this is abstract, although he admits the existence of mathematical numbers as 
potentially separable from sensible things(44). 
Aristotle, dealing with the limited nature of individual things, adopts the Pythagorean 
concept that mathematical ratios determine goodness and beauty: 
And since goodness is distinct from beauty (for it is always in, actions that 
goodness is present, whereas beauty is also in immovable things), they are in 
error who assert that the mathematical sciences tell us nothing about beauty or 
goodness; for they describe and manifest these qualities in the highest degree 
(... ) The main species of beauty are orderly arrangement, proportion, and 
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definiteness(45). 
However, although mathematics in Aristotle is an intrinsic property of beauty, beauty 
is not identified with the notion of eidos as it is in Plato, but related to it through the doc- 
trine of suitability. Substances that are carriers of the same eidos can be beautiful'or not, 
according to whether their proportions, qualitatively conceived, are suitable to this eidos or 
not. By eidos Aristotle understood conceptual forms rather than arrangement of parts, while 
by proportion he meant mathematical relations not beautiful by themselves - as the 
Pythagoreans did - but beautiful because they accord with the eidos they referred to. For 
example, the foot in heroic poetry is the most calm and majestic of all feet, in order to best 
express the nature of this kind of poetry(46). Moreover, "definiteness" which constitutes 
one of "the main species of beauty", is interconnected with the properties of perception of 
the human mind; only objects easily perceptible can please the senses and the mind. Per- 
ceptibility is posed as a condition of unity between the spectator and the work of art(47). 
Nevertheless, it ultimately remains "the limit that derives from the nature of a thing"(48). 
The optical illusions in the temple, far from deceiving the spectator, express this unity, 
given the fact that man and the work belong to different eide. In Plato the unity also 
exists, but only on the level of the idea in the form of participation. 
Summarizing what Plato and Aristotle held about the relation of numbers or 
mathematical proportions to the ideas and the particulars, we could say that numbers or 
proportions are by both connected with the essence of things, the ideas or eide, and 
imposed on matter as a principle of separation; they both agree that "causative" numbers 
do not exist as such in the corporeal world, but only in the form of "sensible" numbers. 
But while Plato assumes that measure and proportion are absolute and universal, Aristotle 
asserts that they are absolute within the limits of each eidos, and sees human perception as 
a means of communication between the spectator and the work of art. Nevertheless, as we 
are going to see next, these two contradictory views appear to have been well combined in 
practice. 
2.3.2.2. AN ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
Although the Classical temple remained fundamentally unchanged from the early 
sixth century till the hellenistic period(38), it underwent a constant change in the form of 
its parts and their relations as well as in the construction techniques and materials used. 
The character of this change can be seen as two-fold: first, a diachronic change, an 
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evolution of the morphological characteristics of the particular temples through time; and, 
second, differencies between temples which, although they were built at about the same 
time, vary in details and relation of parts. Major differences could also occur between tem- 
ples built in different places, as in the mainland, Ionia or Southern Italy. 
The Platonic theory of .a perpetual 
development of the sensible forms towards the 
idea and their generation through imitation, as much as Aristotle's conception of eidos as 
never existing apart-from its particulars which are reproduced in a way similar to the repro- 
duction by seeds, both apply in the case of the temple. In an attempt to explore their rela- 
tion to the essence, the idea or eidos, within their historical context, a descriptive analysis 
of the evolution and modifications of the formal features of the temple will be given first. 
This evolution will be approached on three scales: through a comparative description of 
some temples chosen as representative, through a description of the stages that underlie 
some of these temples, and through a comparative examination of parts. 
The plan of the first temples traced back to the early eighth century as far as the 
archaeological evidence permits us to know, was of an oblong hall with the entrance on the 
narrow side, with a row of wooden posts in the axis. The most important feature of the 
temple, was the row of wooden posts that surrounded it. The first Heraion at Samos seems 
to be such a case(50)(Pl. I, a). This temple, built early in the seventh century, was replaced 
by another on the same site(Pl. I, b). The, new cella was the same length but a foot wider, 
and the pteron nearly twice the width of its predecessor. In the new temple, the overall 
ratio of length to width was about 35: 1(51). 
Temples that have preserved more evidence of their outward appearance and which 
could be characterized as Doric, belong to seventh century mainland Greece. The temple of 
Apollo at Thermon is an, example(Pl. I, c)., It consisted of a long hall with a row of 
columns on the axis, with a false porch at its rear facade that creates a symmetrical effect 
with the front facade, and a perimetrical colonade. The columns were probably wooden 
with a, lower diameter about 64cm which can hardly be justified by their structural func- 
tion(52). They stood on separate stone blocks. The stylobate, the continious platform 
below the whole building, had not yet developed. The length of the temple was 3.25 times 
its width. In a later reconstruction, the columns were replaced by stone ones(53). The early 
columns probably supported wooden beams, while above them ran a painted frieze and a 
cornice, made of terracotta. The tiled roof was elaborately decorated. As the evidence sug- 
gests, the Doric order seems to appear from the beginning in an almost complete form; in 
no way was it the result of a slow development(54). 
The temple of Hera at Olympia built about c. 590 B. C. in old-fashioned 
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materials(55), was considerably bigger than anything that existed before(Pl. I, d). The gen- 
eral proportions of the plan were still very long compared to the later temples, with a 
length to width relation about 2.66: 1 (56). It consisted of a long hall with two rows of 
columns along it instead of one, a false rear porch and a wooden surrounding colonade 
standing on a platform. Reduction of the intercolumnation spacing at the angles, suggests 
that angle contraction was already in use on mainland Greece from the early sixth century. 
This also suggests a Doric frieze which is all lost, but probably made of mud brick(57). 
Progressively in the following years, destroyed wooden columns were replaced by lime- 
stone ones, according to the changing proportions of column; as a result, two neighbouring 
columns could vary in diameter from lm to 1.28m for an axial span of about 3.56m or 
3.26m(58). The different stages in the evolution of the Doric column at the Heraion of 
Olympia could be considered in a diachronic sense as imitations of the same idea or 
representatives of different Bide, successive steps in the process towards a final eidos. The 
fact that they, nevertheless, co-operate in the formation of the same temple, suggests a syn- 
chronic existence as variations within the same eidos. It becomes obvious then, that it is 
difficult to speak about synchronicity or diachronicity in the temple as a matter of either/or, 
for the one easily turns into the other and thus manifests the essentially timeless nature of 
the eidos (genus) of the Classical temple within its spatio-temporal milieu. 
One of the first temples with a stone colonade around the cella is the temple of 
Athena Pronea at Delphi, dated to the seventh century(59). The slender proportions of the 
limestone columns - their total height is 6.5 times their lower diameter - are probably a 
bequest of their wooden predecessors. Remains of twelve columns that alone have sur- 
vived, are insufficient to permit a reconstruction of its plan. 
The temple of Artemis at Kerkyra, contemporary with the temple of Hera at Olympia, 
illustrates the final stage of major changes in the evolution of the Doric temple(Pl. I, e). 
The difference between this and later Doric temples consists almost entirely in variations of 
the proportions between parts. This temple, much bigger than the Heraion at Olympia and 
with wider proportions - its length a little more than double its width - was built entirely of 
stone(60). The pediment and walls have almost totally been destroyed, but what has sur- 
vived shows the existence of fluted columns carrying Doric capitals of the normal early 
type with some particularities at the hypotrachelium, an architrave, a frieze of grooved tri- 
glyphs and plain metopes, and a projecting cornice with plank-like mutules and pegs. The 
columns, characteristically of the sixth century form, were much heavier than those of 
Pronaea, with a relation of height to lower width 4.2: 1 (61). The relief sculpture of the 
west pediment which has survived, belongs to the earliest examples(62). Representing a 
fiercely glaring gorgon flanked by two panthers and her two children, it frightens off any 
evil approaching the temple. 
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In the mid-sixth century, the Ionic temple makes its appearance as a variation to the 
Doric(Pl. II, A, a). The archaic temple of Artemis at Ephesus with two series of columns 
around the cella, is among the first Ionic temples. Though not the largest in Ionia, the tem- 
ple was considerably bigger than anything ever built on the mainland. Its stylobate meas- 
ured about 51.8mxll2m (1: 2), and the columns were 1.8m in diameter and almost 17.7m 
in height (1: 10) (63). The front facade of the temple was octastyle, while the rear was 
enneastyle. On each flank were twenty-one columns with spacing increased towards the 
comers. As a result, a feeling of weakness at the corners was created, in contrast with the 
strength of the Doric angle contraction(64). The columns had Ionic capitals and the charac- 
teristic Asiatic Ionic base consisting of a large torus elevated on a horizontally fluted disc. 
Similar to this temple are the phases III and IV of the Heraion at Samos and the temple of 
Apollo at Didyma. 
The Doric temple of Aphaea at Aegina in the late sixth century marks the transition 
from the Archaic to the Classical era(Pl. 1, f). It provides the earliest instances of enlarged 
comer columns and ` tilted columns(65). The stylobate had wide proportions, 
13.77mx28.82m, 1: 2, and the columns were quite slender for Doric, 1: 5.2, a characteristic 
of the Classical era as distinct from the heavy ones of the Archaic period. Fairly well 
preserved, it was built in the local limestone coated with a thin layer of stucco and richly 
painted. The pediment sculptures, elaborately carved of Parian marble, represent two com- 
bats from the Trojan war as described in the Iliad. A sloping ramp formed the approach to 
the stylobate(66). This temple shows one of the rare efforts to execute a plan with simple 
dimensions: its columns are 3 Doric feet in diameter with those on the corners slightly 
thicker, the axial spacing of the columns is 8 Doric feet on the fronts and slightly less on 
the flanks, with a stylobate width 42.5 Doric feet; the height of the columns is twice their 
axial spacing(67). Aphaea has two earlier phases; the first, underlying the temple, consists 
of a hairpin plan dated in the eighth century; the second, with large columns and wide 
spreading capitals, fragments of which have survived, belongs to the early sixth cen- 
tury(68). 
The Heraeum at Olympia was the place of worship of Zeus and Hera together until 
the c. 460 or 456 B. C., when a new temple for Zeus alone was completed(Pl. I, g). Hex- 
astyle with thirteen flank columns and a stylobate size 27.7mx62.28m, 1: 2.25, the temple 
of Zeus was one of the largest temples erected in the mainland. It was built in the shelly 
limestone of the district, covered with a thin layer of white stucco and painted; the pedi- 
ment sculptures, the metopes of the inner porches, and the simas and roof tiles were of 
Parian marble, while the acroteria were of bronze. The access to the stylobate was provided 
as in Aphaea by a sloping ramp. The aim towards the simple proportions shown in 
Aphaea, is clearer with this temple. The name of its architect has survived, it was Libon of 
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Helis. He keeps the Archaic variation between front and flank only in the column diame- 
ters, and makes the angle columns not especially enlarged. But the axial spacing is uniform 
on all sides and equivalent to 16 Doric feet. The height of the columns, 32 Doric feet, was 
twice the axial spacing, and the abacus width a quarter of the column height. The triglyphs 
were spaced 8 Doric feet on centres, the mutules 4 Doric feet, and the tiles 2 Doric 
feet(69). The height of the columns was approximately 4.5 times their lower diameter. 
Mythological themes were elaborately represented on the metopes and the pediment. 
The Parthenon, dedicated to Athena the patron goddess of Athens, was built in c. 
447-438 B. C. and became the symbol of the golden age of the city(Pl. I, h). The substruc- 
ture of an incomplete temple of Athena burnt down by the Persians in c. 480 B. C., pro- 
vided part of the 30.9mx69Sm, 1: 2.25, stylobate that accommodated the Parthenon. The 
architects of the new temple were Ictinus and Callicrates, and the sculptor, Pheidias. Mar- 
ble column-drums from the burnt temple were re-used for the columns of the peristyle, 
probably affecting the whole size of the temple(70). The columns were nearly 5.5 times 
their lower diameter in height, with the angle ones a little larger. They all diminish at the 
top of the shaft to a little more than three quarters the lower diameter(71). The ratio of 
intercolumnation to diameter was 9: 4. There were no differentiations between the front 
and the flank columns, except of the comer ones which were enlarged. The same ratio 
was applied to the width and length of the building. The overall height of the building 
equalled 3.2 intercolumnations and was in the same ratio of 4: 9 to its width(72). 
The whole temple was of Pentelic marble, distinguished by extremely delicate work- 
manship and liveliness of surface. The interior was divided into two chambers. The eastern 
had Doric colonnades on three sides, in two tiers separated by an architrave and supporting 
the roof timbers. The chryselephantine statue of Athena fully armed and with a winged 
Victory in her right hand, one of Peidias' best works, stood in the axis, near the western 
end. This chamber was known as Hecatompedon, named after the Archaic temple that had 
stood upon the site. The western chamber was the Parthenon, or Virgin's chamber, from 
which the temple took its name. With the roof being supported by four Ionic columns, the 
use of more than one order at the same temple was introduced. The slender proportions of 
the whole building suggests the influence of an Ionic element upon this essentially Doric 
building(73). The metopes, the frieze of the cella and the pediments are extremely elaborate 
works of Pheidias and his school representing mythological themes related to Athena. 
A temple at Bassae in Arcadia, dedicated to Apollo Epicurius, was also made by 
Ictinus, almost in parallel with the Parthenon (c. 450-425 B. C. ) (74)(PL. 1, f). With a 
stylobate measuring 14.48mx38.24m, or 1: 2 2/3, the temple was quite long compared to 
others of its age. The height of the columns was 2 2/3 times their width, similar to those of 
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the Parthenon, but that was the only common characteristic of two almost contemporary 
temples conceived by the same architect The most remarkable feature of this temple is the 
use of all three Greek orders, the Doric outside and the Ionic and Corinthian inside. The 
'collaboration of different orders in the same temple, an innovation probably introduced by 
Ictinus, introduced a harmonic polyphony that very easily turned into an anxious plurality 
in the following Hellenistic age. Chosen here to represent the end of the Classical period, 
the temple of Apollo at Bassae is very similar in size and relation of parts and materials 
used to the temple of Aphaea at Aegina, that was built at the beginning of the Classical 
period. A line closed within itself, a completed circle, self-sufficient, and unique in its own 
historicity. 
Our approach to the evolution of the Classical temple will be further elucidated by a 
closer study of the evolution of some of its elements, particularly the Doric capital and the 
Ionic base. 
The Doric capital, and more precisely the proportions of its constituent parts and the 
curved profile of its echinus, are characterized by a more or less steady and continuous 
evolution(M. 2-3). The early capitals, which date roughly from the late seventh and early 
sixth centuries, spread widely with a round cushion-like echinus. The late ones are cone- 
like and spread considerably less. The relation in height between abacus and echinus 
increases constantly in favour of the abacus(75). Generally speaking, no two Doric temples 
have precisely similar capitals, and, in the Archaic period at least, not even the same tem- 
ple; precise uniformity seems of not overriding importance(Ills 2-4,5). Thus it is not easy 
to distinguish between accidental variations and intentional changes. Major changes charac- 
terize different places at different times and they are not adopted universally or immedi- 
ately. We can say however that the form of the capital, on its way from the Archaic 
through the Classical age, becomes progressively more geometrical and simultaneously less 
important as an individual element of the temple. 
The Ionic base is probably the most striking example of a multiplicity of variant 
forms, more or less restricted by place and time(Ills 2-7,8). In contrast to the Doric 
column that stood directly on the stylobate, Ionic columns stood on elaborately profiled 
bases, since the first instances of their appearance in Asia Minor in the early sixth cen- 
tury(76). 
The Ionic base usually consisted of a convex element, the torus, standing upon a disc 
which tended to become increasingly concave and more deeply worked(Ills 2-8.1-8). This 
type of base with the addition of a plinth underneath, used in the great Ionian Archaic tem- 
ples, remained the established form in Asia Minor until the Roman age. In fifth century 
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Athens, several variants of the Ionic base were developed. The addition of a second convex 
element below the strongly concave disc, seems to have been a widely adopted 
innovation(Ills 2-8.14,15,17-22); a variation to this, introduced by Ictinus at the temple of 
Apollo at Bassae, had a further addition of a second concave element below the convex 
one(llls 2-8.16,23,24). In parallel to the evolution of the Doric capital that became increas- 
ingly less pronounced and more austere, confined within a narrow spectrum of variations, 
the Ionic base became more elaborate, and complex, characterized by major differences 
according to place and time. 
With the possible exception of the Ionic base, though the proportions of the temple 
were transformed in the course of time, the form of its parts remained basically the same. 
As it has become clear from our description of its evolution, measure and proportion in 
the Classical temple were not something strictly fixed and unchangeable. In fact, no two 
temples are the same, and this certainly cannot be justified by lack of technical precision. 
The difference in proportions is even more difficult to justify, in this way. A combination 
of both Plato's evolution towards the idea as well as Aristotle's variations within an eidos, 
seems to be the only way to approach the changes in the form of the Classical temple in its 
own terms, as they emerge through this particular investigation. 
2.3.2.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
AS A MANIFESTATION OF ITS RELATION TO 
THE IDEA OR EIDOS 
In the course of time the materials of the temple changed from wood and clay which 
lack durability but are easily worked, to limestone and marble and finally entirely to marble 
in order to make the temple live for ever. The demand for technical precision followed 
this evolution. From the first stone temples in the early fifth century until the end of the 
Classical period in the late fourth century, we can say generally that as the size of the tem- 
ple increased, its proportions become lighter and more uniform. Variations between tem- 
ples always exist, with some extreme cases, such as the temple of Zeus at Akragas(Pls I, 
III; II, C, c). But the change in the mathematical relations of its form, seems to be the most 
characteristic factor in the evolution of the temple. 
I In contrast to the eternal and universal nature of the essence, particular temples are 
limited in space_ and time. The finiteness of their nature as a principle of existence in the 
corporeal world is due to mathematical relations. As we have discussed in 2.3.2.1. these 
relations are related by Greek philosophy, and Plato and Aristotle in particular, to the 
essence of things. Thus, measure and proportion in the Classical temple is a manifestation 
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of eternal beauty and truth as they are conceived within its spatio-temporal context. On this 
ground, variations are totally justified: either because mathematical relations in the temple 
cannot be but imitations of the "causative numbers" that participate in the idea (Plato), or 
because the potentiality for variations is inherent in the eidos temple as such (Aristotle). 
Thus, for any actual temple, built by and for a society whose conditions are necessarily 
contingent, variations in the form of the temple constitute the only way its essence as an 
eternal and immutable entity can manifest itself. In the same spirit, the evolution of the 
temple follows a perpetual process, either towards a closer approach to the idea and in this 
sense to a constantly higher level, or moved by the Prime Mover without any particular 
grade-defined direction; or a counter-process of decadence as it is argued in section 2.3.5. 
2. of this chapter. 
2.3.3. THE COMING INTO BEING OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
IN RELATION TO THE ARCHITECT 
2.3.3.1. A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF 
THE ARTIST IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE WORK OF ART 
IN THE CLASSICAL ERA 
In order to investigate the coming into being of the work of art in Classical Greece, 
we should try to give the meaning of the term "art", techne, first. Techne was generally 
used to signify skilled production, and was not confined to the fine arts(77). Plato in the 
Ion, speaking about poetry and art in general, says that it is based on techne and inspira- 
tion(78); techne signifies knowledge of the rules of art and is learnable, while inspiration is 
the outcome of divine possession and moving and the cause of invention. Inspiration, 
viewed from the standpoint of "rational reasonableness"(79), is considered by Plato as 
something outside the artist, a kind of divine madness: "... there is no invention in him 
until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him 
... "(80). Composition, though, is based upon inspiration; poetic ecstasy was regarded by 
Plato as man's highest activity. Techne consists of the cognitive function through which the 
artist controls the outcome of his inspiration. 
Plato's conception of art in the sense of mimesis (imitation) is similar to the above as 
far as the role of the artist is concerned: the ideas of things pre-exist in the world of ideas, 
and the artist merely imitates them(81). Artistic creation then includes two planes: one 
metaphysical, originating and existing beyond the artist which is the essential one in the 
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production of a work of art, and a cognitive one, dealing with the manifestation of the 
inspiration or of the idea in the sensible world. In ancient Greece, innovations in art could 
only be introduced after their approval by a joint committee of artists and law-lords, as 
stages closer to the ideal(82). Invention has the sense of "recollection" of a reality which 
already exists in the eternal world of transcendent Forms(83). Thus the idea represents 
tradition, and for the artist invention and innovation are the means to the ends of this tradi- 
tion, which are, of course, its origin. 
We could say that in general this two-fold view of artistic creation was followed by 
Aristotle, but on a scale closer to practice: he removed the metaphysical plane within the 
soul of the artist, and he was more interested than Plato in the reasoning stage of creation. 
According to his usual habit he defined art, techne, precisely, and more than that, extended 
to art a definition he initially applied to architecture: 
Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to 
make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that 
is not an art, art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true 
course of reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into being, i. e. with con- 
triving and considering how something may come into being which is capable 
of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the 
thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, 
by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature ... (84). 
Thus techne is a state of capacity to make which is conscious, reasoned and based on 
knowledge. It follows from this definition that any capacity to make based solely on 
instinct, experience or practice, is not art, since it lacks conscious mastering of rules, 
means and ends. This definition of art was consonant with the Greek tradition and survived 
for centuries(85). 
The role of the artist, the maker, as it comes out of this definition, consists of two 
successive steps: first, the artist is the carrier of the origin, and second, he is the producer 
of the work through a conscious and reasoned activity. As far as "(art's) origin is in the 
maker", or, " as stated elsewhere in the Metaphysics, "from art proceed the things whose 
eidos is in the soul"(86), and eidos - as we have discussed earlier in this chapter- means 
conceptual form and thus cannot exist in the corporeal world as such, it becomes obvious 
that the artist in no sense imitates a pre-existing sensible thing. The task of the artist con- 
sists in the conception "of the result to be produced before its realization in the 
material"(87), of the procedure towards the corporeal manifestation of the eidos. -This 
however indicates a primarily creative stage testified by reason in order to express the true 
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and the essential properly, in accord with the laws inherent in its eidos (88). In this sense, 
"A house (is generated) from a house, inasmuch as it is generated by mind ... "(89). Pro- 
ducts of art that belong to the same eidos are related to each other through their eidos and 
the contriving of their coming into being by human reason; and as far as this kind of 
reproduction bears resemblance to the one by seeds, the individual character of each pro- 
duct is ensured. Certainly this has nothing to do with mere repetition of the same form, as 
in the case of industrial reproduction, for example. 
No emphasis is given by Aristotle to the activity of the artist as ; such, but only to the 
extent that activity serves as the medium through which the work comes into being. Gen- 
erally in Classical times the role of the artist is overshadowed by the outcome of his 
activity. From the surviving works of philosophy and literature, it is clear that the product 
of art is by no means a self-determination of the artist's subjectivity in the Modem sense. 
The Classical artist is actively related to the world, and therefore even his personal 
thoughts and emotions have nothing purely and exclusively subjective in them(90). The 
essence of the work is a universal entity. So the product of art comes out as an objective 
creation, directly related to universal laws as much as to particular socio-cultural condi- 
tions. 
2.3.3.2. TEMPLE AND ARCHITECT 
We saw earlier (2.3.2.2. ) that the ways in which one temple differed from others of 
the same period and area were slight variations in the number and size of the columns and 
their spacing, the proportions of the upper part and the mouldings. This fact indicates that 
the same idea or eidos underlies their conception. The architect either imitates the idea or 
brings into being the eidos that already exists in his mind. In either case the task of the 
architect mainly consists of the manifestation in the corporeal world of one and the same 
universal and unchangeable entity. He first "knows" what the temple is, and then he 
approaches it through techne, through the cognitive procedure that leads to the conception 
"of the result to be produced before its realization in the material". Such a perfect cognitive 
control upon the result seems to have reached its climax with the Parthenon. Ictinus and 
Callicrates mastered the rules of proportion and the construction and material techniques as 
they had been transmitted to their age through the process of evolution of the temple (as 
described in part 2.3.2.2). Furthermore, the pursuit of knowledge that characterized the 
Classical age, was probably required to include a reasoned criticism of the way the essence 
of the temple as a metaphysical entity was manifested through the marble. The innovation 
of a masterly combination of Doric strength and Ionic elegance on the Parthenon, for 
instance, would probably have been justified by the architects themselves on such grounds. 
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They would have said that that particular combination was better suited to the goddess 
Athena, for instance. 
Although it is known that the Greek architects used to write detailed explanations of 
their conception of the final result and its constructional details, none of those treatises has 
survived to the present day and we know nothing of their content(91). These treatises con- 
sisted not only of practical information and technical experience but of general theoretical 
discussions about "laws of symmetry" and "canons in art"(92). 
Among architects who wrote about their art in the fifth century, we know of Silenus, 
the author of a book on the proportions of Doric structures, Ictinus, the architect of the 
Parthenon and some others, mentioned by Vitruvius(93). Vitruvius makes a reference to the 
work of Hellenistic architects such as Pytheos, who was the architect of the temple of 
Athena at Priene and the Mausoleion at Halikamassos in the mid-fourth century. Pytheos, 
in addition to explaining the design of his masterpieces, expressed the opinion that "the 
Doric order ought not to be used for temples, because faults and incongruities were caused 
by the laws of its symmetry"(94). Nevertheless, Pytheos could not be considered as a 
representative of the Classical notion of Doric; for he belonged to an epoch initiating the 
Hellenistic period, by which time Doric was in decline and "regularity" (as we are going to 
discuss later in this chapter) had become a basic principle of conception of the temple(95). 
The most important written documents that have survived seem to have been techni- 
cal descriptions of buildings and the way of constructing them, or accounts of the work 
undertaken by each contractor(96); both are called syngraphai, and there is no mention of 
drawings or plans in them. In syngraphai, the architectural elements are referred to by their 
names and described in terms of their general proportions and material. If a special detail 
was required, the architect would supply a paradeigma or an anagrapheus. Paradeigma 
was a specimen used for parts like capitals or triglyphs; it was usually made of easily 
workable materials like wood or clay and probably in the actual size(97). Anagrapheus, as 
Coulton argues, seems to have been a template used for specifying complex mouldings on 
blocks(98). It seems that the use of paradeigma and anagrapheus helped the architect in 
experimenting before deciding what final form he would choose. 
A recent discovery at the Hellenistic temple of Apollo at Didyma, c. 334 B. C. (99), 
shows that at that period at least, construction plans of individual parts of the building, 
such as a column basis or even whole gables, were incised into unfinished wall surfaces of 
the temple in their actual size. Full-size plans of the stone layers that make up the founda- 
tion of the temple have also been found, each inscribed in the surface of the preceeding 
layer. Corrections on the plans reveal that apart from guiding the stonemasons, they have 
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been used as rough plans for the architect as well. 
It seems however that techniques of experimentation were restricted to the treatment 
of the details of, some component parts. For, as far as the available evidence suggests, 
scaled plans or models were not used by architects. Possibly they found them misleading, 
since, us we have discussed in 2.3.2.2., they used different proportions in buildings of 
different sizes, and the final result was also conditioned by human perception(Pl. I, IT, III). 
The existing temples as well as the treatises written by the architects on the most 
important temples of their time, probably helped at the stage of conception of a new temple 
by providing a means of prediction of its final form. An architect could improve upon that 
already existing by using his imagination, by changing some proportions for instance, and 
imagining the result that would be produced. The way a change of a part would inevitably 
influence the - form of the whole, particularly in terms of proportion, was more or less 
predictable on the basis built up by tradition. A change in the width of a column for exam- 
ple would be interrelated with a chain of alterations in the intercolumnations, the size of 
the stylobate, the articulation of the upper parts. Even at the stage of the foundation, the 
proportions of the parts had to have been decided. It seems that the experience accumu- 
lated by tradition had in principle replaced any need for architectural plans and models in 
the process of conception of the Classical temple., 
The fact that, as we have already discussed, there was a continuity in the develop- 
ment of the form of the temple, shows that the Classical architect was indeed an integral 
part of his society, which was represented by his work. The equal front and flank spacings 
for instance, that appear in the evolution of the temple in the early fifth century (e. g. in the 
temple of Zeus at Olympia), are nothing but an expression of the democratic ideal within 
the city-state, while the differentiation of the comer columns shows the particularity of 
each according to its position. On the other hand, the variations between temples that indi- 
cate the personal character of each, are interrelated with the particularity of the individual 
architect within his socio-cultural context. The names of the architects were known, and 
many of them have survived to us. The particularity of each temple was potentially in the 
essence of the temple. Plato's concept of innovation in the ascent towards the idea seems 
consonant with the first case, while Aristotle's reproduction through seeds with the second. 
Combining both, each temple constitutes a unique entity, an individual within its eidos, its 
existence interwoven with the social evolution of Classical antiquity towards the mastering 
of reason through dialectic. But this will be discussed in the section on the political mean- 
ing of the temple. ' 
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2.3.4. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
2.3.4.1. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF ART IN THE CLASSICAL ERA: 
A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
In both Plato and Aristotle, the idea or eldos despite its metaphysical nature, is well 
anchored in the realm of social reality. The moral benefits of the citizens are a proper end 
of art. But while Plato conceived of the social and the ideal as distinct fields and identified 
morality with the idea of Good, Aristotle took good as socially determined and indepen- 
dent of metaphysics(100). 
In Plato's philosophical thinking, dealing with art as an existence per se has no 
meaning. For him, its purpose and criteria of value are determined by universal, absolute 
laws of Truth and Morality(101). Truth is expressed in the work as a proper arrangement 
of parts, an internal order and good structure, in accordance with the eternal mathematical 
laws that govern the universe. Morality is manifested through the capacity of art to mold 
the characters of the citizens towards the realization of the ideal state(102). 
The factual grasp of the ideal in Plato's ideal state, always remains human(103); in 
the sense that there is always a gap between what the magistrates who fix the laws 
envisage and what is humanly achieved. As a result, the constitution of the state "improves 
more and 'more" towards the ideal(104). The concept of progress indicated here has not the 
sense of something gradually becoming different from itself, but of it becoming more and 
more completely its own self(105). This process - infinite in practice - of the political or 
social towards the idea of the Good, defines the social basis of the latter. In art imitation as 
the image of Good actually depends upon the moral ends of the polls; works in discord to 
those ends are "images of moral deformity" for the citizens. Building in particular is of 
immense importance to shaping the characters of the citizens because it produces works, 
such as walls or sanctuaries which are of a vital function to the state; public buildings are 
indeed a principal expression of the political identity of the city(106). 
Aristotle's concept of art departs from the social reality and not from prefixed ideal 
moral or educational ends. He argues that art must fulfil moral and educational demands, 
particularly in the Politics(107), where he follows the traditional Greek view that morality 
and education constitute the subject matter of political art(108). 
First and foremost, however, Aristotle deals throughout his work with art's value per 
se testified through the aesthetic pleasure (edone) it gives to the spectator, moral or cogni- 
tive truth are relative criteria in art while edone is an absolute one(109). Referring to the 
optical distortions used in painting, for instance, he says that "if men such as Zeuxis dep- 
icted the impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist 
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ought to improve on his model"(110). The autonomy of this aesthetic criterion is, 
nevertheless, far away from the much later developed dogma of "art for art's sake". For, 
on the one hand, dealing with the spectator, Aristotle presupposes that he is a moral and 
logical person within his specific political milieu and requires art to follow this logic and 
morality; any diversion from the moral or logical criteria of the spectator damages his 
aesthetic pleasure unless it favours a higher aesthetic aim(111). And, on the other hand, 
the highest type of aesthetic pleasure which is related to the eidos or essence as a criterion 
and end, derives from the mimesis of the katholou, the imitation of the universal and objec- 
tive that constitutes the essence and the meaning of existence of the work of art within its 
particular culture(112). 
In tragedy, for instance, Aristotle finds this essential pleasure not in external formal 
characteristics such as rhythm, verse or music, but in the myth, "in the composition of 
actions"(113). In this sense a poem can still remain a poem even without those features, 
but Herodotus' work written in verse does not cease to be a species of history(114). The 
feeling of rhythm and harmony is inherent in man and for this reason its recognition in the 
sensible world creates pleasure(115); this kind of aesthetic pleasure nevertheless is not 
referred to the eidos, that is to say it is not a principle or end of art(116). 
The essential form of aesthetic pleasure acquired through mimesis is due, according to 
Aristotle, to the human instinct for knowledge. Through manthanein (understanding intui- 
tive or cognitive), re-creation (mimesis) of the essence of the work of art is achieved by 
the spectator and this is the cause of deep aesthetic pleasure to. him(l17). 
The conception by Aristotle of the aesthetic phenomenon as "acting of the mind", an 
operation identified in the potential recreation of the essence of the work by the spectator, 
defines the autonomy of art in this sense. It seems nevertheless, that Aristotle would sug- 
gest that in order that this abstract acting can exist at all or - in other words - have a mean- 
ing, it must operate upon a particular work within the particular political milieu of the 
spectator. 
As it emerges from the philosophical speculation of the Classical era, the temple has 
to obey the universal and absolute laws of truth and morality as they are expressed by the 
totality of the cultural dimensions of the city-state at a given time. As an integral com- 
ponent of this totality, it will follow its changes towards a closer approach to the idea. 
Furthermore, the aesthetic pleasure of the spectator stressed by Aristotle, is ultimately 
interwoven with the particular socio-cultural milieu. The "spectator", or pilgrim, has to 
re-create the essence of the temple in order that aesthetic pleasure be achieved. Formal 
characteristics, such as measure and proportion, are incapable of creating aesthetic pleasure 
by themselves. Applying Aristotle's example - which refers to music - to architecture, we 
could say that a Classical temple can still remain a Classical temple even without its formal 
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features, while an expression of a different culture dressed in the form of the Classical 
temple never ceases to belong to its own culture; in this way, far from creating aesthetic 
pleasure, it manifests a fanciful contradiction between its form and its essence. Given this 
unity of the aesthetic with the religious and political dimensions within the polls, the 
approach to the meaning of the temple will follow. 
2.3.4.2. THE MEANING OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
WITHIN ITS SOCIO-CULTURAL MILIEU 
A. THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
AS A RELATION TO ITS PAST 
a. INTRODUCTION 
The Classical temple was primarily a religious symbol. The time of its appearance 
about the eighth century B. C., coincided with major cultural and political changes in 
Greece. In religion, Homer and Hesiod, presenting a rational inquiry into the origin and 
nature of the world on the basis of myth as it had been bequeathed by tradition, introduced 
the reorganization of the universe into an ordered whole. The "Homeric" religion remained 
the dominant Greek religion until 393 A. D. (118). The religious expressions of the Bronze 
age in great part survived or were revived through this organization(119). 
In the nineteenth century, German Romanticism was inclined to regard Greek religion 
as dipolar, consisting of two extreme aspects. Winckelmann and Goethe, on the one hand, 
tended to see the Olympians as products of the artistic imagination of Homer rather than as 
a vital religion; as a reaction on the other hand, Creuzer attempted to locate the real reli- 
gion of the Greeks in the realm of mysticism and ecstatic rituals, projecting characteristics 
of late antiquity into the Classical and pre-Classical period(120). But after the rediscovery 
of the "ancient Near Eastern literature, with astonishing parallels to the Homeric world, the 
Mycenaean background of both, the Olympian as much as the mysteries, started to unveil 
itself(121). The continuity and evolution of the Bronze age tradition is of great importance 
to this enquiry, as it forms the historical background of the creation of the Classical tem- 
ple. 
About 1200 B. C., the Minoan/Mycenean civilization collapsed and the last Greek 
tribe, the Dorian, migrated to the Helladic peninsula. That was followed by more than 400 
"Dark" years of emigrations and decline. According to archaeological evidence, all large- 
scale stone building ceased at that period, as did the pictorial and plastic arts. The dark age 
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of Greece constituted the transitional period from Prehistoric to Historical Greece(122). 
In the ninth and eighth centuries B. C., a sudden growth of the mainland sanctuaries - 
from twelve to over seventy - indicates a dynamic expansion of religious elements which 
were firmly rooted in a confusing variety of Prehistoric traditions nourished in the Greek 
peninsula(123). Minoan/Mycenaean civilization is the most important of those traditions in 
so far as it is from this that the Historical Greeks inherited their language, important gods, 
cults and festivals. Fully developed elements such as rebirth, initiation and mystery rites, 
epiphanies, cave cults and periodical return of the gods, were taken over by the Greeks. 
Minoan/Mycenaean civilization appeared as a uniform religious system. Elements of the 
preceding Neolithic civilization, such as the stone cult connected with Hermes and ithy- 
phallic representations, were rejected by Minoan/Mycenaean culture. After the collapse of 
the Minoan/Mycenaean civilization nevertheless, these elements appear again(124), prob- 
ably released under a simultaneous influence from the East(125). 
Investigating the Mycenaean origin of Greek mythology, Nilsson drew attention to 
the fact that the centres of the great myth-cycles coincide with the Mycenaean centres, and 
that in every case the Mycenaean towns stand in the areas which were settled in the Neol- 
ithic and Early Bronze age(126). W. Burkert, arguing that Nilsson does not go far enough, 
stresses that a number of sanctuaries, which are far removed from the later Greek towns, 
occupy the site of a Neolithic settlement(127). As C. Rolley observes however, the 
archaeological evidence suggests that there is always a stratigraphical gap between Early 
Greek (Geometric) habitation areas and sanctuaries, and the underlying Mycenaean 
ones(128). 
In the realm of religious and artistic expression there appears to be no break between 
Early Greek cult and the Mycenaean past; nevertheless, there is discontinuity of cult build- 
ings(129). It seems that a totally new architectural expression of the cult was fermented, as 
part of a changing attitude towards nature and the whole universe(130). 
The experience of the sacred during the Bronze age belonged to a society where the 
notion of the individual as a unit with personal rights and obligations did not exist. Instead, 
the actions of man were almost completely dictated by the will of his family, and - beyond 
all - by his tribe, which represented the will of the divine on earth(131). Impersonal holism 
seems to prevail in the modalities of worship of the divine in that era, based on the sacred- 
ness of nature(132). Despite Homer's affirmation that the twelve Olympian gods existed in 
Mycenaean times, the existing evidence reinforces the probability of the belief in nature 
daemons and in a smaller number of gods(133). The existence of individual daemons of 
nature does not indicate in any case a fragmental conception of life. The multiple and 
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diverse distinct forms were conceived as having a unity of essence that was fundamental 
and eternal. 
From the eighth century onwards however, with social change interwoven with the 
emergence of the individual with the dominant characteristics of personal will and intellect 
(as was extensively discussed in Chapter One), the Bronze age conception of the divine 
appeared to be fragmented. In order to remain a whole, it had to be reorganized according 
to the rules of human reason. Homer and Hesiod created order amidst the apparent confu- 
sion(134). 
The existense of a tradition of oral poetry involving generations of professional bards 
can be shown convincingly from the style of the Homeric poems(135). Following the path 
of this tradition and without becoming separated from the beliefs of their society, Homer 
and Hesiod created "an individual version of a general norm. But as soon as that variant 
(... ) was elevated to the position of a standard representation, it became itself henceforward 
a determinant of the popular conception"(136). Through the poems of Homer and Hesiod, 
the indeterminate daemons become particular personal gods; and probably this is the mean- 
ing of the famous passage in which Herodotus tells us that Homer and Hesiod "made the 
generations of the gods for the Greeks and gave them their names and distinguished their 
offices and skills and fixed their physical appearance"(137). Certainly, he does not mean 
that they made the gods from nothing. Athena, for instance, had been - as we now have 
reason to believe -a Minoan house-goddess(138). 
Neolithic and Mycenaean cults and rituals were maintained mainly in the "unofficial" 
Greek religion, that is to say in the mysteries of Eleusis and Samothrace, and in the 
Dionysiac, Orphic and Pythagorean sects(139). The official religion of the Olympian gods 
as organized by Homer and Hesiod, devoid of mystery and of the arbitrary forces of the 
irrational, constituted a well-ordered, half spiritual, half human world. The meaning of the 
temple in relation to its Mycenaean past as much as its Homeric present will be discussed 
next. 
b. SEARCHING FOR A MYCENAEAN/OLYMPIAN PROTOTYPE 
OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
The Classical temple has long been considered as the architectural descendant of the 
megaron of the Mycenaean palaces: the rectangular room with the entrance on the narrow 
side, and the porch with two columns(Ills 2-9,10). 
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This view has been supported by archaeological interpretations that insisted that at 
least in the case of Tiryns and Athens, it did indeed replace the Mycenaean megaron at the 
very same site. According to recent findings however, no trace of the Mycenaean palace 
remains on the Acropolis, while at Tiryns between twelfth century rebuilding and the 
eighth century temple, a large gap seems finally to emerge(140). 
Descendants in form and perhaps also in function, of the Mycenaean megaron are 
probably the so-called hearth-altar temples: oblong buildings with the entrance on the nar- 
row side and a central hearth, dated to the eighth century. Sacrificial banquets probably 
took place in these buildings. The most important examples are at Perachora near Corinth 
and at Dreros on Crete. The elongated apsidal buildings in Thermos were probably also 
houses for sacrificial banquets. When, in the eighth century, a building of this kind was 
surrounded by a row of wooden columns, one of the earliest columned temples arose(141). 
As the hearth-altar temples - rather short and wide like the Mycenaean megara - differ 
quite remarkably in proportion from the undisputable early temples (e. g. those at Eretria 
and Thennon, which are extremely long and narrow), a doubt has been expressed by some 
scholars as to whether these sacred banqueting buildings could be considered as predeces- 
sors in form of the Classical temple at all(142). 
Generally, although the cella of the Greek temple is very close in form to the 
Mycenaean megaron, there is no clear archaeological evidence that the one really evolves 
in some way from the other. i 
Since archaeology appears so far to have proved unable to provide us with an answer 
about the connection of the Classical temple to the Mycenean megaron, an enquiry into 
the Homeric poems follows next, in an attempt to explore the formal relation between the 
Mycenaean megaron and the Greek temple, on the basis of religious meaning. 
Nilsson, who investigated the origins of the Greek myths and religion in the 
Minoan-Mycenaean world, in a classic Sather lecture entitled "Olympus", explores the 
nature of the kingdom of the gods as Homer sang it, and its possible model in the real 
kingdoms of the Mycenaean age. He concludes that the monarchical institution of the State 
of the Gods could not be organized except in accordance with the political conditions of 
the Mycenaean age, because the social and political institutions of later Greece deviated 
considerably from this pattern. _ 
The full monarchical power of Zeus, can be ascribed only 
to the mighty kings of the Mycenaean age(143). According to the Homeric poems, this 
monarchical power was transmitted to the Mycenaean kings by Zeus. Zeus gave to the 
early kings "the sceptre and themis"(144), as the epitome of their administrative and juridi- 
cal supremacy(145). 
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Originally only Zeus, as a weather-god, dwelt on the peak of the highest Greek 
mountain, Olympus, which, as it was always clouded, was identified with the heavens. 
Poseidon dwelt in the sea, Artemis in the dark forests, Athena on the hills, and so on. 
After their subordination to Zeus, however, they acquired their dwellings on Olympus, 
establishing the City of the Gods. Their palaces, as referred to by Homer, can be assumed 
to be similar to the Mycenaean ones(146). The monarchical institution of the state of the 
Gods according to the Mycenaean kingdoms reinforce this probability. 
_, It is generally accepted that the Homeric poems most probably originated in 
Mycenaean times and belong to the eighth century B. C.; and that through them, the eighth 
century Greeks participated in their heroic Mycenaean past. Though their political organiza- 
tion was different, the Historical Greeks adopted the Olympian gods, with their organiza- 
tion as described in the Homeric poems, throughout antiquity. It seems reasonable to us 
that, as far as their temples were the palaces of the gods on earth, they should use the form 
of the mythical palaces on Olympus, as a prototype; and, since the Olympian palaces (as 
conceived by the eighth century Greeks) were similar to the Mycenaean ones, it is most 
likely that the first Greek temples imitate the Mycenaean megaron. 
If this is so, the Classical temple primarily symbolized for the Greeks their mighty 
roots, and their close relation to the Mycenaean world where men could become heros and 
semi-gods. Although in Archaic Greece man was not an actual participant of the mythical 
reality of things any more, the fact that the old force of mythical thought offered stable 
ground for the investigation of the world and social order, made the need for a more tangi- 
ble expression of the values of the past vital. The importance attributed to the Homeric 
poems on the one hand, and the building of the temple on the other, constitute the two 
basic aspects of the connection of the Archaic Greeks with their past. Classical culture 
was anchored on those representations. From the end of the Archaic age onwards, the 
temple became the symbol of the continuous presence of the past as an indispensable 
source-of faith in the future. In the fifth century, progress, not as an arbitrary gift of the 
gods, but dependent on man's own efforts, conceived as a continuation of the tradition 
rather than as its opposition(147), had little effect on the form of the temple. 
Jaeger stressing the continuity of the Greek philosophical thought that originated in 
Homer and Hesiod, writes: "logic invaded mythology quite early and began to transform it. 
There is no discontinuity between Ionian natural philosophy and the Homeric epics. The 
history of Greek thought is an organic unity, closed and complete"(148). The coherency in 
the evolution of the temple since its appearance in the Homeric age manifests - as we will 
discuss later - this unity between the religious and the political aspects of Classical Greek 
society. The cooperation of both gave birth to the Classical temple. The temple, more than 
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being a monument to the past alone, was the living and eternal symbol of the future as 
well, that accompanied every present until the end of the Classical era. 
The interior of the Classical temple served as an ark of the tradition rather than as a 
place actually used for the cult(149). It housed the statue of the god or goddess of the tem- 
ple it belonged to, as well as votive gifts and offerings. Thus it recreated the place where 
the divine was virtually present. The altar, in front of which communication with the gods 
took place, stood outside the temple, on its east side. There, with their backs protected by 
the temple, which manifested the quintessence of a glorious past, the Greeks venerated 
their gods, facing out onto the open world with confidence and faith in the future. 
c. PREHISTORIC SYMBOLS AND RITUALS AS FORMATIVE 
FACTORS OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
In this perspective of the continuity of the Neolithic and Bronze age tradition 
transmitted down to the Classical times, we shall try to approach the Classical temple as a 
carrier of symbolic meaning bequeathed by symbols and rituals of the early Greek cult. 
The tree and stone cult that played a principal role in the early Greek experience of the 
sacred, and remained throughout antiquity the main forms of expression of the popular, 
unofficial Greek religion as no other form of the Pre-Homeric religion did, will be investi- 
gated next in the formation of the temple. The Homeric and Hesiodic poems will be seen 
here as the filter through which the Prehistoric cults, transformed into more or less abstract 
entities, can contribute to an investigation about the meaning of the Classical temple. 
I. The Religious Experience of Homeric Man 
In contrast to the Prehistoric modalities of veneration of the sacred, religious experi- 
ence tends into abstraction in the Homeric and Hesiodic world: an abstraction that is con- 
ceived not as a quantification of qualitative phenomena, but as the unchangeable, per- 
manent being that underlies all events in nature and human life(150)(M. 2-11). 
Dodds, investigating the religious experience in the Homeric' poems through a 
psychoanalytic perspective, maintains that Homeric man has no unified perception of what 
we call "psyche" or "personality"; the religious idea of psychic intervention, he says, is 
opened wide by the notions of ate -a temporal clouding of the normal consciousness, 
ascribed to an external "daemonic" agency - and thymos - Homeric man's organ of feeling, 
treated as non-self(151). The distinction is clearly articulated, that everything beyond 
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reason is external to man. For the religious attitude of Homeric man in more general, we 
can say however that it tends to abstractions. As Erwin Rohde wrote, "Homer has little 
interest in premonitions and ecstatic states, and no inclination in that direction whatever 
(... ) the psyche is transformed into an abstract "concept of life"(152). 
Hesiod goes a step further in this direction. He claims from the beginning that - 
unlike Homer - that he deals with the truth, and asks the Muses to reveal to him "what was 
existing in the beginning"(153). The logical coherency with which he describes the divine 
genera according to a holistic model - even if not perfectly developed - poses the founda- 
tions of the philosophical way of thinking. Religion, still an aspect of myth, starts to be 
theology. 
It becomes obvious, then, that in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, man tends to 
reject his role as an actual participant in the primary unity of things. In the Theogony man 
is not included in the logically organized totality of the universe; nor his close environment 
of animals, plants, stones. In this sense only everything "objective", beyond man, partici- 
pates in the Hesiodic Whole; man is just "a close and willing observer"(154), an individual 
who perceives reality through its appearance and believes that appearance is the outward 
manifestation of the essence of things. In the subsequent centuries, man tried to regain the 
totality by making himself an "objective" thing. But while logic is objective in itself, "to 
objectify" a feeling rather means to rationalize it, to make it abstract., 
I. The Meaning of the Tree-Cult to the Classical Temple 
Large imposing trees, almost always enclosed by a wall in order to set them apart as 
sacred, frequently appear in cult scenes depicted on the gold rings of the Minoan- 
Mycenaean era. - Ecstatic or orgic dances connected with the presence of the sacred trees, 
constitute the main themes of these iconographies(M. 2-12). Nilsson, describing them, con- 
cludes: 
Thus we have a real tree cult, boughs being not only accessories of the cult, and 
trees not merely abodes of the deities, but cult objects by virtue of their own 
merits. They are adored and venerated with ecstatic rites and dances, and their 
holy branches touched and shaken. Their sanctity is denoted by a special con- 
struction which cannot be called a shrine in the ordinary sense(155). 
The tree cult, wide-spread in the early Greek religion, appears to have been tamed 
during historical times, as a result of the joint efforts of the polis and the oracle at Delphi. 
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In the popular Greek religion nevertheless, it survived till late antiquity. The worship of 
Artemis who was one of the oldest(156) and most individual deities, was closely related to 
the tree cult. The epithets Caryatis, Cedreatis, Lygodesma, Lyaia, Phakelitis are due to her 
connection with the tree(157). Her rituals, including dances and disguises, had often a 
very free or orgiastic character. Being one of the most popular gods, she enjoyed one of 
the most widespread cults in ancient Greece. 
The sacred tree as a hierophany of nature's eternal regeneration, probably revealed to 
man the mystery of life. The dancers drew youth and immortality through their symbolic 
unification with the kernel of vital forces, the absolute being of living nature as a whole; a 
being which manifests itself as a timeless recurring becoming. A palintropos harmonia in 
the Heraclitian sense(158). 
The age of Homer marks the end of the Dark age on the one hand, and the time of 
the appearance of the first temples on the other. This encourages us to seek for some kind 
of analogy between the early tree cult and the formation of the temple, on the ground of 
abstraction. In this spirit, the repetition of the columns - the one slightly different from the 
other - in the temple's peristasis, indicates a possibility of a connection with the timeless 
recurring becoming, manifestation of nature's eternal being, which the tree is here con- 
sidered to represent. Thus all columns can be considered as aspects in space and time of 
one column, that has not any specific structural or sacred character on this level of abstrac- 
tion. 
The Classical column, with or without base, with its body vertically fluted and 
tapered towards the top, crowned with a capital, shows internal integrity and constitutes a 
coherent whole. Furthermore, as one of the constituent parts of the temple, it is a carrier of 
its essence. Thus, essentially speaking, the temple includes the column and the column 
includes the temple, or, the column is the temple. Therefore, the columns as well as the 
temple as a whole, represent the sacred tree as symbol of the timeless recurrence of 
nature's life forces. ' This change in the form of a religious representation is interconnected 
with the transformation of the means of conception of the world which characterized the 
beginning of the new age, as was discussed above. The modalities of worship and the 
meaning attributed to the Bronze age tree-cult cease to be obvious any more. Man tries to 
express the essence of things through reason. Thus, the new aspect of the essence of the 
tree-cult, its new state of being, has to manifest itself in the corporeal world through a 
different form. It operates as a formative force of the peristasis of the Classical temple at 
the very time of its genesis. 
The fact that Samos, the place of the oldest found peristyle temple, is one of the 
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places at which the continuity of the Mycenaean past through the Dark ages is known to 
have been very strong(159), supports, or at least does not contradict, the above proposal. 
However, Nilsson's affirmation that "no single cult form has penetrated the whole cult to 
such an extent as the tree-cult has"(160), and the proof of a strong Mycenaean tradition on 
Samos during the Dark age, in combination with the fact that the archaeological findings 
from the Dark age are very meagre and do not, indeed, ' provide any particular evidence 
about tree-cult on the island during the Dark age, cannot give indisputable support to the 
view of a tree-cult origin of the peristasis of the first Heraion at Samos. 
Generally, at such a point of transition from a mainly religious to a mainly political 
society, the formula of incorporation of modes of the past in the newly bom world is 
defined by the new world, in order for change to be possible. That is to say, that if the 
abstract configuration of the tree-cult described above had some meaning to Homeric man, 
the connection of the peristasis to the tree-cult remains a possibility. 
iii. The Sanctity and Anthropomorphism of Columns in the Minoan/Mycenaean Age 
and its Relation to the Classical Temple 
The morphologically most prominent element of the Classical temple, its columns, 
have frequently been connected with anthropomorphic representations(161). The anthropo- 
morphism of the columns has been considered as related to the sanctity of the columns in 
the Minoan-Mycenaean civilization on the one hand(Ill. 2-13), and with the anthropocentric 
ideals of Classical Greece on the other. 
In the Minoan/Mycenaean religion, there is evidence that an anthropomorphic god- 
dess had developed from the tree-cult(162). As far as the sanctity of columns as such is 
concerned, Evans affirms that structural columns or pillars were hailed as embodiments of 
a god or as cult objects. Nilsson nevertheless, in common with almost every scholar who 
has approached the subject, and based strictly on the archaeological evidence, believes that, 
most probably, only free-standing columns may have claim to this title(163). 
On a seal cylinder from Mycenae. a row of six free-standing fluted, and tapered 
columns with bases and capitals are represented; between them, a man is raising his hand 
in an attitude of worship(M. 2-13b). Although the role of these columns is not very clear, 
it can be assumed that they are sacred columns(164)(Ill. 2-14). On the contrary, the lack of 
any sufficient proof about the character of structural columns, does not permit us to accept 
them as hierophanies. Thus, most probably, the Minoan/Mycenaean past is not directly 
related with any anthropomorphic value attributed to structural columns of the Classical 
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temple. 
The opinion can be expressed, however, that in the case of the temple the columns, 
by becoming structural, subordinate their individuality in order to participate in the syn- 
thesis of a whole. As in the case of free-standing columns, the hierophany regains its unity 
and constitutes the hierophany that consecrated the temple as a whole. In the case of the 
first temple of Athena on the Acropolis of Athens for example, according to myth, the god- 
dess had to confront Poseidon at the very place upon which the temple was afterwards 
built, and after winning the contest, she became the patron goddess of Athens. The 
Parthenon was built in order to signify this primordial hierophany. In virtue of this hiero- 
phany, the Parthenon remained sacred throughout antiquity, although the value attributed to 
it changed according to the changing religious attitude of the Greeks in the realm of the 
polls. 
iv. The Meaning of the Stone-Cult to the Classical Temple 
The petrification of the temple that gradually started in the sixth century, in order "to 
be sung for ever"(165) as a manifestation of the eternal nature of the "new" universal prin- 
ciples, can be connected with the stone-cult. 
In parallel with this survival of "primitive" types of cult in the unofficial Greek reli- 
gion, the official one is characterized more by a historical dimension. That is to say, the 
elementary manifestations of the sacred present a development in their religious content or 
at least in their formal function. At one moment of history, a sacred stone is venerated as 
something other than its cosmic surroundings and it is absolutely, invulnerable, beyond 
change. This state of being in the stone, nevertheless, can change over the course of time. 
Usually, this change of the "form" of the stone on a religious level, is accompanied by a 
manifestation of the change on the material level(166). 
We can follow this development in the worship of Hermes and mainly of Apollo. Of 
all the gods of the Greeks, Apollo had the closest relation to the stone cult. When Apollo 
superseded the ancient earth religion of Delphi(167), he took over the omphalos (navel) 
and its privileges. Pausanias, who lived in the second century A. D., wrote about the 
omphalos: "What the people of Delphi call the omphalos, is made of white stone, and is 
said by them to be at the centre of the whole earth, and Pindar, in one of his odes agrees 
with this"(168). Much has been written on what the omphalos originally was(169). All 
agree, however, that it was a sacred stone which, since the beginning of the historical times 




world and Heaven. 
Before the entrance of every house in ancient Greece stood a pillar tapering at the 
end. It was the embodiment of Apollo Agyieus who protected the house from evil(170). 
Apollo Karinos in the Gymnasium of Megara was a small, pyramid-shaped stone, and 
Apollo Lithesios at Malea stood beside a stone as well(171). 
Stone expressed permanence and power. Its hard, clearly definite form, was a symbol 
of the eternal, absolute character of the laws of nature. Stone is, for ever. This is probably 
the meeting point between the stone-cult and Apollo: the religious legality of the anthropo- 
morphous Apollo, constituted a transformation of the religious legality of the man of 
nature, represented by stone. 
In'the case of the temple, the translation of its whole material existence into stone 
signifies a turning point in the evolution of its being. On the one hand, a transformation of 
the previous state of becoming that characterized the modes of worship of the temple, 
mainly made of wood and mud bricks in the prehistoric age, to a state of an eternal 
unchangeable being, is indicated through this petrification. It is accepted as the absolutely 
true for ever. On the other hand, however, a new state of the being of the temple is ini- 
tiated, so , 
far as the temple belonged to the new age. Although major changes on the mor- 
phological level did not occur any more after its petrification, the being of the temple 
underwent a slow and continuous evolution. The expression of this evolution within the 
realm of the polls will engage us next. 
B. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
AS A RELATION TO ITS PRESENT 
a. INTRODUCTION 
As it was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the Classical temple, besides 
its fundamentally religious nature, constituted the symbol of polis from the time of its 
genesis.. Until almost the end of Classical times, polis was considered as an all-embracing 
universal entity, the, final stage of the development which human society as a whole and 
man as an individual could achieve. The harmonization of the Homeric god-given with the 
new man-made but still attributed universal authority justice, was the principal aim of the 
polls as such. In the Classical age, individual liberty and equality of the citizens in front of 
the law constituted the basis for the political field to operate. The Classical temple was the 
symbol of the identity of the polis in this sense. From the mid-fifth century onwards, 
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however, the deterioration of polls, expressed by the split between human justice and the 
justice of nature and the emphasis on the relativity and instability of the former, gradually 
leads to plurality and external conformity as far as the temple is concerned. The investiga- 
tion of the meaning of the temple as it evolves within its political milieu will engage us 
next. 
b. DIVINE AND HUMAN JUSTICE AS EXPRESSED 
BY THE FORM OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
It was argued in the third section of Chapter One that nomos (law) within the limits 
of polls was man-made and intelligible in principle. Although it was conceived by the first 
legislators (Draco 621/20, Solon 594/3 and Cleisthenes 508/7) as relative and subject to 
change, it was considered, until the mid-fifth century at least, as sacred and immutable in 
practice. Almost as a rile, changes were introduced through legislation by decrees. In 
parallel to nomos, the Homeric, god-given themis survived under the name of thesmoi. 
Religious matters were dealt with mainly by thesmoi, which were, in principle and practice, 
sacred and unchangeable, offering no justification of their content. 
Although double natured, polls was a divine and universal entity, ordered by god and 
human reason. In the philosophical field, the resolution of these two, apparently contradic- 
tory aspects of the identity of polls, was achieved through metaphysics. In the case of the 
temple, its metaphysical origin, its eldos, was located, as has already been discussed (2.3. 
5.1. ), in the realm of the Homeric religion. 
The Classical temple is first and foremost the symbol of the Homeric religion, in 
which, although gods still hold sway over men, the process of individuation is already 
under way. As with the case of the law ,- 
divine or human - the form of the temple was 
accepted as sacred and immutable from the very time of its genesis and throughout the 
Classical period. Only minor changes, similar to those of legislation by decrees, could be 
accepted in order to express analogous changes in the political identity of the city-state 
through the course of time. The unity of the religious and political dimensions of the tem- 
ple under the universal authority of the polls remains the principal. characteristic of the 
identity of the temple, at least till the mid-fifth century B. C. Every change in the form of 
the temple indicates a closer approach to the idea of polls as such. 
Within the Classical period, aesthetic pleasure deriving from the expression by the 
form of the temple of the essential unity between morality and politics, enjoys a universal 
authority. Moreover it expresses the particularity of the essence, the differentia specijlca of 
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the temple as an individual within its particular culture. External formal characteristics, 
such as simple mathematical relations, technical precision, over-elaboration of the formal 
details and refinements although not essential to a work of art, give, nevertheless, pleasure 
to the spectator, as Aristotle argues. This kind of aesthetic pleasure seems to be given no 
less importance than the aesthetic pleasure caused by direct participation in the essence as 
expressed through the form, as the evolution of the temple within the Classical period 
shows. However, the expression of these formal characteristics is ultimately controlled by 
the essence(172). At the point of perfection reached by these characteristics in the second 
half of the Classical period, it is impossible to argue convincingly that perfectness in form 
had not become, to a certain extent, an aim in itself. 
The use of refinements, for instance, was not just compensation for optical illusions, 
but mainly stressed the individual character of the constituent parts of the temple, express- 
ing the political identity of the city-state. The earliest instances of entasis of the columns 
and the stylobate occur in the temple from the beginning of its appearance in stone. The 
temple of Hera at Paestum (early sixth century)(Ill. 2-14) and of Apollo at Corinth (c. 540 
B. C. )(f. 2-15) provide some of the earliest, very pronounced instances of entasis. Gradu- 
ally, in the fifth century, 'entasis was reduced, and along with other refinements such as 
tilted columns, enlarged comer columns, curved stylobate and architrave, became more 
elaborate(Ills 2-16-20). With the use of prefabrication (not according to a detailed design 
but with final shapes and sizes precisely cut and curved in 'situ) extreme visual subtlety 
was combined with simplicity in construction. The Parthenon represents the culmination of 
the evolution towards formal perfection(173)(Ill. 2-21). 
From the second half of the fifth century onwards nevertheless, the nomos of the 
polls started to lose its sacred and universal character. The split between human justice and 
the justice of nature, which was mainly expressed in the teachings of the Sophists, opposed 
the relativity of the former to the universality of the latter. Political and individual morality 
started to become two contrasted domains(174). Law ceased to be a moral and political 
code which had grown in men's souls. The Homeric religion lost its meaning. The old, 
ecstatic forms of worship that had survived in the margin of the Homeric religion, started 
to become increasingly popular(175). As the nomos of the polls turned into an externally 
imposed compulsion, separated from morality as a universal norm, the mass production of 
laws started, according to the self-interests of the several political parties. Concepts like 
political individualism and equality manifested in the temple, gradually turned into plurality 
and regularity. The essential split between morality and politics was expressed through the 
first, and their superficial unity through the second. Despite the loss of meaning that 
underlies the form of the temple, the same form is maintained as a symbol of the following 
ages, due to inertia. As a consequence of regularity, preciseness in the elaboration of form 
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ceases to be an aim of art any more. Form follows the deterioration of its essence. Thus, 
formal characteristics such as the refinements, causing more difficulty in building - techni- 
cal and economical - rather than expressing the essence, lost their meaning and use(176). 
At the same time, plurality is expressed by the introduction of more than one order in the 
columns of the same temple, for instanse. The concepts of plurality and regularity will be 
more extensively discussed in the next section. 
c. POLITICAL FREEDOM AND EQUALITY AS EXPRESSED 
BY THE FORM OF THE CLASSICAL TEMPLE 
We discussed in Chapter One that the notion of justice (themis) conceived as the 
social order by Homer and Hesiod, still remains under the control of supernatural beings. 
In the early sixth century however, the new justice of the polis as conceived by Solon, 
although it maintains a divine power, is intelligible in principle, based on a cause and 
effect relation between free individuals. In Soloman justice, the determinent agency of 
social order is sought in the ensuring of individual freedom, and through this of common 
freedom, in intelligible terms. 
The concept of individuation can already be identified in the poems of Homer and 
Hesiod. We have discussed earlier that the evidence we have from the Minoan-Mycenaean 
age supports the conjecture that an important part of religious life at that time was enacted 
outdoors, far from the everyday existence of the settlements. The cultic activity performed 
in caves, on peaks and at tree sanctuaries (either identified by archaeological evidence or 
depicted in iconographies e. g. seals), reveal that human response to the experience of 
nature was expressed in great part through forms of nature. The shift from the prehistoric, 
"natural" modes of worship to an essentially man-made form articulated as a clear and 
intellectually coherent whole, seems to be expressed in religion by the organization of the 
divine genera by Homer and Hesiod out of the indeterminate deamons of nature of prehis- 
toric times. The separation of man from the original unity of things in particular, as first 
expressed by Hesiod, is interrelated with the concept of form as the means through which 
things become sensible as individuals. The aesthetic dimension of the Classical temple 
comes to show this separation. Interrelated with politics and morality, it defines the evolu- 
tion of the Classical temple throughout its life. The fact that the law of the polis was 
universal and immutable in practice until the second half of the fifth century at least, shows 
that the unity of the aesthetic with the political and religious dimension of the temple pre- 
vailed over their individual expressions. More than that, unity is the source of their separa- 
tion. 
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Through the form of the temple its eidos acquires a corporeal existence. The notion 
of enteleheia according to which every individual thing contains its end and purpose of 
being within itself, defines the limits of this material existence as a principle of individua- 
tion. It gives form essential unity between its parts, that renders it self-sufficient. 
The concept of individual freedom, as was ensured in the political field by the 
Solonian Justice, underlies the form of the temple through demands for self-sufficiency of 
the whole and of the parts within the whole. In this spirit, self-sufficiency is achieved in 
the form of the temple through the mastering of the interaction between cause and effect in 
its members. The causal relation between the members of the temple is expressed as a 
constant evolution of form ordered by the aim towards the achievement of the maximum 
result with the minimum effort. Thus, in the course of time, the Doric capital becomes less 
tapered and more conical, the columns more slender, and the intercolumnation spacings 
larger, for instance. Representing the political order, the conceptual order of the temple 
predescribes the causal relation between its parts in such a way as to insure the individual 
character of each, by connecting it into an ordered whole in intelligible terms. Thus the 
essence as expressed by Homeric religion is translated into matter through a procedure 
testable by the intellect. 
This evolution is ultimately controlled by the essence, as becomes clear with the case 
of the columns, for instance, which throughout antiquity remained much thicker than what 
was needed in terms of structural strength. The self-sufficiency of the parts is actually 
achieved through the overcoming of a mere expression of their material function. The 
flutings, for example, release the column from its material existence, while the tapering 
stresses its individuality by manifesting an active response to the supportive function. 
Under the process of individuation, the strong tapering of both shaft and capital - which 
attached the column to the stylobate and the architrave rather than stressing its individual 
character - was progressively reduced and modified. This aimed to emancipate the column 
from the stylobate and the architrave, and in this sense, lead to maximum active participa- 
tion between the parts of the temple. In architecture, as in the political field this was 
achieved only about a century after Solon's laws. 
In the late sixth century, with Cleisthenes' reforms, through which political justice 
was emancipated from morality as expressed by the solidarity of the family, a real har- 
mony between individual liberty and equality of the citizens in front of the law, was 
accomplished(177). The causal relation that underlies the process towards individual liberty 
in the Solonian Justice, gave its place to a dialectic relation between free individuals 
interacting on equal terms within the political realm of the polls. The harmonization 
between individual liberty and equality expressed in the political life of the citizens, which 
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was not easily achieved, constituted the quintessence of the concept of polis itself. Until 
the end of the fifth century, the universality of the polls served as the common factor 
through which this harmonization was possible. 
As far as the Classical temple is concerned, equality built upon dialectics, far from 
being a frozen and superficial relation, is essential and creative. The fact that temples of 
different size do not follow a uniform scale, but differ from each other in the relation of 
their parts for instance, shows the essential character of equality based on a dialectic rela- 
tion of the constituent parts. Regularity and individual liberty develop in parallel for a cer- 
tain period. Diversity in the same or between different temples still prevents equality, far 
from resulting in a meaningless typification. 
In the temple, the increasing demand for equality appears to form the necessary 
ground for the process towards individual, liberty on an aesthetic level to be accomplished. 
The demands for equality in the realm of the polls were transferred to architecture as an 
increasing trend towards regularity. The temple of Aphaea at Aegina built about the turn of 
the sixth century belongs to the first of the temples that clearly aim at simple relations of 
parts. At the same time, the tapering of the shaft and the capitals are much more geometri- 
cal and reduced in comparison to earlier temples, in favour of the manifestation of the indi- 
vidual character of the columns(178). 'Considering the evolution of the temple in general, 
we could say that in contrast to the temples of the Archaic period, from the mid-fifth cen- 
tury onwards there are no differentiations between the front and flank columns,, while the 
axial spacings in most of the Doric temples are uniform on both sides. In this way they 
give equal opportunities to the front and flank columns to express their freedom as indivi- 
duals in order to collaborate on equal terms as a manifestation of the relation between the 
citizens within the city-state. 
It seems that the evolution of the temple upwards, towards the achievement of the 
ideal of justice, gradually turns into an opposite kind of evolution away from the idea. 
The Classical period, that is to say the fifth century B. C., could be characterized as the 
transitional period. Towards the end of the fifth century, the excesses of individualism des- 
troyed the concept of polls as a harmonic interaction between economically and intellectu- 
ally free individuals ordered by a universally applied justice. The Parthenon could be con- 
sidered as a representative of the climax of the transition, by being the closest to the ideal 
of the corporeal manifestation of the polls, showing the unity between its political and reli- 
gious aspects, and, at the same time, indicating the overestimation of the aesthetic aspect of 
the temple as an expression of power and wealth at the expense of morality and politics in 
the traditional sense(f. 2-21). It seems that the concept of individuation as separation 
from the original unity, interwoven with the coming into being of the polls, and carrying 
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within itself the seed of the aesthetic dimension of things as separate from morality and 
politics, was momentarily expressed through formal sophistication that carried along with it 
plurality and anxiety before giving itself up to typification and formal deterioration(Ills 2- 
22,23). 
The Parthenon itself shows some of the first instances of plurality in form, by its 
wealth of sculpture which was alien to the traditional Doric simplicity, and by being the 
first temple which combined both the Doric and Ionic orders. The development of its inte- 
rior in the same way marks the first major innovation in the interior of the Classical temple 
since its appearance: the two internal rows of columns turn behind the statue, providing a 
more complex and elaborate background(IIl. 2-24). The temple of Apollo at Bassae estab- 
lishes plurality in form, by introducing three orders, Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian as consti- 
tuents of one temple. Its interior, in particular, continuing the sophistication of the 
Parthenon, combines a horseshoe colonnade that in contrast to anything existing in earlier 
temples is not functional, consisting in half-columns attached to short spur walls that rise 
only one storey in height instead of the normal two-storey columns. Another innovation is 
the replacement of the normal Doric columns of the cella by Ionic and Corinthian ones, as 
well as the running of a sculptured frieze above the interior columns(Ill. 2-25). These two 
temples are the most characteristic of the transitional period in that they show, in parallel 
with aesthetic perfection, plurality and anxiety, combined with a search for new forms. 
This search resulted in the building on a much larger scale of agoras, sanctuaries or even 
whole cities in the Hellenistic age. Perfection of detail and notions like individualism and 
equality expressed in individual buildings, gave their place to regularity of design and the 
handling of architectural groups(179). The democratic city-state had already given itself up 
to monarchical institutions. After the 338 B. C., with the Macedonian domination, the ideals 
of the polis had no meaning any more(180). 
Simultaneously with the gradual demoralization of the law, which tended to become 
external conformity rather than an objective, universal moral order, the concept of equality 
gradually superseded the demands for individual expression of the parts of the temple, and 
led to the appreciation of the aesthetic dimension of its form per se, in separation from the 
universal justice it originally manifested. 
Equality made lifeless through typification, along with lack of formal precision, con- 
stituted the main characteristics of the deterioration of the form of the Classical temple dur- 
ing the following Hellenistic and Roman age, which reached its climax with the "Rules of 
the Doric" as they were expressed by Vitruvius: "The thickness of the columns will be two 
modules, and the height, including the capitals, fourteen. The height of a capital will be 
one module, ... "(181). The typification of the relations 
between the. parts of the temple 
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signifies a superficial attempt to keep alive the Classical spirit of a universal concept of 
justice based on a dialectic relation between free individuals. By modifying form into one 
easily approachable to an outsider, the individual character of the parts is destroyed in 
favour of this emptying of essence by typification. Paraphrasing Heidegger's words refer- 
ring to Roman thought, we could say that "Roman architecture takes over the Greek tem- 
ples without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they say, without the 
Greek temple" (182). 
c. CONCLUSIONS 
It has been argued that the Classical temple, besides its fundamentally religious 
dimension, constitutes the symbol of the polls as a universal half-divine half-human entity. 
The religious dimension of the temple derives mainly from the Minoan-Mycenaean 
religion, as it was conveyed to the later Greeks through the Homeric and Hesiodic poems. 
More than that, the Homeric religion stands for the glorious Mycenaean past as a socio- 
cultural entity. As such, it forms the stable ground upon which the conception and realiza- 
tion of the polls become feasible. The Classical temple is, in this sense, the symbol of the 
Mycenaean world. It originates in the mythical palaces of the Olympian gods, by imitating 
the Mycenaean megaron. Its interior in particular, drew its sacrality from being an ark of 
the Mycenaean tradition, rather, than as a place where the cult was actually performed. 
Although the main room, the cella of the Classical temple imitates the Mycenaean 
megaron, its exterior takes on a totally new form, having two aspects: first, as deriving its 
meaning from earlier symbols and rituals, and, second and most important, as the mirror 
image of the eidos of the polis itself. 
The notion of abstraction as it emerged in the Homeric and Hesiodic world, as an 
approach to the unchangeable, universal and purely qualitative being that underlies both 
human life and nature, is the filter through which earlier cults could contribute to the mean- 
ing of the Classical temple. In particular, the tree and stone cults, considered as represent- 
ing Nature's eternal being and recurring becoming, may be seen as a possible source of the 
stone colonnade around the cella of the temple. 
As the symbol of the polls on the other hand, the temple expresses in principle its 
ideal of justice. In parallel to the universal and immutable character of the nomos of the 
polls, divine and human alike, the form of the temple was accepted as sacred and 
unchangeable throughout the Classical period. Minor changes only, analogous to legislation 
by decree, were accepted in order to express analogous changes in the political identity of 
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the city-state. 
The aesthetic pleasure that derives from the essential unity between morality and poli- 
tics is the principle and end of the form of the temple until the end of the Classical period. 
From the second half of the fifth century nevertheless, the gradual split between human and 
divine morality under which the polls ceased to be a sacred and universal entity, resulted in 
the growth of plurality and regularity as far as the temple is concerned. Through regular- 
ity, unity is maintained on a superficial level and thus violates aesthetic pleasure in the 
Classical sense, while plurality turns aesthetic pleasure into a personal - as distinct from 
universal - matter, a question of taste. 
The concepts of individual freedom and equality of the citizens in the political field 
find their expression in the form of the temple. The individual freedom of the constituent 
parts of the temple is ensured first, through a causal relation between them, controlled by 
the essence, the eidos of the Classical temple. Equality in the sense of a dialectical relation 
between the parts, is built upon the individual character of the parts as much as upon their 
essential unity. 
Following the changes in the political order, individual freedom turns into plurality 
of form, while equality results in regularity. The first instances of plurality and regularity, 
along with perfection of detail, characterize the form of the temple during the transitional 
stage of the separation between politics and morality. As the separation grows up, lifeless 
typification and lack of formal precision indicate the deterioration of the aesthetic dimen- 
sion of the temple in the Classical sense. Universalism in the sense of unity gives itself up 
to universalism in the sense of separation, plurality and empty typification. Individualism, 
instead of gaining its existence from unity, becomes self-referent and self-indulgent. The 
concepts of universalism and individualism as expressed by Classical architecture in its 
decline rather than in its flowering have their equivalents in the Modem situation as well. 





THE SECULARIZATION OF POLITICS 
AND THE GENESIS OF THE MODERN STATE 
3.1. THE EMANCIPATION OF POLITICS FROM METAPHYSICS 
AND RELIGION 
In contrast to the Classical era where the concept of polls constituted a universal, all- 
embracing entity, politics in the Modern world has no relation with "living in the state" as 
a metaphysical principle and end; nor has it any relation to religion. This separation was 
the result of a long historical process, under which the meaning of the term "politics" was 
subjected to several transformations interrelated with the changes the Classical concept of 
reason underwent through the centuries. 
The split between politics and metaphysics can already be identified in the Medieval 
rejection of metaphysics in favour of religion. The feudal system of the Middle ages, 
ecclesiastic and secular alike, represented the universal order established by God, and was, 
therefore, eternal and immutable. The unity between religion and politics derived from this 
primarily religious unity(1). 
Medieval politics, although universal and originating, as did the Classical one, on a 
higher ontological level, differ essentially in the extent to which that ontological level is 
approachable by man. For the Greeks, as we have discussed already, justice as the order of 
the polls takes its validity and authority from reason through metaphysics. The knowledge 
of the Good is the outcome of argumentative reasoning. In the Christian world, political 
justice as celestial order - at least in principle - is obtainable by man only through divine 
revelation. The will of God is revealed through deep voluntarism(2). 
As Ernst Cassirer from his neo-Kantian standpoint argues, beside this essential 
difference between the Medieval and Classical conceptions of politics, Medieval culture 
was not the outgrowth of a single system that had developed a separate and independent 
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theory of knowledge. Scholastic philosophy derived from two contradictory systems of 
thought, Jewish prophetic religion and Greek speculation(3). The Greek concept of reason 
although seemingly preserved, underwent a profound change of meaning in order to be 
fitted into the Medieval system from which it has never recovered. Based on an eclectic 
mixture of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions, the scholastics interpreted Greek 
philosophy in a symbolic way without any interest in historical truth. Even in the work of 
its main thinkers, reason was never conceived as autonomous. The absolute superiority of 
the Christian revelation of truth was never questioned. 
Based on the authority of Plato, St. Augustine, the founder of Medieval philosophy, 
established a sharp distinction between the empirical and spiritual worlds(4). Aquinas, in 
attempting to originate the development of the state in the free and conscious activity of 
man towards the mystical vision of God, and thus to reconcile -in some sense- religion 
with metaphysics, marked the beginning of the later Medieval period(5). His thinking 
aroused strong reactions among the theologians(6). 
The dissociation of reason from metaphysics in the Middle Ages, deprived reason of 
the formative power it enjoyed in the Classical times, which gave polls its universal 
authority and was expressed in the political field through dialectics. Even in this form how- 
ever, reason did not prove less dangerous to the theocratic state. 
During the Renaissance, reason was gradually detached of its Medieval foundation of 
faith(7). Religion, deprived of its transcendent authority, became a political tool, while pol- 
itics, far from deriving from a higher, religious or metaphysical reality, was reduced to a 
technique, that had just to point to "the nature of things", in order to legitimize itself on an 
ethical foundation. 
The secularization of politics during the Renaissance is best expressed in 
Machiavelli's book "The Prince"(8). As Cassirer points out, Machiavelli, in breaking away 
from the scholastic tradition, conceives of politics as a technique and never argues about 
political doctrines. "The nature of things" invoked by him when necessary, replaces any 
higher theocratic principle. He takes the facts of political life as the only valid basis for 
building up his arguments. The only political "virtue" for Machiavelli is strength(9). 
Machiavelli's conception of politics as mere technique, had its parallel in philosophy 
in the rejection of metaphysics by the humanists. It was this that offered a fertile ground 
to the development of the concept of scientific method in the seventeenth century. By argu- 
ing that the only valid knowledge that man can have is of the social and not of physical or 
metaphysical phenomena (in so far as only the social phenomena are created by himself), 
the humanists re-established rhetoric on an apparently Aristotelian basis. Nevertheless, as 
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P. Kondylis asserts from a viewpoint similar to Cassirer's, through their interpretation of 
Aristotle the absolute validity of the metaphysical ground o'f Aristotle's demonstrative argu- 
ments was lost, since they incorporated the Aristotelian "categories" into the rhetoric loci 
(10). Furthermore, while the Aristotelian categories were the outcome of a process of 
abstraction, that led in the end to the essence of things (to the katholou), the rhetoric loci 
were reached through evaluation of classified empirical material on an inductive analytic 
basis(11). Under this process, the term "method" gradually lost its Classical meaning of 
"art" that departed from the absolute ground of metaphysics, and was transformed into ars 
inveniendi, which could lead to the invention of the loci as probable truths(12). 
In the seventeenth century, method in the sense of ars inveniendi transcends the 
boundaries of humanistic rhetoric, and joins mathematical physics in an everlasting rela- 
tion, which transforms its originally social character(13). In this new role, method is no 
more confined to rhetoric probability. Transferred from rhetoric to the domain of nature, it 
regains an absolute validity, founded on the non-reasoned belief that reason is the inherent 
order of nature. On the other hand, method remains an ars inveniendi, in the sense that 
through the expression of physical phenomena by mathematical equations, it leads to the 
quantitative determination of unknown factors. The mathematical laws taken to underlie 
nature, however, conceived in this sense, far from belonging to the sphere of metaphysics, 
are based on a quantification of natural phenomena. More than that, what Aristotle 
describes as symbebekota (attributes), are considered, without any qualitative distinction, as 
constituting the thing itself(14). And since all attributes are in a constant process of 
change, and being has been reduced to its attributes, the concept of an unchangeable, 
immutable being distinct from the world of change and decay has been replaced by laws of 
change and movement. In Galileo's and Hobbes' universe alike, being is defined by univer- 
sal and eternal mathematical laws in this sense, as they derive from the quantification of its 
attributes(15). Thus being is unified with the process of becoming on the level of 
mathematical physics. As such it could be characterized as supra-empirical rather than 
metaphysical(16). 
In a similar spirit, Descartes abolishes the distinction between two essentially 
different ontological levels and their corresponding types of knowledge as they appear in 
the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and establishes the uniformity of all knowledge as an 
object of hypothetico-deductive mathematical thinking(17). By starting from Galileo's 
discoveries in physics, Descartes introduces the Modem role of philosophy to follow a step 
behind science. Ontology turns into epistemology and exploration of the human mind. 
Philosophy was not the only field of expansion of scientific knowledge. The belief in 
the self-sufficiency of Modem science motivated a search for its expansion in and 
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domination over all the fields of human knowledge. In this spirit, Grotius claims that it is 
by no means impossible to find a "mathematics of politics"(18). The basic axiom of sci- 
ence, however, the belief in the rational structure of nature, which cannot be applied to 
political life by itself, is combined with the moral doctrine of "natural equality of men" in 
a revival of the Stoic teachings(19). Thus truth as provided by science appears to be united 
again with morality in a distorted combination. Distorted that is, in comparison with any 
older metaphysical or religious system but claiming de facto a universal status. 
The principle of individualism deriving from the doctrines of the intrinsic equality of 
men and of the rationalism of nature constituted the basis for the development of the 
Natural Law theory of the State, which originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu- 
ries(20). Running from Grotius and Hobbes to Fichte and Kant, it introduces Modem poli- 
tics. It "naturalizes" old legal conceptions and develops a timeless and spaceless and, in 
this sense, universal concept of the State as distinct from Society. It is emancipated from 
the Church, with a tendency to subject the Church to it, rather than the opposite. 
During the "doubting and seeking" years of the Enlightenment, Natural Law's ration- 
alism, individualism and universalism were severely criticized by the School of Historical 
Law, which, interconnected with the Romantic movement, originated in Germany in the 
eighteenth century. Instead of proceeding from and returning to the 
-individual 
through a 
system of rational rules, Historical Law emerges from the Volkgeist, the spirit of the co(lec- 
tive life of a particular place considered within its historical flow. The Historical Law 
theory of the State claims that, in opposition to the Natural Law ý theory, it constitutes a 
profound theory that re-establishes the metaphysical basis of society(21). The Modern 
polarisation between capitalist and centrally planned states originates in the conflict 
between the Natural and the Historical Law Schools, after the rejection of any metaphysical 
ground in political practice at least. -I 
The investigation by Kant of the conditions of our knowledge, turns the ontological 
question about what things are into the exploration of the psychology of the human subject. 
This self defined subject in scientific terms, is inadequate for motivating any political 
interaction. In contemporary political practice political interaction is actually motivated by 
supra-empirical factors such as economy. 
The endeavour to re-establish the lost unity between reason and metaphysics on an 
essential ground was undertaken by Hegel. Hegel, although departing from the Historical 
theories, conceived of the spirit as transcending the limits of particular socio-historical con- 
ditions and becoming universal and etemal(22). Thus he attempts to embrace the whole of 
human history as it unfolds within the State: by applying to human history the scientific 
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concept of linear development, and combining it with a mode of reasoning alien to science 
(that is to say dialectics, which he borrowed from ancient Greece), Hegel establishes an 
all-embracing system. Since dialectics could not be founded on myth such as in Plato any 
more, after the centuries' long strife of human reason either to gain control over metaphy- 
sics or redeem itself from it, Hegel conceives of reason as constituting its own foundation. 
The triumph of reason is the underlying principle of his system(23). 
In Hegel's system the State is the essence of historical life, and in so far as he 
defines reality in terms of history rather than of nature, the State is the supreme reality: 
"When conceiving the State, one must not think of particular states, not of particular insti- 
tutions, but one must rather contemplate the Idea, God as actual on earth, alone"(24). 
Morality can only derive from the life of the State. Although Hegel has exerted an 
immense and enduring influence on Modem political thinking and practice, his system has 
lost its metaphysical standpoint and its inner unity and consistency through the attempted 
interpretations. 
We see, then, that after a process of reductions and eliminations, reason arrives at the 
threshold of the Modem era free of metaphysics. The faith in reason, interrelated with and 
supported by the myth of scientific progress, constitutes the principle of the Modem age. In 
Modem political practice, reason is actually in the service of economic forces which deter- 
mine the supra-empirical ground that underlies the interaction of individuals as members of 
the State(25). Unity is provided in the form of quantitative relations that derive from this 
supra-empirical foundation of the Modem State. It seems that man's process of self- 
elimination within the boundaries of human reason after rejecting metaphysics, was bound 
to motivate a counter movement away from the essence of things, and in this sense away 
from any form of understanding of creation and life. Or, as Kafka describes Modem man's 
situation after his emancipation from metaphysics, "He found the Archimedean point, but 
he used it against himself; it seems that he was permitted to find it only under this condi- 
tion"(26). 
3.2. THE MODERN STATE AS A MEANS TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
Modem politics, originating in the establishment of human reason as an autonomous 
and objective tool of knowledge by the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment, and 
earlier than that, in the humanistic principles of the Renaissance, claims to share with Clas- 
sical antiquity a common ideal, the achievement of individual freedom through rational 
procedures in the society. This ideal however, after undergoing the Christian conception of 
-66- 
a socially - in opposition to the politically - referred individual, never managed to reattain 
its Classical sense of liberty which could only be gained through political dialectics. 
Despite the fact that after the exploration of the limits of human knowledge, metaphy- 
sics lost its higher ontological status and thus ceased to be universal and eternal, morality 
was the last to be affected. It maintains a metaphysical standpoint which, placed though it 
be within human mind and soul, still claims universality. In the seventeenth century, in the 
philosophy of Descartes for instance, man arose himself as a "self-defining" subject, stand- 
ing over and against the physical world. Nevertheless, in so far as the physical world was 
conceived in a quantitative sense, the uniformity and objectivity this implied threatened the 
autonomy of the self as part of the world. 
Kant detected this threat and rigorously defended the freedom of the moral self. By 
so doing, however, far from solving the duality, he established a more rigid dualism 
between man's moral and physical selves, or between theory and practice, and metaphysics 
and politics(27). Thus the concepts of freedom and equality which in Classical times 
derived from the polis as a metaphysical entity and defined the political interaction of the 
citizens in this sense, now derive from man's inner, subjective self where Kant sees the 
potentiality of gaining universality only through a personal striving for deep, subjective 
morality which is totally opposed to the physical world(28). 
Hegel attempts the synthesis, based on the postulate of a cosmic spirit who lives only 
through individuals and expresses itself through their thoughts and deeds. Thus the indivi- 
dual acquires its own freedom through the self-expression of the spirit(29). 
The dualism between moral and natural self can be originally identified in the Stoic 
concept of "natural equality of men". That concept, although contradictory to the hierarchi- 
cal organization of the Medieval world, constituted, along with divine revelation, the comer 
stone of the Medieval state(30). Reinforced through the seventeenth century and in the 
Enlightenment, the "natural ethics" of the Stoics offered the qualitative outfit that politics, 
after having been transformed to a mere technique, needed in order to reaffirm its secular 
authority(31). 
In the Modem field of political practice, freedom and equality defined in terms of 
morality (but actually implying an economic or authoritative basis) turned out to be a sub- 
stitute for metaphysics, or a fake metaphysics. On this ground Marx refers to every ideol- 
ogy as a lie, and Nietzsche sees conceptions of moral truth, objectivity and rationality as 
masks of a distorting will to dominate(32). 
We saw in the first part of this thesis that in Classical Greece freedom and equality of 
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the citizens were interrelated with the concept of polls as an end, a telos in itself. Freedom 
and equality were legitimized in the sense that their principle and end derived from the 
polls as a metaphysical entity. They were the necessary factors for political dialectics, the 
quintessence of the polis to operate. They had meaning only with reference to the political, 
that is to say the public life. Morality unified with politics belonged to the public field. 
In the Modem political world, freedom and equality defined in moral terms derive 
from and return to the individual by guaranteeing his privacy. As far as the moral ground 
of Modem politics holds for the individual within his own subjectivity, it cannot motivate 
any political interaction. Economy as a supra-empirical common factor is evoked in order 
to provide the unity needed as the basis for interaction in the public field. This interaction, 
far from deriving from individual autonomy in the Classical sense, regulates the issues of 
equality and freedom among the citizens in terms of economy. Since it is motivated by a 
factor external to the human eidos, it can never become essential for man. 
Thus, interaction by itself hardly has anything to do with persons. Rather it deals 
with producers of products who never show either themselves or their skills and qualities, 
as in the "conspicuous production" of the Middle Ages, for instance. Moreover, as Arendt 
comments, Marx's assertion that economic laws are not made by man, but, like natural 
laws, are "functions of the productive conditions of the society as a whole", holds true only 
in the Modem society where "activity" is reduced to the human body's metabölism through 
labour. In this sense, the only exchange is consumption(33). 
In our contemporary political thinking, nevertheless, Habermas still insists that reason 
- not merely analytic-empirical but also leaving some space for insight - can cause "com- 
municative action". Rational explication and inner consistency of the value systems can 
motivate political interaction. Lyotard from a postmodern standpoint attacks him as 
offering us only one more "metanarrative" of Modemism(34). 
Popper's criticism of the inductive method of science and his suggestion of a "piece- 
meal engineering" for a rational social reform offers a more "practical" proposal within the 
existing system(35). However, by rejecting any holistic approach as utopian, he cannot 
transcend the limits of Modernity. 
In the Modem field of political practice, we can speak of two "types" of individual 
freedom and equality, corresponding to the two rival constellations of political systems, 
liberal capitalism and centrally planned communism. 
Liberal capitalism is based on the individual's freedom to exchange capacities and 
commodities through the mechanism of the commercial market. It claims that it renders 
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individuals fundamentally equal on the basis of contractual voluntary exchange. To the 
extent, though, that all those without substantial property are required to work for the com- 
mon good, this exchange is compulsory rather than voluntary(36). 
In centrally planned systems the concepts of freedom and equality, although defined 
on an economic basis, are quite different from their counterparts in the capitalist state. Here 
individuals exercise their autonomy through state organization indended to develop their 
capacities for production and distribution of products. They are fundamentally equal by 
being denied the right to accumulate property, especially by means of production(37). 
Thus the moral ground upon which Modem politics appeals as its departure point, 
does not, in reality, have any relation to political processes. The intersubjective relations 
which individuals can develop through personal moralities are inadequate to motivate any 
political interaction. They rather define the social field which is distinct from the political. 
Individual freedom, far from being related to politics, has the meaning of protection of the 
individuals' intimacy within the sphere of the social(38). This kind of freedom is regulated 
by the State which operates as a "system for determining the boundaries and rules of all 
the other systems of activity in the community"(39). On the other hand, the freedom 
implied in political interaction is defined in economic terms and has nothing to do with 
man as a person. 
3.3. CONCLUSIONS 
We have discussed in this chapter the process which the Classical concept of reason 
underwent through the centuries up to Modem times and tried to understand the meaning 
of Modem politics and the role of the individual within the State, in terms of this process. 
We saw that the striving of man to confine himself within the limits of reason, 
defined as separate from metaphysics, springs out of his desire to gain full control over his 
knowledge(40), and originates in the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment. The 
separation of reason from metaphysics is already present in the Medieval replacement of 
metaphysics by religion and the symbolic interpretation of Greek speculative thinking, 
while, in the Renaissance, reason was gradually emancipated from its Medieval foundation 
of faith. 
In Classical times, the reasoned interaction between the citizens on the basis of tradi- 
tion constituted the quintessence of the polls as a metaphysical principle and end. The unity 
between political theory and practice was given in this sense. In the Modem field reason 
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still defines political interaction, but far from dealing with metaphysics, it has the sense of 
"being rational"(41). As a result, political interaction bears the sense of quantitative rela- 
tions, and theory and practice arrive separately at the threshold of the Modem age. Equal- 
ity and freedom in the political field, far from having any moral foundation, operate in 
economic terms. 
In contemporary political practice, supra-empirical factors seem to be the only legiti- 
mate ones which can derive after the quantification of all knowledge and the rejection of 
metaphysics. Any claim to a moral ground of politics can be nothing more than a moral 
disguise of science or a scientific disguise of morality. Any assertion of higher ideological 
principles on the basis of which suggestions are deduced about the way science must 
change in order to become socially acceptable, far from motivating political interaction, 
perpetuate the separation between political theory and practice. There could hardly be 
found any mode of reasoning, causal or dialectical, that could bridge the gap departing 
from the one or the other end alone. 
We shall argue next that economy and function, as. the supra-empirical and in this 
sense objective and universal factors in Modem architecture, constitute the corporeal 
expression of the Modem political situation. In Le Corbusier's words, "Economic law 
inevitably governs our acts and our thoughts"(42). Furthermore, any personal moralities or 
ideologies expressed in architecture in the Modem era, far from transcending the limits of 
personal myths, end up as social utopias. I 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF ART AS AUTONOMOUS 
4.1. THE SECULAR ORIGIN OF MODERN AESTHETICS 
Aesthetics as an autonomous philosophical discipline, distinct from ethics and meta- 
physics, which focusses solely on art, took its definite form as part of an integral system in 
the late eighteenth century, in Kant's philosophy. Kant's aesthetics constituted the philo- 
sophical elaboration of a body of concepts developed in treatises in France and England 
first and in Germany later, over about a century(1). The term aesthetics was coined by the 
German philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten but opinions differ as to whether he 
can be considered the founder of the discipline. However, as Paul 0. Kristeller states in 
his foundational for the history of aesthetics paper "The Modem System of the Arts: A 
Study in the History of Aesthetics", to which we are indebted, Baumgarten is the founder 
of aesthetics to the extent that he first conceived - though without adequately developing it 
-a general theory of the arts as a separate discipline within the system of philosophy(2). 
Although historians generally recognize that aesthetics as a distinct discipline 
emerged in the eighteenth century, they also usually apply the term to earlier phases of 
Western thought, starting with Classical antiquity(3). This, however, should be done only 
with reservations, since such basic terms of Modem aesthetics as "art" and "beauty" bore 
quite a different meaning in antiquity, as well as in Medieval times and the early Renais- 
sance. 
The term art comes from the Latin ars, which is the equivalent of the Greek rechne. 
Techne' in Classical Greek means craft, skilled production(4). As Plato states it, rechne 
proceeds from rational principles and rules, and, as defined by Aristotle, art is a kind of 
activity consciously controlled, reasoned and based on knowledge, that deals with the com- 
ing into being of a preconceived result(5). The stage of inspiration, connected with the art 
of poetry in particular, is conceived by Plato as "divine madness", something outside the 
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artist; techne consists of the cognitive procedure that controls and brings into being the 
results of the poet's inspiration(6). The Greek term for beauty, kalon, on the other hand, 
was never distinguished from the moral good. It was associated with art, but only in a 
very general sense(7). When Plato discusses, beauty in the Symposium and Phaedrus, he is 
not referring to works of art but to human persons, in the sense of natural beauty, beauty 
of the soul and beauty of cognitions without distinction(8). ' Similarly, 'the Latin equivalent 
pulchrum of the Greek kalon does not particularly denote aesthetic beauty in the Modem 
sense. 
Only in later thinkers does beauty start to acquire an increasingly aesthetic 
significance. In the third century A. D., the Neoplatonist Plotinus, in his Enneads, and par- 
ticularly in the sixth treatise of his first Ennead, called "On the Beautiful" which exerted an 
immense influence in the development of the concept of aesthetics through the centuries, 
deals not only with the beauty of the soul, but with the beauty of sensuous things, as 
works of sculpture, architecture and music. The beauty of man-made objects is, according 
to Plotinus, a symbol of cosmic ' harmony and derives, ultimately, in common with the 
Soul, from the One cosmic principle, the Good(9). Plotinus' ideas about beauty permeated 
the works of Augustine, 354-430 A. D. The speculation of these thinkers concerning the 
various arts, neither occupies a major place in their theories, nor implies a separate system 
of aesthetics in the Modem sense(10). 
As 
. 
Tatarkiewicz points out in a paper entitled "Classification of arts in antiquity", 
there were numerous classifications of the arts in ancient times, none of which faced the 
possibility of considering what we ' call fine arts as a separate group of arts. A widely 
known classification was that of the Sophists, who, considering the aim of art, dis- 
tinguished between useful arts, which are necessary for life, such as architecture, and 
pleasurable arts, which are cultivated for amusement, like painting(l 1). Plato and Aristotle 
divided arts from the viewpoint of their relation to reality: those which produce real things 
and those which produce images. Architecture was considered to belong to the first 
category as it produces a new reality, while painting to the second as it imitates the exist- 
ing reality(12). The best known and most generally accepted classification in antiquity 
nevertheless, was the division of arts into vulgar and liberal. The liberal were intellectual 
arts, superior to the vulgar that required physical effort. Galen's classification in the second 
century B. C., mentioned as 'liberal arts rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, as 
well as music(13). 
. 
According to Paul 0. Kristeller, the classification of the liberal arts was bequeathed 
to the early Middle Ages and retained down to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Archi- 
tecture, sculpture and painting were listed among the subordinate mechanical arts, in the 
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scheme of seven mechanical arts formulated by Hugo of St. Victor in correspondence to 
the seven liberal arts. Many important subsequent authors, including St. Thomas Aquinas, 
adopted this classification(14). Whereas poetry and music, included in the liberal arts, were 
taught at many universities at that period, the visual arts were confined to the artisans' 
guilds. Furthermore, the. treatises written either on the liberal or on some of the mechanical 
arts have a strictly technical character and do not attempt to connect these arts with others 
or with philosophy(15). The concept of beauty occasionally discussed by Aquinas and a 
few other thinkers, is not related to the arts but, as for instance in Augustine's writings, 
constitutes a metaphysical attribute of God and his creation(16). 
It was not until the late Renaissance that the three visual arts, painting, sculpture and 
architecture were separated from the crafts. The term Arti del Disegno coined by Vasari, 
was the predecessor of the Beaux Arts. It was -in Florence in 1563 that the first Academy 
of Art, Accademia del Disegno, was formed by the painters, sculptors and architects who 
no longer belonged to the craftsmen's guilds(17). Scientific subjects such as geometry and 
anatomy were included in the teachings of the Academy. The major part that some sciences 
played in the visual arts was generally emphasized. The institution of the Academies was 
the outcome of an attempt introduced in fifteenth century Florence to define the visual arts 
as requiring intellectual activity, that is to say as liberal. This was probably seen as a 
means to enhance the social and cultural position of the visual arts. Hence, a particular 
type of literature, quite different from the technical treatises of- antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, appeared as a necessary support to the work of art(18). 
In fifteenth century Florence, in Alberti's and Leonardo's writings alike, the relation 
of art to such natural sciences as optics and anatomy is emphasized. In his paper "On the 
Emergence of Aesthetics", Richard Woodfield states that Alberti's De Pictura, ' the first 
Western art theoretical text, manifests an application of the humanist principles of rhetoric 
to an analysis of painting(19). The work of art is treated as an extension of the physical 
world in terms of science, at the expense of its direct connection to the divine and the 
metaphysical. The continuum between the physical and the divine worlds, however, is not 
yet broken, but through its mundane representations the divine is drawn rather towards the 
phenomenal world than the opposite. Thus in De re aedificatoria, the first architectural 
treatise of the Renaissance, Alberti justifies his preference for round forms in sacred archi- 
tecture on the ground of nature's love for the round. Nature, as understood by Alberti, 
"aspires to absolute perfection, she is the best and divine teacher of all things"(20) This 
can probably be considered as the first step towards the release of the visual image into an 
autonomous world. 
It was in the age of Mannerism in the first half of the sixteenth century, that the work 
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of art was finally separated from its relation to the divine world. The visual arts gradually 
lost their meaning as crafts and turned into a world in themselves, constituted in show- 
pieces of the virtuosity of the artists. Architecture at that period lost its Renaissance clarity 
and became painterly, displaying the virtuosity of the artist for its own sake rather than for 
any religious significance(21). The emancipation of the visual arts from the crafts was 
interrelated with the increase of their social prestige and the rise of an educated amateur 
public to which they were addressed. In fifteenth century Florence, patrons shifted their 
interest from the works of art as pieces of craftsmanship to works as demonstrazioni, that 
is to say as a display of mental ingenuity from the artists(22). It has been argued in Marx- 
ist terms by the social historian Hauser that this change in the commodity function of art 
introduces its role in modemity(23). 
As Richard Woodfield argues in the article already referred to, it was the Catholic 
Church itself, with the Counter-Reformation, that forced the separation between religious 
and secular art during the period of Mannerism. The spiritual world of the Renaissance, 
where the secular was more or less extended to incorporate the divine, was succeeded by a 
severe disruption of the unity of the two worlds brought about by the Protestant reforma- 
tion. Protestant iconoclasm, with its attack on visual imagery as materially corrupt, could 
be considered as the first step towards stripping visual arts of their relation with the divine 
world as had been accepted by the Renaissance. The Classical thematology of the Renais- 
sance was no longer subjected to Christian allegorization; it tended to be regarded as a 
"perversion of thought", instead(24). 
In a reaction to the Protestant reformation, the Council of Trent maintained the utility 
of images, "not, however that any divinity or virtue is believed to be in them ... but ... the 
honour ... is referred to the prototypes which they represent ... "(25). Although the 
Council 
intended to re-assert a direct emotional relation between image and spectator, patrons 
inclined to be antipathetic towards religious representations, and, in terms of patronage, a 
rigid distinction between religious and secular art was established. And while religious art 
followed the role prescribed by the Council of Trent, secular art became the playground of 
artistic skill and a source of pleasure in this sense(26). The disengagement of art from its 
bondage to the divine during the period of Mannerism, Woodfield argues, marks its emer- 
gence into an autonomous world. 
But in order to gain its autonomy, art had to cut its ties to the empirical world as 
well. It was during the Enlightenment in the seventeenth century, the century of Galileo 
and Descartes, that arts were separated from sciences and in this way from the empirical 
world. This gives ground to the view that the origins of Modem aesthetics lay in this 
separation(27). The famous Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes during the last quarter 
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of the century, was largely due to the great development of the natural sciences(28). In 
their attempt to shake off the authority of Classical antiquity, the Modems developed a sys- 
tematic comparison between the various fields of human endeavour and tried to identify the 
reasons why some intellectual activities which we now call Fine Arts could not follow a 
similar kind of progress to the sciences. 
With Charles Perrault's Parallele des Anciens et des Modernes (1688-96) the separa- 
tion of the fine arts from the sciences is almost complete(29). In another of his writings, Le 
Cabinet des Beaux Arts (1690), Perrault opposes the concept of Beaux Arts to the Arts 
Liberaux and reaches a system of seven fine arts which is very close to the Modem system 
of Fine Arts, the only difference being the inclusion of Optics and Mechanics. The split 
between the Humanist principles of the Enlightenment and man's increased capacity to 
exercise control over nature, or between Fine Arts and Mechanics, could be dated to the 
foundation of the first engineering school, L' Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees, in Paris, in 
1747(31). This split was bequeathed to Modem Movement architecture as an inner contrad- 
iction between its aesthetic and its practical self, that has not yet been resolved. 
Despite the separation of the fine arts from the sciences due to their lack of progress 
in the scientific sense, the character of art as an intellectual activity was emphasized by the 
Academies which dominated artistic creation from the seventeenth until the nineteenth cen- 
turies. As a result, the organic growth that characterized the continuity of art in the earlier 
ages, was replaced by a convention of classicism and eclectic imitation of Renaissance 
models(32). The Modem expression of the autonomy of art was accomplished, on a 
theoretical ground, with the development of aesthetics into a distinct philosophical discip- 
line during the Enlightenment. 
It may seem strange that the emergence of art into an autonomous world distinct from 
the divine and from nature, was actually defined in terms of the human subject. This was. 
probably implicit in the decision of the Council of Trent, where pictorial religious art was 
dealt with from the point of view of the emotions it was intended to arouse in the specta- 
tor, but finds an explicit form mainly in the philosophy of the British Empiricists and in 
Kant, during the Enlightenment. 
While the -Aristotelian concept of entelecheia indicated that the principle and end of 
the Classical work of art was inherent in the work, now the principle and end of art is 
situated within the mind of the human subject: that is to say, the artist on the one hand and 
the spectator on the other. Within the shift in the nature of human knowledge from reli- 
gious and metaphysical to epistemological, which was accomplished in the eighteenth cen- 
tury, questions about the ontology of art were transferred into the exploration of the 
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psychology of the human subject(33). 
The implicit relativity in any evaluation of a work of art constitutes the major obsta- 
cle for a definition of the aesthetic. This results in the rise of art criticism, which attempts 
to bring sensation and taste into the light of pure knowledge. David Hume's essay "Of the 
Standard of Taste", and Immanuel Kant's book "The Critique of Judgement", are con- 
sidered to be the best texts dealing with the evaluation of art in modemity(34). Although 
they both maintain the principles of art as universal, they disengage the beautiful from the 
good and relate it to the human senses(35). 
For Hume, beauty belongs to the domain of psychology. The mind is relatively pas- 
sive and its operation entirely explicable in terms of the association of ideas. "Beauty is no 
quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; "(37). 
But since the sentiments of men vary, Hume seeks fora "Standard of Taste", the universal 
principles of beauty. 
The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature. In order that any judge- 
ment of a work of art be true, it has to be based on delicate sentiment, to be aided by prac- 
tice, improved by comparison, and cleared of prejudice(38). Variations in judgement are 
due to defect or perversion of the above faculties. However, Hume admits, a certain degree 
of diversity in judgement is still unavoidable because of preferences of taste: some persons 
are pleased by simplicity, others by ornament, for instance. These, nevertheless, are "inno- 
cent", variations, for which there is no standard(39). 
As far as moral principles and religion are concerned, Hume asserts that the critic has 
simply to overlook them when he expresses a judgement on art with regard to a certain 
historical period, since they are in constant flux and revolution(40). Hence the work of art 
is considered by Hume as universal and ahistorical, detached from morality, and subjective 
in the sense that human judgement substitutes for objective principles. 
Kant goes further in the direction of the Modern notion of the autonomy of the 
aesthetic and defines taste as "the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representa- 
tion by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a 
delight is called beautiful" (41). The judgement that comes forth in this way is called 
aesthetic judgement and is conceived of as distinct from cognitive judgement which is 
based on reason. It is based on a priori principles and related not to the object, but to the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure of the human subject(42). 
Like Hume, Kant conceives of beauty as subjective and tries to overcome the implied 
relativity in judgement. Thus, according to his third definition of the beautiful, the shape of 
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an object must indicate final purpose in terms of perception and this is not to be related to 
any end whatever. "Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in it 
apart from the representation of an end' (43). So beauty in architecture for instance lies 
beyond the practical or functional purposes a building has to fulfil, and derives from the 
feeling of pleasure it creates in the human subject. 
In his "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant investigates the subjective principles upon 
which aesthetic judgement is based(44). He asserts that the representation of an object in 
the mind requires "Sensation" through which a multiplicity of distinct feelings arrives at 
the mind, "Imagination" which composes these feelings into perception, and finally, 
"Understanding" which unifies perception into concepts. In this way perception is 
transformed into objective knowledge. Imagination is described as a "blind but indispens- 
able function". The word "blind" indicates the freedom of imagination and means that it 
"cannot anticipate its own results by conceiving them as purposes in advance of executing 
them"(45). 
- Aesthetic judgement is involved before understanding. It cannot be related to a sensa- 
tion or concept in terms of causality, so far as it is based on a priori principles, while 
causal relations are a posteriori. It is founded only on the "form of finality" of an object. 
Since it is not a cognitive judgement, it deals only with the relation between the representa- 
tive powers of imagination and understanding(46). The feeling of pleasure is "the cons- 
ciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the Subject, 
attending a representation whereby an object is given"(47). Through the formal finality of 
the object the feeling of pleasure is related to beauty. From the definition of beauty in 
terms of formal finality derives the necessity, and from this the universality of the judge- 
ment of taste(58). Necessity is represented as objective "under the presupposition of a 
common sense"(51). Common sense is "the effect arising from the free play of our powers 
of cognition"(50). Two further definitions of beauty are drawn: "The beautiful is that 
which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of ä necessary delight"(51), and "The 
beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally"(52). 
With Kant, the autonomy of the aesthetic from reason and morality, and in this sense 
from both the empirical and the divine -world, is accomplished. The question of the ontol- 
ogy of art is replaced by the exploration of the psychology of the human subject. On this 
ground, the aesthetic strives to maintain an objective, universal, intersubjective expression. 
With the shift, however, from the question "What is art? " to the postulate of a peculiarly 
aesthetic attitude displayed by the subject, the essential qualities of the work no longer 
determine whether or not it is art. The boundaries of the aesthetic are indeed open to any- 
thing. Anything can be considered as art to the extent that it be experienced through the 
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aesthetic attitude. And while the universality of the aesthetic attitude proves rather an ideal- 
istic standpoint in practice, the distinction between art and non-art remains undecidable. 
The origin of Modem aesthetics in art criticism constitutes an expression of this situation. 
4.2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARTIST IN THE MODERN SENSE 
Art, then, arrived at the threshold of the Modem age independent from reason and 
morality, and related to human psychology instead. This implied, on the one hand, the 
impossibility of any generally accepted distinction between art and non-art, and on the 
other, the development of art theory in an attempt to maintain the relation between art and 
the human subject. The change in the nature and the social function of art is interrelated 
with a major change in the role of the artist. 
The artist becomes gradually free to express his own aesthetic attitude through his 
work. His "capacity to achieve" is overestimated at the expense of the actual achieve- 
ment(53). Moreover, he has to support the work in theoretical terms, which in an extreme 
situation means that the work cannot stand as such without a theory. 
Hence, in opposition to the minor attention he was given in antiquity, in comparison 
with the appreciation of his work - since continuity in tradition was far more important 
than any personal expression of the artist -, a totally new situation emerged in modernity. 
The personality of the artist is placed above art. This does not mean however that the artist 
in the ancient Greek world lacked individuality. Even in Archaic times, for instance, sculp- 
tors used to sign their works and proclaim their excellence. It is clear nevertheless that the 
real object of the praise was the work(54). In late antiquity however, certain behavioral 
traits were attributed to the artists. Thus Pliny mentions that the sculptor Kallimachos was 
nick-named "the niggler" due to his devotion to detail, while Apollodorus was called "the 
madman" because he often broke up a finished statue if it could not fulfil his initial con- 
ception(55). 
It was not till the time of the Renaissance, however, that the psychological idiosyn- 
crasies of the art sts were over-estimated and their social position raised to an elite. 
There are contradicting opinions among specialists concerning the effect of the guild- 
system - which did not become powerful until the thirteenth century - upon the lack of 
development of individualism during the Middle Ages. Coulton argues that the role of the 
organization in guilds was devastating for the personality of individual artists, while Doren 
insists that the development of the artists' personality was independent of the guild- 
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system(56). There is evidence from an earlier Medieval period that, as in early Antiquity, 
the masters themselves praised their works' excellence in inscriptions(57). In the Renais- 
sance however, with the emancipation of the visual arts from the crafts and their rise to an 
intellectual activity defined in terms of their relation to the artes liberales - as discussed in 
the first section of this chapter - artists started to give a theoretical justification of their 
works in this sense. The change in the classification and nature of the visual arts from 
mechanical into liberal raised the social position of artists. 
Simultaneously, for the first time in history, not only did the artist become capable of 
considering his art as an act of self-expression, but his personality was placed above his 
work(58). Early in the sixteenth century, artists were given such high prestige that 
Michelangelo, for example, was acclaimed as divine and ranked above the princes of the 
blood; Raphael possessed his own palace and associated with princes and cardinals as 
equals. These are mentioned by Vasari, in his Vite de' piu eccellenti architetti, pittori et 
scultori Italiani first published in Florence in 1550, which is the first book on the history 
of art(59). It is generally accepted that one of "Vasari's aims in his "Lives" was to elevate 
the artist. 
We argued earlier that the Renaissance artist, in order to be freed from the protective 
bond of the guilds, tried to link his work to the liberal arts. So far as the liberal arts were 
primarily sciences or teachable knowledge(60), the visual arts started to be regarded as an 
extension of the phenomenal world defined in terms of science(61). Thus Alberti, the first 
Western art theoretician, along with Leonardo, tried to prove that painting was a science. 
The type of versatile artist, who sought to unite both art and science, the homo universale 
who was the opposite of the craftsman artist, was developed(62). 
Freed from the authority of the crafts(63) and based on theoretical training, Renais- 
sance art became open to amateurs. This was particularly the case with architecture. Of the 
leading architects of the high Renaissance, only Antonio da Sangallo was originally an 
architect. Bramante was a painter, Raphael, and Peruzzi combined painting with architec- 
ture, and Michelangelo was principally a sculptor(64). 
The idea of genius, interrelated with the concept of originality, was a fundamentally 
new element in the Renaissance conception of art. The Middle Ages' role of the artist as a 
medium through which the eternal, universal order of things becomes visible, was super- 
seded by artistic creativity that transcended tradition as much as theory(65). 
The thesis that art is unteachable and that the artist is bom was developed. In the late 
sixteenth century, writers such as Lomazzo and Zuccari think that the artist creates not 
merely from nature, but like nature. The artistic idea, the disegno inferno, asserts Zuccari, 
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is the manifestation of the divine in the soul of the, artist(66). The revival of Platonism 
contributed to the spread of the notion of the "divine madness" by which Plato refers to the 
poet, to the visual arts in order to increase their status(67). 
Wittkower, discussing the difference between the. Platonic mania and the Renaissance 
pazzia, mentions that while pazzia would be unthinkable without Plato's concept of "mad- 
ness". Renaissance artists appropriated this inspired condition to themselves in a narcissis- 
tic way, probably because it would help them to share the prestige of poetry which 
belonged to the liberal arts. Yet, when Michelangelo uses the word pazzia, he means his 
"non-conformist obsessions" rather than the Platonic "madness"(68). 
Most important however seems to be the fact that while the Platonic "madness" has 
its sole source in the divine, in the Renaissance - as Hauser argues - "the human mind has 
already become conscious of its creative nature..., and the derivation of its spontaneity 
from God merely serves, in the mind of the mannerists, to enhance its justification"(69). 
The basic belief of Leonardo that art follows nature had no reason to exist any more. The 
disengagement of the visual arts from the sciences that took place in the seventeenth cen- 
tury, marked the separation which set the ground free for the creative function of the ima- 
gination of the artist, which Kant describes as "blind". Thus, instead of the reasoned 
activity of the Classical artist, based on knowledge, the Modem artist starts from his 
"blind" imagination and a priori principles of aesthetic judgement. 
The emergence of caricature as a new expression of artistic virtuosity in the seven- 
teenth century, anticipated this situation. As Gombrich and Kris point out, "Once the 
artist's prerogative as a dreamer of dreams was asserted the sophisticated art lover of the 
seventeenth century would be flattered rather than hurt to look at his countenance in the 
distorting mirror of the great artist's mocking mind... "(70). 
Until the middle of the sixteenth century, the new function of art as an act of self- 
expression of the artist, introduced by' the Renaissance, was reinforced with displays of 
idiosyncratic temperament and eccentric traits by artists. Wittkower, describing the per- 
sonality of the Renaissance artists, writes: "Their approach to work is characterized by 
frantic activity alternating with creative pauses; their psychological make-up by a tendency 
to melancholy; and their social behaviour by a craving for solitude and by eccentricities of 
an endless variety"(71). This refers not only to such leading artists as Leonardo, 
Michelangelo, Pontormo, Parmigianino, Barocci but also to a number of minor ones. 
The value of melancholy derives its authority from Aristotle's view that only men of 
a melancholic nature are capable of mania. Thus Ficino, invoking Plato and Aristotle, in 
his De vita triplici poses pazzia and maninconta as prerequisites for the man of genius(72). 
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Michelangelo, who claimed to be a homo melancholicus, describes his situation in a 
famous sonnet: "Melancholy is my joy / And discomfort my rest"(73). The experience of 
art can only be gained through suffering and isolation. The meaning of this experience is 
immense, as it constitutes, as Michelangelo puts it in another sonnet, a condition for under- 
standing: "Entire understanding none can have / Before he's experienced the immensity / 
Of art and life"(74). 
From the middle of the sixteenth century, the decline of Mannerism marked the 
decline of the foibles and eccentricities of artists, without nevertheless affecting the appre- 
ciation of artistic virtuosity. The artist started to be integrated into the social and intellec- 
tual elite. Vasari, under whose influence the first Academy of Arts was established in 
Florence in 1563, portraying Raphael, talks about his superiority over the majority of 
artists who are, detached from reality and whose eccentricity is mixed with madness and 
uncouthness(75). The institution of the Academies of Art which had their birth in Florence 
and flourished mainly in France between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, 
played a principal role in this change in the type of ardst(76). 
Every recognized artist is now a professore del disegno and his imagination has to 
conform to the models imposed by the revival of Classicism by the Academies. This 
academic type of artist retained prestige till the Romantic era, when the "bohemian artist" 
with his non-conformism and eccentricities, started to rise again(77). As the Renaissance 
artists strove to gain their freedom from the authority of the guilds, the Romantic artists 
fought for liberation from the domination of the Academies. 
We shall see in the next chapter that the eccentric individualism of the Renaissance 
and the Romantic era, along with the intellectualism first brought forward by the Academ- 
ies, was re-enacted by the avant-garde of the twentieth century. The disruption within the 
social tended to be substituted by communication on the intellectual level. 
4.3. "DISINTERESTED INTERESTEDNESS" AS A SHARED PRINCIPLE 
IN THE MODERN AESTHETIC ATTITUDE 
We argued in the first section of this chapter that in the Modem world the autonomy 
of the aesthetic dimension of the work of art from the empirical as well as from the divine 
world is defined in terms of the human subject "apart from any interest". Which is to say 
that the enjoyment involved in the experience of the aesthetic is not conditioned by any 
external, practical interest. ", Interestedness" is "practical" in the sense that it refers to an 
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anticipated goal. Kant considers the "delight in good" for instance as a "practical" interest, 
since it implies an end. As such, it is alien to the aesthetic judgement(78). 
The concept of "aesthetic disinterestedness" is taken by Kant to be the "first moment 
in the judgement of taste". From this he deduces the definition of the beautiful as univer- 
sal(79). Hence, it constitutes the basis of the relation between the viewer and the work of 
art. The significance of "disinterestedness" in Modem aesthetic theory and criticism is vital. 
Although the concept started to acquire a theoretical formulation in eighteenth century 
British thought(80), and found an integrated place in philosophy with Kant's "Critique of 
Judgement", its origins, as far as the attitude of the public towards the work of art is con- 
cerned, can be traced back to the era of the Renaissance(81). 
Actually, the autonomy of the aesthetic criterion in terms of the pleasure it gives to 
the spectator was first advocated by Aristotle: but there are fundamental differences, how- 
ever, between that and the Modem concept of aesthetic autonomy. As was argued previ- 
ously, for Aristotle, aesthetic pleasure, edone, far from being derived from the psychology 
of the human subject in the Modem sense, comes forth from enteleheia, the work of art as 
an autonomous ontological entity. Furthermore, it is not related to external, formal charac- 
teristics, but to the eidos, the essence of the work, its meaning within its culture. Eidos is 
conceived as universal and immutable. Edone is achieved through mimesis, that is to say 
recreation of the essence of the work by the spectator. Thus the work is understood in its 
own terms. Yet, any diversion of the work from the moral and logical criteria of the social 
milieu damages the aesthetic pleasure of the spectator. 
We have already discussed how during the Renaissance the emancipation of the 
visual, arts from the crafts and their rise from mechanical into liberal arts increased their 
social prestige and laid the ground for an amateur interest in the arts(82). The artists' 
attempt to define the visual arts in terms of science as well as the stress on art's fictionality 
imposed by the Church, forced the disengagement of art from the divine. From Manner- 
ism onwards, the patrons, confined within the limits of secular art, enjoyed the exercise of 
artistic virtuosity as a display of the creative function of the artist's imagination. The 
enjoyment experienced in this way, released through the break between art and the divine, 
posed the foundations for the attitude of "disinterested interest" on behalf of the spectator. 
The relativity of taste implied, gave birth to art criticism which started to develop in Italy 
in the sixteenth century, carried on by and addressed to an amateur public(83). 
It was not until the late seventeenth century in France nevertheless, when, as a conse- 
quence of the Querelle, the fine arts were separated from the sciences, that the way was 
opened widely to the autonomy of the aesthetic indicated by the notion of 
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disinterestedness. About that time, the art public started to grow and widen as never before. 
Up to the second half of the seventeenth century, the Academy had preserved the exclusive 
right to express an opinion on artistic matters. For the first time now its authority was 
disputed and it was forced to appeal to a wider public. As a consequence, the circle of 
people interested in art was broadened to include not only artists, patrons and collectors, 
but non-specialists as well(84). ' 
In order to, elucidate the idea of disinterestedness further, we must give a short 
account of the emergence of the teen in the eighteenth century theory. The task of the his- 
torical investigation of the notion of disinterestedness was undertaken by Jerome Stolnitz in 
his seminal paper "On the Origins of "Aesthetic Disinterestedness". A review of the main 
points of this paper will follow. 
"Disinterestedness". as argued by Stolnitz, comes into being through eighteenth cen- 
tury British thought. At the beginning of the century, Shaftesbury, a follower of Plato and 
Plotinus, departing from "contemporary controversies in ethics and religion"(85), drew 
attention to the appreciation of beauty, aesthetic and moral alike, for the sake of the pleas- 
ure it causes. When he describes the virtuous man as a spectator, he uses the term "disin- 
terested" to denote not any action related to an anticipated goal, but the state of "barely 
seeing and admiring"(86). This refers to "internal sensation" since the pleasures of the 
sense are always and necessarily "interested" for Shaftesbury. 
, 
In one of his last works, 
Shaftesbury deals with the aesthetic on its own for the first time; furthermore, he opposes 
disinterestedness to the desire to possess or use an object, a conception which is widely 
adopted in Modem aesthetics in general(87). 
"Disinterestedness", as first defined by Shaftesbury, had been a recurring theme in 
eighteenth century British thought. Shaftesbury's views on disinterestedness are followed 
by Hutcheson, who goes further in that he excludes from the aesthetic experience the role 
of any form of knowledge about the object. Intellectual or cognitive pleasure caused by 
knowledge of the object is wholly different from aesthetic pleasure(88). 
The concept of disinterestedness is implicit in Burke's analysis of beauty. He opposes 
it to "desire" or "lust" "that hurries us to the possession of certain objects"(89). A beauti- 
ful object can be perceived as such only if it is perceived disinterestedly. He calls "love" 
"the satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating any thing beautiful"(90). 
Dealing with the sublime, he relates "delight" to "distance": "When danger or pain press 
too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight... but at certain distances, and with cer- 
tain modifications, they may be and they are delightful"(91). 
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Disinterestedness as employed by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson or Burke is not taken as a 
distinct feature in the aesthetic experience, but only to elucidate other concepts such as 
beauty or love and in this way it is related to the faculties of aesthetic awareness or to the 
responses which are aroused by the experience. Archibald Alison, at about the end of the 
century, was the first to dissociate the aesthetic attitude from the other components of 
aesthetic experience. Following Shaftesbury, Alison rules out from the aesthetic the self- 
concern of interest as well as "the useful, the agreeable, the fitting, or the convenient in 
objects"(92). Then he goes further to argue that the mind has to be in a certain state in 
order to appreciate beauty and sublimity. "The state of mind ... is most favourable to the 
emotions of taste ... in which the attention is so little occupied by any private or particular 
object of thought, as to leave us open to all the impressions, which the objects that are 
before us can produce. It is upon the vacant and the unemployed, accordingly, that the 
objects of taste make the strongest impression"(93). 
Unlike his predecessors, Alison holds that there are no "aesthetic objects" on their 
own merits, but an object can be aesthetic only if certain conditions of . attention and 
interest have been satisfied by the spectator. The examination of the peculiarities of the 
aesthetic "state of mind", permits Alison to deal with less obvious features of the aesthetic: 
he asserts for instance, that aesthetic attention is impossible as much for the philosopher 
and the art historian, as for the critic, because it presupposes lack of thoughts or feeling in 
relation to the object. On this ground, he insists that criticism "never fails to destroy" 
aesthetic appreciation. 
A particular place in the first moments of Modem aesthetic theory is occupied by 
Addison, who, about the middle of the century devotes his Spectator "Essays" to the Ima- 
gination. This, as Stolnitz argues, implies the experience of disinterested perception(94). It 
seems that Addison tries to identify the specific faculty of the mind which accommodates 
and serves the disinterested interest. Thus among sensation, imagination and understanding, 
he singles out imagination. Shaftesbury related the concept of disinterestedness to reason, 
and Burke to sensation, while the meaning of disinterestedness to all three is essentially the 
same. The reason Addison attributes the concept to imagination - argues Stolnitz - is sim- 
ply because its meaning is "loose and uncircumscribed". For Addison, imagination finds 
pleasure in dwelling upon the ideas of colour, figure, etc. 
Hence, the concept of aesthetic disinterestedness comes to be foundational in Modem 
aesthetic theory, while terms like "fine art", "beauty", "good taste" come to be defined with 
reference to it. Aesthetic disinterestedness, instead of deriving from the ontological position 
of the aesthetic object, originates in the mind of the human subject. As a consequence, the 
boundaries of the aesthetic have been widely opened. Not only art, but nature, the sciences 
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and generally anything can be an object of disinterested perception. On the other hand, by 
definition, disinterestedness excludes morality, reason, feeling, any self-referred or practical 
interest. As such, it cannot be subjected to criticism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE MODERN MOVEMENT ARCHITECTURE: 
FORM AS THE BATTLE-GROUND 
OF AESTHETIC VERSUS ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The architecture of the Modem Movement seems to have emerged out of two 
different but related attitudes towards knowledge. The first is the replacement by economic 
imperatives of the religious or moral supra-human principles which underly social and pol- 
itical interaction in pre-Modern societies. The second is the development of the Modem 
notion of the aesthetic which, emancipated from morality and religion, was deprived of its 
ontological status and defined instead in terms of human psychology. 
In fact, the changes in social and political conditions as well as in the nature and the 
meaning of aesthetics are expressions of a fundamental shift in the nature of human 
knowledge from a metaphysical to a secular basis. In a process whose origins can be 
identified at the end of the Classical era and which was mainly accomplished during the 
Enlightenment, man attempted to explore, define and finally confine himself within his own 
limits in teens of knowledge. Departing from this process, Modem architecture substituted 
history and morality for an a-historical and a-moral intellectual order, that derives its ulti- 
mate principles from geometry and nature. 
Modem architecture, although it belongs to the sphere of the aesthetic in common 
with the other fine arts, has, in contrast to them, to satisfy certain practical purposes: by 
definition, it has to accommodate aesthetic as well as practical requirements. The contradic- 
tion inherent in the Modem Movement resides in the fact that it never managed to resolve 
the duality between its aesthetic and its practical dimensions or between form and function. 
The fundamental difference between the Modem Movement and Classical architecture lies 
in the fact that this duality is well resolved in the case of Classical architecture. We argued 
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in Chapter Three that in Classical times the meaning of art was skilled production of a 
preconceived end or principle that existed as a metaphysical ontological entity as idea or 
eidos, irrespective of the artist. It is obvious that a split between form and function would 
make no sense in the case of Classical architecture. 
In Modernity, the position of architecture seems exactly the opposite. On the one 
hand, the aesthetic factor is defined by Kant "apart from any (moral or other practical) 
interest" and thus is incompatible with the practical needs architecture has to serve. On the 
other hand, the practical factor is conceived as operating within the social-political frame- 
work of Modernity, which means that it has to follow its principles. Technological 
development and the requirement for function which were brought about by economic 
imperatives constituted the social basis of Modem Movement architecture. Moreover, the 
economic foundation that underlies technology and function in Modem society, appears in 
the Modem Movement - in response to Modem politics - as a highly moralistic ideal. The 
roots of this kind of morality can be projected back to the Stoics' "natural ethics"(1). It 
was asserted in Chapter Three that the role of morality in modernity is far from political. 
In fact, it preserves the autonomy of the self threatened by the objectivity implied in the 
quantification of nature. In this sense, morality is a subjective matter, and as such it can 
lead to personal solutions but cannot provide the unifying basis which is necessary for pol- 
itical interaction to operate. Economy as a factor external to the human eidos, is incapable 
of forming this basis. The paradoxical situation where the aesthetic criterion claims abso- 
lute autonomy, while the practical one asserts that in social terms it is the only true source 
of form, indicates the essential gap upon which Modem Movement architecture was built. 
The Enlightenment's search for objectivity on a rational basis operated as a link 
between the Modem Movement and Classical architecture. Neo-Classical architecture 
emerged in the mid-eighteenth century through a precise reappraisal of antiquity. In parallel 
with the extraordinary technical changes which began to advance rapidly at that time, this 
seems to have produced the necessary conditions for Modem Movement architecture to 
appear. Both are expressions of the transformed attitude of man towards nature within the 
secularization process of the Enlightenment. 
In the pursuit of a sort of "natural ethics", which, since the Renaissance had been to a 
certain extent embodied by Rome, the architects of the Enlightenment looked upon Greek 
architecture as the true style from which Roman architecture had drawn its origins. Greek 
architecture represented the most ancient period of human history; it was seen almost as a 
work of nature(2). Thus architectural truth, and consequently beauty, could be derived 
directly from nature conceived as independent from metaphysics. The implied dualism 
between morality and nature was for the first time clearly expressed in architecture during 
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the Neo-Classical period. 
More than half-a-century before the first Neo-Classical buildings appeared, an early 
desire for "natural" truth had brought the validity of the Vitruvian canons under question. 
In the late seventeenth century, Claude Perrault, in his treatise, criticized the Vitruvian pro- 
portions and elaborated his own distinction between "positive" beauty and "arbitrary" 
beauty. He attributed to "positive" beauty a nonnative role related to standardization and 
perfection, and to "arbitrary" beauty an expressive role related to a particular circumstance 
or character(3). 
Going a step further in the same direction, Abbe de Cordemoy in his Nouveau Traite 
de toute 1' architecture published in 1706, replaced the Vitruvian attributes to architecture, 
utilitas (utility), firmitas (firmness or solidity) and venustas (delight or beauty), by his own 
ordonnance, distribution and bienseance. The first two refer to the proportioning and dis- 
tribution of the Classical orders, while the third bears the meaning of fitness or appropriate 
application(4). With the concept of bienseance Cordemoy foreshadows Blondel's ideas 
about the need for differentiated formal expression in response to the varying social charac- 
ter of different types of buildings(5). Furthermore, Cordemoy launches a direct attack 
against the ornamental use of the orders, or what he calls "architecture in relief'. Instead of 
the dramatic forms of the Baroque, he proposes geometrical purity(6). 
In 1753, Abbe Laugier in his Essai sur l' architecture asserts the "primitive hut", 
consisting of four tree trunks, supporting cross beams and a pitched roof(IIl. 5-1), as the 
primordial image of architectural truth: "the model, upon which all the magnificences of 
architecture have been imagined"(7). Any metaphysical meaning which the orders could 
still have carried through to the Renaissance and the Baroque, was definitely rejected in 
favour of a rational prototype drawn from nature. The universality of the prototype was 
ensured in so far as it could be considered as the basis for a sort of classicized Gothic 
structure, or, in Kenneth Frampton's words, "a projection of Gothic structure into Classical 
syntax"(8). Greek architecture was seen as a direct derivative of this primal form that 
embodied "natural" truth. The church of Ste-Genevieve by Soufflot, which was begun in 
Paris in 1755 on the basis of the rational simplification advocated by Cordemoy and Lau- 
gier, constitutes the first building of Neo-Classical formalist architecture(9)(Ill. 5-2). 
The impulse towards the discovery of the true principles of architecture through a 
rational reassessing of the past, stimulated the rapid development of archaeological 
research. On the basis of Vitruvius, archaeological expeditions were extended beyond the 
frontiers of Rome and during the first half of the eighteenth century, the Roman cities at 
Herculaneum and Pompeii were discovered and excavated. Visits to Paestum and other 
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Greek sites in Sicily and Greece followed(10). Measured drawings of the Greek monu- 
ments were soon published offering actual ground for challenging the Vitruvian canons. J. 
D. Le Roy's Ruines des plus beaux monuments de Grece (1758), James Stuart and Nicho- 
las Revett's Antiquities of Athens (1762) and G. M. Dumont's Sequence of Plans, Sections 
and c. of Paestum (1764), published closely upon one another, show the intensity of the 
research. 
The most influential book on Classical archaeology appeared in Germany a few years 
later, namely J. J. Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums (History of Ancient 
Art), published in 1764. Following the doctrine of the autonomy of the aesthetic discipline, 
as it had been elaborated within a rational framework by his teacher A. G. Baumgarten, 
Winckelmann conceived art as an independent system evolving in itself, and tried to iden- 
tify its first origins. He concentrated on the formal evolution of Classical art but attacked 
the evolutionary theory of development that had been unchallenged hitherto, by exposing 
the Roman works of sculpture as forgeries or imitations of Greek works. He classified 
antique sculpture into four periods: the first, the "direct and severe style" dated up to the 
time of Phidias; the second, the "grand and angular style", up to the time of Praxiteles; the 
third, the "beautiful and flowing style", up to the decline of the school of Praxiteles; and 
the last, the "style of imitations" up to the time of Imperial Rome(11). It is characteristic of 
Winckelmann's formal kind of approach that he considers as the greatest period not the 
fifth but the fourth century B. C., where - as it was shown in Chapter Three - artistic vir- 
tuosity was most explicit at the expense of essence. His theory, however, caused a major 
shift towards Greek art. 
Laugier's position on the one hand and Winckelmann's on the other, gave rise to the 
two diametrically opposite poles around which Neo-Classical architecture evolved in the 
nineteenth century: the Structural Classicism which emphasizes structure as the source of 
truth, and derives its ultimate principles through a rational appreciation of nature; in this 
spirit, August Choisy, for instance, considered the Doric order to be the application of 
woodwork to stone(12); and the Romantic Classicism which, on the basis of a secular 
aesthetics, stresses form as the essence of architecture. This duality was handed down to 
the Modem Movement, which credited itself with the task of resolving it. 
In the late nineteenth century, within the Romantic Classicism's search for the arche- 
typal, eternal form common in art and nature, regulating lines and arithmetical relations 
were assessed as the unique source of the beauty of Classical and Medieval architecture. 
Pythagorean and Platonic ideas were invoked as a theoretical support to this research. The 
majority of the scholars (G. Dehio, Th. Ficher, M. Raphael, P. 0. Wolff, E. Moessel, A. 
Thiersch, J. Hambidge) claim that the simple geometrical forms - triangle, square, circle 
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and regular polygons - with all the relations they create, constitute the basis for the concep- 
tion of form in a work of art. One or two of them (W. W. Lloyd, M. Theuer)(13), by 
refusing the validity of any geometrical eile, maintain that simple numerical ratios are what 
defines harmony in a work of art(Ills 5-3). Some of these theories (such as Hambidge's 
and Theuer's) verify more or less the validity of various mathematical systems in the archi- 
tectural forms of the Classical era. 
However, mathematical, abstract configurations are not capable of existing in the cor- 
poreal world in and for themselves. Furthermore, they cannot predefine the form of any- 
thing in existence(14). They gain their existence only attached to concrete forms - the 
form of the Classical temple for example. Through analytical methods and based on the 
assumption that a work of art can originate in bare mathematical relations, the work is 
reduced to lines and two-dimensional figures in such a way that the same relations could 
be used as patterns for designing almost anything. Hence, the mathematical relations in 
which these theories concluded convey nothing essential about the particularity of a work 
of art, nor could they be taken as the archetype, the idea of this work. This misinterpreta- 
tion of Plato for whom proper measure was the means for the manifestation of the idea in 
the corporeal world, is obvious. 
This separation of numberness from existence - numbemess still claiming universal 
authority - has been bequeathed to the Modems as the basis of an objective, timeless world 
of universal forms. In this spirit, the form of the Parthenon ' serves for Le Corbusier 
rationality and individual imagination, at the expense of creation within the context of a 
particular age. 
5.2. THE MODERN MOVEMENT QUEST FOR AESTHETIC AUTONOMY 
Modem Movement architecture, far from having a simple functionalist conviction 
(which actually applies only to the International Style after the 1930s), is a complex move- 
ment whose principles, as Bruno Zevi argues, "are open, flexible, experimental, pragmatic; 
destroying every convention, they always go back to the "Zero Degree""(15). This "Zero 
Degree", of course, implies a tabula rasa where architecture is a matter of invention as 
opposed to tradition. Knowledge is related to the invention of new forms on a rational 
ground with reference to function and technology as well as to intellectually derived 
abstract principles. 
Although the character of the work of architecture as a use-object was often 
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overstated by some of the leaders of the movement, the priority of the aesthetic, factor is 
apparent in the experimental investigations of major trends within it. Intellectual principles 
that derive from abstract reasoning, nature or technology, govern the aesthetic requirements 
of Modernist avant-garde groups such as Purism, De Stijl, Constructivism, or Expression- 
ism. 
The Cubist movement that represents the most striking event in the development of 
art in the first half of this century, is an immediate source of ideas and formal devices for 
Modem architecture(16). The theoretical investigations that underlie the architecture of Pur- 
ism, De Stijl, Constructivism, or, indeed, Modem Movement architecture in general, were 
greatly influenced by the "conceptual" mode of representation suggested by Cubist art. The 
effect of Cubist aesthetics upon Modem Movement architecture is obvious in the intersec- 
tion of volumes and surfaces, the interpenetration of inner and outer space, the conception 
of the plane as opposed to mass, and the use of simple, geometrical, prism-like forms 
which represent the formal principles of this architecture. 
The Cubists rejected the "perceptual" mode of the Impressionists as transient and 
unfaithful, in that it is related to a particular instance of a visual subject, in favour of the 
stability and universality offered by conception(17). However, they maintained a basic reli- 
ance on the visual world. They adopted the restricted range of the Impressionist thematog- 
raphy - landscape, still life, portraiture - in an attempt to choose subjects as emptied as 
possible of symbolic, historical or literary meaning(18). As Maurice Raynal (an early 
apologist of the movement) states using Kant's words, Cubism aimed at a "finality apart 
from any end"(19). In a similar spirit, Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler - with reference to the dis- 
tinction made by Locke between primary and secondary qualities of the objects - considers 
the object's form and its position in space as the primary qualities of painting, and such 
properties as colour or tactile quality as secondary(20). Although this distinction is more 
related to the first, "analytical" phase of Cubism(21), it is indicative of the general Cubist 
trend to recreate the world with means that refer to form alone in terms of the intellect. 
By doing so, Cubist art becomes "essentially independent" and in this way "universal". As 
A. Gleizes and J. Metzinger discuss in Du Cubism, the autonomy of Cubist art lies in its 
neutrality of essence: 
The picture bears its pretext, the reason for its existence, within it. You may 
carry a picture with impunity from a church to a drawing room, from a museum 
to your study. Essentially independent, necessarily complete, it need not 
immediately satisfy the imagination: on the contrary, it should lead it, little by 
little, towards the fictitious depths in which the co-ordinate light resides. It does 
not harmonize with this or that environment; it harmonizes with things in 
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general, with the universe: it is an organism(22). 
The reality of conception on the one hand and the search for truth in visual experi- 
ence on the other, are the two principal, although diametrically opposite, statements of 
Cubism. Gleizes and Metzinger write: "the visible world can become the real world only 
by the operation of the intellect"(23). 
Cezanne is considered as the forerunner and main source of early Cubism. The truth 
of human vision and the unity of the represented form in itself constituted his principles of 
composition. Maintaining a single compositional plane, he arrived at a distorted, non- 
perspective form after a process of multiple viewings of the object from discrete points. In 
order to correspond to the limits of human vision, he organized his forms in discrete areas. 
He further distorted them to achieve formal contrasts - lines meeting at right angles, for 
instance - and an overall two-dimensional unity. With the technique of multiple viewpoints 
or passage pictorial unity is achieved between near and distant objects(24)(Ill. 5-4). 
Picasso and Braque at first, in 1908-9, assimilated Cezanne's principles of representation, 
giving rise to Cubism. By putting emphasis on some of Cezanne's methods, such as pas- 
sage and the inner autonomy of the visual image, they arrived at a completely new kind of 
visual reality(IlL 5-5). Conception was established as the new means of achieving truth as 
far as the visual world was concerned. This attitude of the Cubists towards art culminated 
with the papiers colitis and their paintings of 1913-14(25). 
Edward Fry attempts an approach to Cubism on the basis of contemporary philosoph- 
ical thought. He finds a parallel between Bergson's stress on the role of duration in experi- 
ence and the methods of Cezanne and the 1908-10 Cubist art. Bergson, in such works as 
the Introduction a la Metaphysique (1903) or L' Evolution Creatrice (1907) claims that the 
perceptual information about a given object of the empirical world accumulated over a 
period of time in the memory of the observer, becomes the basis of the observer's concep- 
tual knowledge of the object(26). This cumulative psychological process based on percep- 
tion, which seems to characterize the compositional rules of early Cubism, does not apply, 
Fry argues, to the papiers colles and the paintings of 1913-14. 
In the papiers colds and the compositions of 1913-14, the object represented did not 
stand for a particular object of the empirical world(Ill. 5-6). It represented a class of similar 
objects by exhibiting their essential formal qualities. Essence was approached by intuition, 
and this, in contrast to the Cezannian "scientific" method, allowed for a multiplicity of 
solutions. For, in Picasso's words, "A head ... was a matter of eyes, nose, mouth, which 
could be distributed in any way you like -the head remained a head"(27). It becomes clear 
that the meaning of essence or intuition here strictly refers to form as such. As Apollinaire 
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remarked "The subject has little or no importance any more"(28). Fry talks -about "striking 
similarities" between the -works of 
Picasso and Braque in 1913-14 and the concept of 
eidetic reduction through intuition in the phenomenology of Husserl. However, we should 
comment that as was shown above, while in Cubism essence is correlated to form as an 
autonomous aesthetic entity, the phenomenological essence refers to the subject as a whole. 
The Cubist subject, approached either with the detachment of science or with intuition, is 
chosen first and foremost for its neutrality of meaning. Shifting from an-art of induction 
which proceeds from experience, to an art of deduction which proceeds from a formal 
essence, the Cubists developed a coherent, self-sufficient and completely new aesthetic 
interpretation of the empirical world, which concerns form per se. The subject was 
reduced to its form, a situation that was reinforced with the introduction of the collage, 
where the real subject stands for its form(29)(M. 5-7). 
Raynal, in 1919, searching for a philosophical justification of the reality of conception 
advocated by the Cubists, appealed to Plato: "the senses perceive only that which passes, 
the understanding that which endures"(30). Earlier than him, in 1916, Ozenfant quoted 
Plato's passage from Philebus on the beauty of geometrical forms(31). Among the 
Cubists, the work of Juan. Gris seems to be closest to mathematical principles. In most of 
his compositions after 1911, Gris attempts a recreation of the empirical world either by 
means of the golden section or by strict mathematical ratios of whole numbers(111.5-8). In 
1921, he wrote in L' Esprit Nouveau (the review edited by Le Corbusier and Ozenfant): 
I work with the elements of the intellect, with the imagination. I try to make 
concrete that which is abstract. I proceed from the general to the particular, by 
which I mean that I start with an abstraction in order to arrive at a true fact. 
Mine is an art of synthesis, of deduction, as Raynal has said. 
I want to endow the elements I use with a new quality; starting from general 
types I want to construct particular individuals. I consider that the architectural 
element in painting is mathematics, the abstract side; I want to humanize it. 
Cezanne turns a bottle into a cylinder, but I begin with a cylinder and create an 
individual of a special type: I make a bottle -a particular bottle- out of a 
cylinder(32). 
It was argued in Chapter Two that, as far as the relation of the Platonic idea to its particu- 
lars is concerned, there is no distinction between the appearance of a thing and its moral, 
religious or political meaning, in so far as measurement is a qualitative factor identified 
with beauty and virtue on a metaphysical level. Furthermore, ideas do not originate in the 
human mind. In this sense, a cylinder as an abstract geometrical entity could never be the 
idea of a bottle in the metaphysical world. Consequently, it cannot exist in the corporeal 
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world as well. to the extent that sensible things are related to the idea by Plato in the sense 
of either imitation or participation(33). Thus the Cubist artist, far from realizing ideas con- 
centrates upon the subjective images of his own mind. 
Cubism is directly related to architecture through its development by Le Corbusier 
into Purism. This was a new aesthetic elaborated by Ozenfant and Jeanneret, which 
appeared fully formulated in 1920, in an essay entitled Le Purism(34). This, they hoped, 
would succeed Cubism. In their Apres le Cubisme published in 1918, they criticized 
Cubism for its impressionism, ambiguity of form and lack of spatial definition(35). They 
emphasized the need for a more rigorous style instead, which would derive from a firm, 
scientific expression of the Cubist structure and composition. The belief of Ozenfant and 
Jeanneret that Purism was a higher stage of Cubism, the rejection of Cubist ambiguity, ten- 
sion. and sensibility of form in favour of clarity, precision and geometrical arrangement that 
Purism proclaimed, implied the death of Cubism as a style(36). 
Form is categorized by the Purists as primary and secondary. Primary forms such as 
cubes, spheres, cylinders and cones are distinguished from the secondary, in so far as they 
have the same "plastic" meaning for everyone. For this reason, they are taken as the basis 
for composition which is ruled by the vertical and the horizontal. Composition is defined as 
a secondary elaboration on a primary formal theme. Colour is a surface factor subordinate 
to form(37). 
The Cubist subject matter of still-lives which had been chosen for its neutrality and 
emptiness of symbolic meaning, was -adopted by Ozenfant and Jeanneret in their Purist 
compositions(M. 5-9). They restricted it even further to the most basic objets types, which 
were seen as a bridge between the aesthetic and the practical or the autonomous and the 
social dimensions of art(38). The objets types, more than an elaboration on a primary 
geometrical theme, display a man-centered functionalism. The notion of Selection 
Mechanique which is discussed in Ozenfant and Jeanneret's Le Purisme, lies at the basis of 
the conception of the objets types. In the human organs, "One is able to ascertain a ten- 
dency towards certain identical features, responding to constant functions". Economy of 
effort is the factor that motivates the evolution of the organs towards the greatest harmony 
between form and function. In Greek antiquity to which reference to the order of the 
human body goes back through Vitruvius, there is no distinction between form and func- 
tion, in the first place; furthermore, should there exist a dialectic relation between form 
and function, the motive factor could only be a purely qualitative one that would constitute 
a common element of both form and function. This role, which Modem Movement archi- 
tecture ascribed to economy, will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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From the human body Ozenfant and Jeanneret move to certain objects such as 
glasses, bottles, etc., that "associate themselves with the organism and complete it". These 
objets types are, Ozenfant and Jeanneret argue, in harmony with Man. The Pavillion de 1' 
Esprit Nouveau, built for the Exposition des Artes Decoratifs held in Paris in 1925, was a 
condensed expression of Purist furnishing according to the objets types: Thonet bentwood 
furniture, English club armchairs, standard Parisian cast-iron park pieces, Purist objets 
tableaux, as well as oriental rugs and South American pottery are here placed as a state- 
ment against the Art Deco movement(39)(1L 5-10). 
Accepting the conceptual mode of representation introduced by the Cubists, Le Cor- 
busier and Ozenfant concentrated on the ability of the intellect for general, impersonal 
statements. They thought that this was the true aim of art, which it shared with science: 
"Science and High Art have the common objective of generalisation, which is the highest 
ideal of the spirit. "(40) They sought for a universal order common in science and art, in 
reason. As Ozenfant states, we are not sure that the order of our surroundings as revealed 
to us by reason is but a reflection of the order of our minds; nevertheless, we can be sure 
that our minds find an equilibrium in discovering this order in the external world(41). It is 
clear that order no longer derived from a metaphysical reality. It has been transferred into 
the human mind and ultimately justified by an appeal to a quantitative consideration of 
nature. In this sense, the laws of mathematics were seen as the true, absolute laws of life 
and therefore of science and art. 
In his "Vers une Architecture", Le Corbusier introduces "regulating lines" as a means 
to achieve order in terms of the intellect: 
An inevitable element of Architecture. The necessity for order. The regulating 
line is a guarantee against wilfulness. It brings satisfaction to the understanding. 
The regulating line is a means to an end; it is not a recipe. Its choice and the 
modalities of expression given to it are an integral part of architectural crea- 
tion(42). 
Recalling Laugier's "primitive hut", Le Corbusier looks back on nature and the primitive 
man and finds that order by means of measurement is the basis of all human constructions. 
He assumes that this is "a direct function of-the human instinct"(43). By instinct man 
imposes the order of the human scale on his creations. By taking the length of his foot or 
his arm, man has created the regulating unit of the whole work "to his own measure"(44). 
In this sense, the work is in harmony with him. Le Corbusier's emphasis on measure on 
the basis of the human body, an extension of Renaissance humanism though it may be, 
rejects the ultimate foundation of the latter on the concept of God(45). God is explicitly 
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replaced by instinct or nature conceived in a quantitative sense, common to art and science. 
Hence, such notions as measure and harmony, as used by Le Corbusier, can in no way 
share the metaphysical, purely qualitative meaning which Plato ascribed to the words. 
As far as form as a whole is concerned, man, by instinct alone according to Le Cor- 
busier, employs the right angle, the axis, the square, the circle. With these geometrical 
truths that derive from the human mind and are immediately recognizable by the human 
eye Le Corbusier insists, man establishes his own order against chance, irregularity and 
capriciousness(46). 
In the same spirit, considering the relative distances between objects, Le Corbusier 
argues that man following "an organic inevitability" has discovered rhythms which are in 
clear relations with one another and apparent o the eye(47). 
With the use of regulating lines, Le Corbusier insists, purification of the composition 
can be achieved in so far as the artist's inspiration is realized in its greatest precision as 
determined by mathematics. The choice of the regulating lines should be an outcome of 
inspiration: "There is no universal, easy to apply formula for obtaining these regulating 
lines; it is truly a question of inspiration, of true creation... "(48). Considering the villa at 
Garches for instance(IIL 5-11), Le Corbusier explains in his Precisions: 
The choice of proportions, of full and empty, the determination of the height 
with respect to a length which in turn is dictated by the constraints of the ter- 
rain, all these are in the domain of lyrical creation: such is the creation which 
has sprung out of a deep stock of acquired knowledge, experience, and personal 
creative power. However, the mind, curious and grasping, tries to get to the 
heart of this unrefined product in which the destiny of the work is already per- 
manently inscribed. This search by the mind and the improvements which result 
from it give rise to the establishment of a mathematical order (arithmetical or 
geometrical) based on the "golden number", on the interplay of the perpendicu- 
lar diagonals, on arithmetical relationships involving 1,2,4, between the hor- 
izontal bands, etc. Thus all the elements of this facade are in harmony with 
another. Precision has created something final, sharp, true, unchangeable and 
permanent, which is the architectural moment (49). 
The regulating lines are here means of solving the problem of unity between the various 
elements of an architectural composition at the aesthetic, visual level. By penetrating the 
work from the structure to its form they assure the rule of the human mind over the com- 
position. The mathematical control suggested by Le Corbusier originally belonged to the 
work of Alberti and Palladio(50). 
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The source of the fundamentally mathematical order by the terms of which an archi- 
tectural composition expresses truth as universal and eternal always remains for Le Cor- 
busier the human intellect: I, 
We can accept that the great periods in architecture were based on a pure sys- 
tem of structure. This pure system of structure which satisfies the insatiable 
demands of reason brings to the mind a satisfaction, a feeling of wonder, a joy 
which brings forth the spiritual and purely intellectual expression of a pure sys- 
tem of architectural aesthetics (51). 
In this spirit, Le Corbusier writes about the Propylea of the Acropolis: 
From what is emotion born? From a certain relationship between definite ele- 
ments: cylinders, an even floor, even walls. (... ) From a plastic system that 
spreads its effects over every part of the composition. From a unity of idea that 
reaches from the unity of the materials used to the unity of the general 
contour(52)(IIl, 5-12). 
He sees the Parthenon as "a pure creation of the mind" that "gives almost the feeling of a 
natural growth"(53)(IIl. 5-13). 
With the use of a mathematical order Le Corbusier aims at the precise realization of 
the artistic idea. Idea here does not bear the meaning of archetype like the Platonic idea 
but of a vision in one's mind. The Modem artist departs from the subjective images of his 
own mind. In this sense, an idea can never be realized as such in the corporeal world. As 
Jose Ortega Y Gasset remarks, there is always an absolute distance that separates an idea 
(either in the Modem or in the Platonic sense) from its corporeal expression. Making an 
idea alive as such means realizing the unreal. "In this way we do not move from the mind 
to the world. On the contrary, we give three-dimensional being to mere patterns, we objec- 
tify the subjective, we "worldlify" the immanent"(54). This deforming and dehumanization 
of reality Y Gasset argues, results in lack of communication. 
The mathematical aesthetics imposed by the intellect as a means of achieving purity 
and precision in the realization of the artistic idea can only enhance the absurdity of the 
situation. In this way, the columns of the Propylea far from being the realization of abstract 
geometrical bodies such as the cylinders which Le Corbusier sees, are fluted, tapered and 
crowned with a capital, whose dimensions and formal relations always vary within the lim- 
its of their metaphysical order. Instead of being "clear and precise" creations of the mind, 
they are expressions of a complex culture where man explores Logos as the moral, political 
and natural order of the universe. It is obvious that the imposition of a mathematical order 
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upon subjective artistic visions can in no way give rise to an objective, universal work. 
The universality of the Classical work of art results from the metaphysical nature of the 
idea or eidos; and the work far from deriving from the human intellect stands by itself as 
an autonomous entity, obedient only to metaphysical, universal laws. An infinite number 
of different corporeal expressions of the same idea can come forth in this way but never 
the idea as such, of course. 
The ultimate subjectivity of Le Corbusier's conception of mathematics as an absolute 
value is discussed by Colin Rowe in his "Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and other essays". 
Le Corbusier's incapacity to define an attitude to sensation Colin Rowe argues, confirms 
the private significance of the architectural truth which he imputes to mathematics: (... ) 
cubes, spheres, 'cylinders, cones, and their products are demanded as objects governed by 
and intensifying sensuous appreciation. At one moment, architecture is "the art above all 
others which achieves a state of Platonic grandeur", but, at the next, it becomes clear that 
this state, far from being changeless and eternal, is an excitement subsidiary to the personal 
perception of "the masterly, correct and magnificent play of masses brought together in 
light". So the reader can never be clear as to what conception of rightness the world 
"correct" refers. Is it an idea, apart from, but infusing the object, which is "correct" (the 
theory of the Renaissance); or is it a visual attribute of the object itself (the theory of 
1900)? A definition remains elusive(55). 
Hence Le Corbusier's initial attack against Cubism in Apres le Cubism in 1918, for its 
impressionisme des formes has no meaning, since he contributes to the Cubist experiment 
of rationalizing a world of personal sensation(56). 
Le Corbusier's attempt to establish order as an intellectual concept affirmative of 
universal truths found aesthetic expression as a reaction to the past in his Les cinq poins d 
une architecture nouvelle, published in 1926(M. 5-14). Le Corbusier's "five points" of 
architecture, despite their elaborate rationalization on the basis of function and structure, 
constitute an upside-down turn of the aesthetic values of the past and in this sense a kind 
of anti-architecture. They' are what Summerson describes as "Alice in the Wonderland 
inversions" or Collins as "Dadaist jokes"(57). The elevation of the mass of the building 
off the ground on columns is an inversion of the Classical use of colonnades on a solid 
walling base; whereas Classical architecture used load-bearing walls, Le Corbusier intro- 
duces the free plan achieved with the separation of the load-bearing columns from the 
walls; the free facade is introduced as the corollary of the free plan in the vertical plane; 
the long horizontal sliding window that divides the facade into a sequence of solid and 
open strips, is suggested in contrast to the Classical closed facade whose windows do not 
disturb its unity; and finally, with the roof-garden, the Classical unity between architecture 
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and nature has been replaced by a forced peace between the human habitation and nature 
exploited technologically by man. The moral aesthetics of the past was definitely replaced 
by an intellectual aesthetics, addressed to a disinterested spectator in Kant's sense. 
Another aspect of Le Corbusier's aesthetics which is also characterized by disinterest- 
edness (as far as the essence of a thing is concerned), is his "engineer's aesthetics"; In the 
name of a social demand for response to practical needs - though actually in favour of 
intellectual pleasure deriving from a world of personal sensation - Le Corbusier appeals to 
the machine's clarity and limpidity: 
Not in pursuit of an architectural idea, but guided simply by the necessities of 
an imperative demand, the tendency of the engineers of to-day is towards the 
generating and accusing lines of masses; they show us the way and create plas- 
tic facts, clear and limpid, giving rest to our eyes and to the mind the pleasure 
of geometrical forms(58)(II1.5-15). 
Such was his admiration of the engineer's exactitude, that he wrote about the Parthenon: 
We are in the inexorable realm of the mechanical. There are no symbols 
attached to these forms: they provoke definite sensations(59). 
and 
All this plastic machinery is realized in marble with the rigour that we have 
learned to apply in the machine. The impression is of naked polished 
steel(60)(lU. 5-16). 
Le Corbusier's attempt to derive aesthetics from function, structure or technique, taken as 
the intrinsic processes of Modem society, in order to give architecture an objective 
significance, actually reinforced the form-content duality which he aimed to abolish. It will 
be argued in the next section of this chapter that, in fact, it was the loss of the emotional 
appeal to the machine which integrated technology into life after the twenties. 
The most revolutionary of the implications of Cubism, which drove the Cubist des- 
truction of the modes of representation of the past to its limits, was the notion that painting 
should have no relation to the visible world at all and that it should be composed of pure 
abstract forms which originate in the human mind. Opposed to Purism, this concept leaves 
no place for any reference - direct or indirect - to the world of the senses. 
Released from its last bondages to the visual world, art could derive completely from 
the intellect. Some of the extremist exponents of these principles believed that since 
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universal laws were common to art and geometry, art would reach perfection if it could be 
composed in terms of the intellect alone. In this way, art could gain autonomy through a 
universality defined by means of the intellect. The individuality: of the artist would be 
absorbed by the universal laws from which his work would originate. The artist would play 
a messianic role in attaining between man and society that ideal harmony in terms of the 
intellect. 
The destruction of natural three-dimensional space constituted the aim of De Stijl or 
Neo-Plasticism as expressed in the first manifesto of the movement in 1918. Its intention 
was to achieve "true" abstract art in contrast to the "naturalistic" abstraction of Cubism and 
in this way reach a balance between the universal and the individual(61). It shared with 
Cubism the reference to form empty of symbolic or other meaning and disregard for the 
individual subject. In Mondrian's words: 
In general, people have not realized that one can express our very essence 
through neutral constructive elements. (... ) For pure art then, the subject can 
never be an additional value; it is the line, the color and their relations which 
must "bring into play the whole, sensual and intelligent register of the inner 
life..., " not the subject(62)(UL 5-17). 
Thus the work itself is rejected in favour of the attunement of man's "inner life" with a 
formal abstraction of the work conceived in terms of the intellect. 
The definition of space through a destructional order (destructional by means of the 
intellect) becomes for De Stijl the focal point of artistic creativity which concerns form per 
se. It seems to dominate the intuition of the artist much more strongly than Le Corbusier's 
appeal to a mathematical order as a means of realizing an artistic idea, which is finally 
absorbed by sensation. This is very clear in Van Doesburg's Cafe 1' Aubette in Strasburg, 
designed in 1928, where a huge diagonal relief of coloured rectangular areas is imposed on 
all the surfaces of a partially orthogonal interior(M. 5-18). The result, consistent with De 
Stijl's principles, is a fragmented and distorted place, the outcome of the unification 
between painting and architecture(63). 
The Schröder-Schräder House in Utrecht, designed by Rietvelt in 1923, represents the 
crystallization of De Stijl's concepts about space(Ill. 5-19). In most respects, it exemplified 
Van Doesburg's "Sixteen points of a Plastic Architecture" published at the time of its com- 
pletion, in 1924. The eleventh point reads as though directly referring to the house: 
The new architecture is anti-cubic, that is to say, it does not try to freeze the 
different functional space cells in one closed cube. Rather it throws the 
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functional space cells (as well as overhanging planes, balcony volumes, etc. ) 
centrifugally from the core of the cube. And through this means, height, width, 
depth and time (i. e. an imaginary four dimensional entity) approaches a totally 
new plastic expression in open spaces. In this way architecture acquires a more 
or less floating aspect that, so to speak, works against the gravitational forces of 
nature(64). 
In the pursuit of universality prescribed in intellectual terms, the Schrader House was a 
dynamic, space-exploding construction, articulated in an asymmetrical arrangement of ele- 
ments; low relief coloured rectangular areas modulate "transformable" internal spaces, 
while the primary colours were used for accentuation, recession, etc. of the architectonic 
elements. In this way, the Schrader House fulfilled Van Doesburg's sixteen-point prescrip- 
tion, being elementary, economic and functional, unmonumental and dynamic, anti-cubic 
and anti-decorative(65). 
Thus the aesthetic order established by Dc Stijl maintains and reinforces the rational, 
scientific conception of space introduced by Cubism. Like Cubism and Purism, it actually 
constitutes a self-reference which, expressed by rational means, claims liberation as much 
from the constraints of tradition as from the cult of individuality. 
The Theosophist cosmological formulations of the mathematician M. H. Schoenmaek- 
ers virtually underlie the formative principles of De Stijl. Schoenmaekers, who coined the 
term "Neo-Plasticism", in his book "The New Image of the World" published in 1915, pro- 
vided a cosmological justification for the limiting of the De Stijl's formal expression to 
orthogonal elements: 
(... ) the two fundamental, complete contraries which shape our earth and all that 
is on the earth are: the horizontal line of power, that is the course of the earth 
around the sun, and the vertical, profoundly spatial movement of the rays that 
originate in the centre of the sun(66). 
Later. in the same work, he wrote about the primary colours to which De Stijl restricted 
itself: 
The three principal colours are essentially, yellow, blue and red. They are the 
only colours existing... Yellow is the movement of the ray... Blue is the con- 
trasting colour to yellow... As a colour, blue is the firmament, it is line, horizon- 
tality. Red is the mating of yellow and blue... Yellow radiates, blue "recedes", 
and red floats(67). 
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Elementarism, conceived as the asymmetrical articulation of architectural elements in 
space, was a basic principle of composition for De Stijl. Although directly derived from 
the Neo-Plastic cosmology as expressed by Schoenmaekers, it was greatly influenced by 
the Russian Elementarism which had its origins in Suprematism(68). 
Kasimir Malevich, the originator of Suprematism, conceived of elemental geometrical 
forms as the straight line, the square and its permutations as realities of the mind standing 
against the world of appearances and of past art. His approach was radical. In defence of 
his "Black Square on a White Ground"(1915)(Ill. 5-20), he argued that it was not an empty 
square but on the contrary, it was full of the absence of any object(69). The empty white 
fields in which the Suprematist forms floated represented for Malevich cosmic infinity, the 
ultimate expression of which was his "White on White"(1918), a tilted white square on a 
white canvas. 
Suprematist Elementarism. although ` it' shares with De Stijl a cosmological 
significance derived from and expressed by intellectual terms, is more radical in its formal 
means. However, the rejection of the artistic object and the realization in art of ideas as 
such instead, conveys as much for Neo-Plasticism as for Suprematism their subjective basis 
and exposes the utopianism of their claims to universality. This subjectivism is reinforced 
by Malevich's appeal to a universal kind of sensation through works such as "Composition 
of Combined Suprematist Elements Expressing the Sensation of Metallic. Sounds"(1915), or 
"Surpematist Composition Conveying a Feeling of, Universal Space"(1916)(II1.5-21). In 
this spirit, Suprematism was founded on "the supremacy of pure sentiment translated 
without representation of the exterior world by means of plane geometry"(70). 
The Suprematist floating space acquired an architectural form in the compositions of 
S 
Constructivism. Constructivism, although opposed to the Suprematist subscription to the 
doctrine that art should be free of any utilitarian, social or political purposes, embraced to a 
certain extent Suprematist abstract Elementarism and applied it directly to social reality. 
The Constructivists, consistent with the Marxist ideology, believed that aesthetic real- 
ity could enhance the physical and intellectual needs of society if it could derive from a 
dialectic interaction between tectonic and factura; that is to say between the conception of 
the work on the basis of social utilitarian needs and expedient materials on the one hand, 
and the realization of the natural tendencies of the materials according to the principles of 
technology on the other(71). In fact, however, the above requirements were flagrantly 
disregarded in the Constructivist designs which did not take into account the actual 
economic and technical means of architectonic construction in the USSR or their structural 
feasibility(72). With works such as Constantin Melnikov's Projet de concours pour le 
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Pavillion de P U. R. S. S. a 1' Exposition des Arts Decoratifs, Paris, 1925, or his Projet de 
concours pour 1e Palais des Soviets, Moscou, 1931 (IIl. 5-22), or Gueorgui Kroutikov's 
Ville Volante, Immeuble d Habitations, 1928 (Ill. 5-23), Constructivism turns out to be a 
symbolic statement of the absolute functionalism of the machine and - in this sense, rather 
than for its social realism - an appeal to emotion for its aesthetic significance. 
Expressionism seems to be the only movement within Modem architecture which 
appeals primarily to sensation evoked by means of forms and colours(73). It shares with 
the other manifestations of Modem art an indifference to the artistic subject per Se. Yet, 
the architect expresses his own individuality in a dramatic way, while still claiming a lead- 
ing cultural role in society. As the architect Adolf Behne wrote in 1918 referring to Bruno 
Taut's Glass Pavilion erected for the Werkbund Exhibition at Cologne in 1914(M. 5-24), 
It is not the crazy caprice of a poet that glass architecture will bring a new cul- 
ture. It is a fact. New social welfare organizations, hospitals, inventions, or 
technical innovations and improvements - these will not bring a new culture - 
but glass architecture will... (74). 
Bruno Taut's image of a glass architecture found its most impressive expression in 
Poelzig's Max Reinhardt theatre designed in Berlin in 1919, where the light reflected on 
the stalactite interior results in the dissolution of form and an infinity of space(IIl. 5-25). 
However, Expressionism questioned the principles of Modem architecture which had 
already started to acquire a definite shape. The Expressionists showed no concern for the 
Modem convictions about ornament and decoration, and they doubted the aesthetics of the 
cube and the two-dimensional surfaces, as well as criticizing the Modem attitude towards 
function and construction(75). 
Form was conceived by the Expressionists as a three-dimensional, plastic, restless 
manipulation of mass that derived from an inner creative source and was addressed to 
society as a whole(IIl. 5-26). Scharoun, who along with Taut stressed the creative power of 
the unconscious, wrote in 1919: "We must create just as the blood of our ancestors brought 
on waves of creativity"(76). 
The organization of the Arbeitsrat für Kunst immediately after the war (its leading 
members were Behne, Gropius and Taut) argued for a new total work of art created 
through active participation of the people. The ultimate goal as Gropius stated it in intro- 
ducing an exhibition of the movement in 1919, was "the creative idea of the Cathedral of 
the Future"(77), which could only be reached by a co-operation between architecture, 
sculpture and painting. About the same time, Behne wrote: 
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The most important thing seems to me to be to construct an ideal House of 
God, not a denominational one, but a religious one... We must not wait until a 
new religiosity is upon us, for it may be waiting for us while we are waiting for 
it(78). 
The Expressionists dreamed that through the creative power of society as a whole, the 
building of a Cathedral would arise in a way similar to the Middle Ages and result in the 
unification between art and society. This concept proves to be circular on the one hand 
and utopian on the other, to the extent that, as we discussed in chapter four, the principle 
unifying factor in Modem society is economy which is unable to create political interac- 
tion. Transparent materials and dynamic forms are far from adequate as a means to give 
rise to a new culture. Being a "moving exercise in irrationalism"(79), in a sometimes 
naive way - as the imitation of biological forms in H"aring's Prinz Albrecht Garten residen- 
tial project of 1924 and Scharoun's Home and Work Exhibition building at Breslau of 
1924 show(IIl. 5-27) - Expressionism, although it exercised a considerable influence in 
determining Modem architecture, proved unable to establish itself in society as an alterna- 
tive to the Modem principles it initially reacted against. Its search for light-exploiting, 
emotionally loaded or organic forms contributed more to the cinema and theatre than to 
actual building(80). 
The conflict between Haring and Le Corbusier at the foundation of the Congres Inter- 
nationaux if Architecture Moderne at La Sarraz in 1928, which resulted in Hazing's failure 
to convince the Congress about his "organic" conception of architecture in confrontation 
with Le Corbusier's pure geometrical functionalism, denoted the end of the Expressionist 
dream(81). Expressionism can be seen as a counter movement in so far as it boldly 
exposed the subjectivity and irrationality that underlies the conception of form in Modem 
Movement architecture. 
We have argued that the universality to which Modem Movement aesthetics aimed, 
turned out to be more or less subjective statements which by intention ignored the artistic 
subject as such. In the pursuit of a universal formal expression, an attempt to objectify the 
fundamentally subjective conception of a work of architecture was made either through 
mathematical and intellectual schemes or by means of function and structure. To this end 
Le Corbusier imposed mathematical relations on his artistic ideas, while the De Stijl archi- 
tects attempted to identify their ideas with geometrical coloured forms; Constructivism, 
which intended to respond to social utilitarian needs through the expression of the techno- 
logical potentialities of materials, resulted in a structural aesthetics on the one hand and an 
intellectual, geometrical aesthetics of Suprematist origin on the other, and, Expressionism 
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that sought for an emotionally charged form which would derive from the intrinsic qualities 
of function rather than external geometrical principles, resulted in a dramatic exposure of 
the Modem quest for form. The appeal to sensation hidden behind the Modem claim to 
universality by rational means or through a structural aesthetics as in the case of Constnic- 
tivism, was driven by Expressionism to its limits. 
The essential emptiness of Modem Movement architecture in which the artistic idea 
is depressed to the level of a formal exercise on a subjective basis, prevented it from gain- 
ing universality. Yet, it is not a formalism, since this requires a contradiction between form 
and essence, while in the Modem Movement the aesthetic level that has replaced essence 
refers to form as such. 
It was the ultimate subjectivity of the Modem Movement quest in architecture that 
gave rise to a multiplicity of different expressions of the pursuit for establishing reason as 
the timeless and spaceless order of things. This subjectivity, as it comes forth from the pre- 
vious discussion, was what made the need for theoretical foundations indispensable for the 
Movements within the Modem. Theories, of course, proved inadequate to transcend 
private aesthetics. "Aesthetic disinterestedness", on the one hand defines the autonomy of 
the aesthetic, while on the other opens the aesthetic realm to almost anything in so far as 
anything can be the subject of a personal aesthetic appreciation. Modem Movement archi- 
tecture is here understood in this sense. The role of theory in Modem architecture will be 
discussed in the next, concluding chapter of the thesis, in contrast to the knowledge that 
underlied Classical architecture and which was a common sharing between all citizens. 
5.3. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE 
Modem Movement architecture is characterized by the utopian belief that, using a 
materialistic disguise of morality, it could play a role in forming social conditions. In the 
name of the social imperatives that had first been raised by the nineteenth century critics 
such as Pugin, Ruskin and Morris, leaders of the Modem Movement enthusiastically 
worked for an architecture that could be produced cheaply and become available to all. 
Generation by function, structure or technique, on the basis of economy, seemed to the 
Modems the only way in which architecture could improve social conditions and stimulate 
social change. 
We discussed in chapter four how economy, being purely quantitative and essentially 
external to the human eidos, is incapable of stimulating political life, bios politicos, in the 
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sense of reasoned interaction between citizens. Interaction based on economy, as is the case 
with the Modem political or social situation, is far from adequate to cause any change on 
the essential level, while any appeal to morality seems naive within the rational framework 
which, as we argued in Chapter Three, excludes morality by definition. Thus a social con- 
sideration of Modem Movement architecture in fact implies a universal and timeless 
artifact, in the quantitative sense. 
Since the unity which is necessary for any kind of growth was, in Modem Movement 
architecture, a quantitative unity or a uniformity provided by economy, no growth was pos- 
sible. Moreover, any concept of social change stimulated by architecture, which is by itself 
problematic, seems to be without meaning under these circumstances. The differentia 
specifica of Modem Movement architecture expressed in terms of uniformity on an 
economic ground, is fundamentally different from that of the Classical era where the work 
derived from a unity of essence on a moral, political basis. In Classical architecture, econ- 
omy was not an essential factor in the choice of materials and techniques. Besides, function 
had a totally different meaning in Classical times, being in accord with the efdos of the 
individual work and not, as happens in Modernity, obeying a mechanistic consideration of 
human or other needs. 
The notion of building typology which had been developed during the Enlightenment 
in the writings and drawings of architects and theoreticians like Blondel, Ledoux, Boulee, 
Durand and Dubut, is a forerunner of the Modem Movement concept of standardization in 
architecture and other use objects. In the treatises of the Enlightenment however, typology 
was based upon the consideration of form in itself rather than on functional and economic 
specificadons(82). 
The peculiar planning technique taught by Durand for instance, based on the intro- 
duction to design of graph paper, with the lines representing potential axes of walls and 
columns, although it was addressed to engineers supposedly for practical purposes, actually 
aimed at purely abstract compositions: students had to compose balanced wholes from 
given ideal abstract room shapes(83). 
The quest for standardization was a basic principle of Modem Movement architecture 
and the theme of a great debate as well. This debate was an expression of the intrinsic 
duality of the Modem Movement between its aesthetic and its practical self. At the 
Cologne Werkbund Exhibition in 1914, where the split was first expessed, Muthesius 
declared: 
Architecture and with it the whole area of activity of the Werkbund moves 
towards standardization (Typisierung)... Only standardization can ... once again 
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introduce a universally valid, self-certain taste(84). 
Normative forms that originate in the Enlightenment's consideration of Greek anti- 
quity, are applied in architecture on the grounds of functional and economic qualifications. 
Mass industrial production based on standardization was seen as the answer to the 
economic needs of the new era. House building seemed to be an appropriate application of 
mass-production. Le Corbusier gives a justification: 
Industry, overwhelming us like a flood which rolls on towards its destined ends, 
has furnished us with new tools adapted to this new epoch, animated by the 
new spirit. 
Economic law inevitably governs our acts and our thoughts. 
The problem of the house is the problem of the epoch. The equilibrium of 
society to-day depends upon it. Architecture has for its first duty, in this period 
of renewal, that of bringing about a revision of values, a revision of the consti- 
tuent elements of the house. 
Mass-production is based on analysis and experiment 
Industry on the grand scale must occupy itself with building and establish the 
elements of the house on a mass-production basis(85). 
" Although Le Corbusier confuses the mass-production of the house as described above 
with his aesthetic consideration of the machine or his machine aesthetics - which as we 
argued earlier in this chapter are mutually exclusive - the fact is that the economic law that 
governs mass-production leaves little room for anything other than minimum functional and 
technical requirements. Moreover, far from a revision of social values on a moral basis, Le 
Corbusier's proposals simply facilitate the adaptation of architecture to the Modem social- 
political situation. 
The Maison Dom-ino designed in 1915, is an early example of this case(IIl. 5-28). 
The Dom-ino system invented by Le Corbusier by 1914, was based on the principle of 
standardization and mass-production(86). Yet, he put the aesthetic requirements for clear 
and simple articulation of elements above the technical ones: for instance, although it is 
more economical in terms of the function of reinforced concrete to use beams in order to 
transmit the weight of a horizontal slab to cantilever elements, Le Corbusier omitted the 
beams. 
In the early 1920s, Le Corbusier designed several proposals for standardized dwel- 
lings, such as the Citrohan type, '"That is to say a house like a motor-car, conceived and 
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carried out like an omnibus or a ship's cabin"(87)(M. 5-29). However, elements such as 
the staircase of the Citrohan type of dwellings, which unfolds as a balcony along one side 
of the living-room either at the exterior or at the interior of the house, seems to support an 
anthropocentric, Cubist aesthetic allusion to the viewing of the particular space rather than 
any machine-functionalism or even machine-aesthetic. The unifying basis among the 
Citrohan dwelling types seems to lie in the aesthetic manipulation of such elements. 
Proposals based on the Citrohan type were put under construction at the Pessac hous- 
ing scheme at Bordeau, in 1926. As Le Corbusier comments in Vers une Architecture: 
"For the first time perhaps ..., the pressing problems of 
Architecture, ... were solved in a 
Modem spirit. Economy, sociology, aesthetics: a new solution using new methods(88). " 
However, his attempts to market an adaptation of the Citrohan type, the Immeuble-Villa 
unit, did not meet with success(89). 
It was in the large scale urban project for the Ville Contemporaine in 1922(111.5-30) 
that the social and political intentions behind Le Corbusier's Citrohan type of mass- 
production dwellings were, for the first time, fully expressed. The city was articulated in 
three areas. The outer consisted of industries and garden cities for the workers, and was 
sited beyond the green belt that actually defined the city. The city itself included residential 
blocks some ten to twelve storeys in height, while the centre was occupied by twenty-four 
sixty-storey office towers, the so-called Cartesian skyscrapers, which provocatively demon- 
strated the replacement of the religious core of the. traditional city by centres of secular 
power(90). In this way, the form of the Ville Contemporaine as conceived by Le Cor- 
busier constituted the glorification of human reason as the only absolute source of truth. 
However, the expression of moral issues about the right way of organizing a city in a 
mathematical form - for instance the area occupied by the office towers is a golden section 
of the total surface of the city - can in no way transcend the limits of a private mythology 
as we have already discussed with reference to the Modem era in general. 
Architecture conceived on the basis of the abolition of the distinction between "fine" 
and "applied" arts was proclaimed by the Bauhaus at the time of its foundation in 1919. 
The word Bauhaus echoed the medieval Bauhütte, the masons' lodge. The return to the 
"craft" conception of architecture as the only way that could motivate and serve a socialist 
foundation-of society, proved, of course, to be a rather unrealistic standpoint. 
In Medieval society, as in ancient Greece, the meaning of human creation derived 
from the one suprahuman metaphysical principle that ordered every aspect of human life. 
The Bauhaus conception of craft implied unity between art in the Modern sense and tech- 
nology, which - as we have already argued in this chapter - was self-contradicting and 
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practically unrealisable. This situation was reflected in the confrontaton between Itten's 
assertion of the art component of architecture as the ultimate resort of the autonomy of 
man's inner self and Gropius' anti-individualistic, mass-production approach -a confronta- 
tion which was resolved with Itten's resignation from the Bauhaus in 1923(91). 
In fact, instead of transforming society as it initially aimed to do, the Bauhaus ideals 
conformed to the critical economic conditions of their times. As Oskar Schlemmer states in 
a letter written in 1922: 
Originally the Bauhaus was founded with visions of erecting the cathedral of 
socialism and the workshops were established in the manner of the cathedral 
building lodges. The idea of the cathedral has for the time being receded into 
the background and with it certain definite ideas of an artistic nature. Today we 
must think at the best in terms of the house, perhaps even only think so. (... ) In 
the face of the economic plight, it is our task to become pioneers of simplicity, 
that is, to find a simple form for all life's necessities, which is at the same time 
respectable and genuine(92)(M. 5-31). 
And as Gropius clarifies further, 
The teaching of craft is meant to prepare for designing for mass-production(93). 
Hence the teaching of craft was understood in the sense of becoming familiar with 
the technical possibilities of the materials, in order that artistic conception be disciplined in 
favour of economic solutions in terms of mass-production. The meaning of craft here, 
although like the term techne it indicated a reasoned, consciously controlled activity, ' differs 
in essence as far as the two ends of the production of a work are concerned. 
Techne Takes its departure from a metaphysical principle, the idea or eidos of the 
work, and is directed towards a corporeal manifestation of this principle. Furthermore, 
although works which derive from the same eidos are united in their common origin, each 
maintains its individuality as a result of the potentiality for an infinite number of particular 
expressions intrinsic in its eidos. Thus, each individual work refers directly to its eidos. 
The unity between works of distinct eile is gained through the religious-political frame- 
work of the polls as a metaphysical principle and end. 
Craft in the sense that it was used by the Bauhaus, in particular after 1922, starts 
with the concept of mass-production founded on economy and results in the designing of a 
product on this basis. An endless series of identical, uniform products can proceed from 
the same design. The individuality of a work is justifiable only on the ground of practical 
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requirements and has to follow the principles of mass-production. As Gropius proposes in 
1924, 
Dwellings must be designed in such a way that justified individual requirements 
derived from the family size or the type of profession of the family head can be 
suitably and flexibly fulfilled. The organization must therefore aim first of all at 
standardizing and mass-producing not entire houses, but only their component 
parts which can then be assembled into various types of houses(94)(M. 5-32). 
The unity between different types of mass-production is attained within the economic 
social-political ground of the Modem state on a quantitative basis. 
In 'the second half of the 1920s, the concept of mass-production becomes a prevailing 
consideration within the Modem Movement. For instance, for the second Werkbund Exhi- 
bition held in Stuttgart in 1927, a neighbourhood of display houses was erected by leading 
architects of the times including Le Corbusier, W. Gropius, H. Poelzig, P. Behrens, H. 
Scharoun, B. and M. Taut and Mies Van der Rohe, who had also undertaken the organiza- 
tion of the exhibition, and others. The buildings were free-standing, individual gestures of 
their architects, unified in terms of form as white prismatic volumes and in terms of social 
character as responses to man's practical needs on the basis of economy(95)(IIl. 5-33). A 
few years later, this type of building was to be identified by Hitchcock and Johnson as the 
International Style(96). 
Mies contributed the main building, a four-storey apartment block with a steel struc- 
ture, which permitted a variety of different apartment shapes and sizes(IIl. 5-34). Treating 
mass-production from a standpoint similar to that of Gropius, where unity is defined in 
terms of economy and individuality in terms of practicality, Mies wrote in 1927: 
Today the factor of economy makes rationalization and standardization impera- 
tive in rental housing. On the other hand, the increased complexity of our 
requirements demands flexibility. The future will have to reckon with both. For 
this purpose skeleton construction is the most suitable system. It makes possible 
rationalized building methods and allows the interior to be freely divided. If we 
regard kitchens and bathrooms, because of their plumbing, as a fixed core, then 
all other space may be partitioned by means of movable walls. This should, I 
believe, satisfy all normal requirements(97). 
After the 30s, due to the economic crisis of the times, mass-production became the 
prevailing trend in architecture. By this time, the emotional appeal of the clear, geometrical 
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forms and the machine was actually lost. Faced with the new social reality, the Modem 
Movement morality of a man-centered socialist society reluctantly contributed to the a- 
moral and a-humanistic project of Modernity. 
S. 4. THE ROLE OF THE ARCHITECT IN THE MODERN MOVEMENT 
In the Modem Movement, the role of the architect in the coming-into-being of a 
work can be described by two notions that contradict one another self-reference of the 
architect on the one hand and predominance of his social role on the other. By self- 
reference we mean the expression of a personal aesthetic or morality through the work, 
while the term social is used here to indicate the priority of the economic factor. 
In both cases, the architect occupies a standpoint beyond and ahead of his own time. 
He constitutes an avant-garde in the sense that, far from founding his work on an interpre- 
tation of the past, he is obliged to invent totally new forms evaluated in terms of the 
future. The concept of progress intrinsic to science, becomes tangible in the never-ending 
rush of technology to produce the most advanced machines, and, being extended to all the 
fields of human production, conveys to art the message that the most unusual it is, the 
more advanced it must be. With industry,. what is designed now, takes some considerable 
time to come into production. Thus the industrial designer is looking constantly to the 
future(98). In this respect, the architect is to a certain extent commissioned with the role of 
the prophet and this was the role which the architects of the Modem Movement were given 
by society. 
The revolutionary spirit which distinguishes most of the trends within the Modem 
Movement originates in the notion of scientific progress. The Futurists in particular, were 
the first to denote the revolutionary role of art stimulated by technology. Referring to 
Marinetti's 1909 Futurist manifesto, Reyner Banham wrote: 
As we look back from the threshold of the space age, we see the Foundation 
Manifesto standing up, the furthest familiar landmark in the fog of history, the 
first point in which we can recognize an image of our own machine age atti- 
tudes(99). 
The Futurist obsession with the speed of the machine as opposed to the "static" forms 
of the past was expressed at city-scale by Sant'Elia's sketches for the Cittä Nuova, in 
1912-14. As was suggested by the subtitle of the exhibition by Sant'Elia's group Nuove 
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Tendenze held in Milan in the same year, where the drawings for the Cittä Nuova were 
shown, the Cittä Nuova represented the image of Milano 1' ano due mille (Milano the year 
2000)(100)(M. 5-35). 
The Modem. concept of progress which constitutes an essential element in the 
definition of the artist and of the architect in particular, did not have a counterpart in the 
Classical times. We have argued in the First Part of the Thesis that progress in Classical 
culture bears the meaning of reasoned (in a metaphysical sense) investigation of the world 
order on the basis of tradition. The architect could not but refer to the eternal and immut-ý 
able essence and origin of the work in order to bring it into corporeal existence. In no case 
had he to visualize new forms which reject not only the past but the present as well in the 
sense that they are intended to precede their age. 
The Modem Movement architects believed that by visualizing a new social reality 
and expressing it in architecture, they would have a leading role in bringing about social 
change. We discussed in the third section of the present chapter how moral issues were 
raised by architects as the new principles of society. Nevertheless, these issues, far from 
transforming society, were swept away by the economic rules of the actual social and polit- 
ical situation. The private character of morality in modernity made impossible the social 
visions of the Modem Movement architects. In most cases, this morality constituted an 
idealization of the economic and scientific imperatives of modernity. In this sense, we have 
already argued that projects such as Le Corbusier's Ville Contemporaine or the Bauhaus 
concept of the craftsman-artist cannot transcend the limits of the private. 
Other architects attempted to exceed the role which' was given to them by society: 
they dreamed of changing the social conditions which had created the need for their 
avant-garde role, by putting forth moral principles. In this case, their utopia lies not only 
in the fact that they tried to give universal meaning to personal moralities,, but in the fact 
that through these moralities they express a self-denial of their role as an avant-garde of 
their own time. Bruno Taut's model for an agricultural settlement centrally, situated around 
the governor's "House of Heaven"(101), constitutes such an anarchic conception. 
The rejection of metaphysics as a unifying moral/political ground in Modem society 
left the question about creation problematic. Certainly the expression of economic values 
through a work is not a matter of creation and in this sense the artist or architect who aims 
at the production of works ordered by such values denies his role as an artist or architect. 
Economy or any other quantitative principle is inadequate by itself to give birth to any 
kind of form. The only thing it can certainly do is to suggest a form that satisfies it. 
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In Classical times, the architect was the intermediary between the metaphysical level 
where the work originated, and the work itself. The task of the ' architect was, through 
reasoned activity, to bring into being the work which constituted a manifestation of its 
eidos that already existed either beyond the artist (Plato) or within his soul (Aristotle). His 
role was minor compared to the two ends of artistic production. 
With the Modem Movement, the origin of the work is situated in the domain of the 
aesthetic which, as was shown in Chapter Four and the second section of this chapter, far 
from belonging to the moral and political universal basis of the state, is by definition 
independent of them and derived from the subjectivity of the architect. One aspect of the 
utopianism of the Modem Movement lies in the fact that this subjectivism, dressed up in 
forms that derive from abstract geometry and mathematical relations, claims the objectivity 
and universality attributed to science. 
In defense of the universal manner in which the abstract painter addresses the specta- 
tor, which could be equally applied to architecture, Mondrian wrote in 1937: 
(... ) in his creations he (the nonfigurative artist) frees himself from individual 
sentiments and from particular impressions which he receives from the outside, 
and ... he breaks loose from the 
domination of the individual inclination within 
him. (... ) ... the progress of science, of technique, of machinery, of life as a 
whole, has only made him into a living machine, capable of realizing in a pure 
manner the essence of art. In this way, he is in his creation sufficiently neutral, 
that nothing of himself or outside of him can prevent him from establishing that 
which is universal. Certainly his art is art for art's sake ... for the sake of the art 
which is form and content at one and the same time (102). 
The subjective character of artistic production in Modernity caused a turning upside 
down of the traditional role of the architect Now, in contrast to the Classical era, the 
architect is the major factor in the process of the coming-into-being of a work. This status 
of the architect is indicated by the establishment of the plan not simply as a tool but as a 
"generator" of the final product. 
Of course, in Modernity, the lack of precedents on the same theme (which always 
existed in Classical architecture where each work was a representative of its idea or eidos) 
probably suggested that some kind of drawing would be necessary in the procedure of 
approaching the final result before its realization in material. However, this in no sense 
justifies the role of the plan as generator. 
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The plan is a pattern on paper and as such differs essentially from the work. More- 
over, the scaled reduction usually used in the plan, instead of the actual size of the work, is 
an arbitrary abstraction even in quantitative terms, in so far as the structural and construc- 
tional qualities of the materials used in the work, for instance, are not always subject to 
simple analogic relations. In fact, with the plan as generator, the order of the abstract 
geometry considered as the order of the human mind is introduced as a medium through 
which the work is reduced to its projection on paper. As Le Corbusier expresses this, 
Architecture ... brings 
into play the highest faculties by its very abstraction. 
Architectural abstraction has this about it which is magnificently peculiar to 
itself, that while it is rooted in hard fact, it spiritualizes it. The naked fact is a 
medium for an idea only by reason of the "order" that is applied to it. - 
Mass and surface are the elements by which architecture manifests itself. Mass 
and surface are determined by the plan. The plan is the generator(103). 
Thus the meaning of the artistic idea refers to the aesthetic level of personal sensa- 
tion, while the plan supports the role of the architect as creator but, at the same time, inter- 
rupts the direct relation between him and the final product. The architect brings forth the 
plan as a manifestation of the intellectual character of his activity in the sense in which it 
is prescribed by science. In this sense, the geometrical order of the plan, placed as an 
objective limit between the architect and the corporeal world, is seen as the filter through 
which a subjective architectural conception can be presented by objective means(Ill. 5-36). 
This indeed restricts the freedom of the architectural conception which has to conform to 
the Cartesian geometrical space suggested by the plan, while the plan represents the final 
product through a similar kind of relation. In this way, the plan has replaced the Classical 
notion of eidos as the principal element of the architectural composition. Trends within the 
Modem Movement such as Expressionism, which insisted on treating space as a restless 
three-dimensional manipulation of mass and in this way rejected the role of the plan as 
generator, found it difficult to survive(Ill. 5-37). 
The role of the plan as generator of the work originates in the Structural Classicists' 
criticisms of the Ecole des Beaux Arts from the standpoint of the rational quest for 
geometrical simplicity and articulation of form on the basis of structure in the technological 
sense. The Ecole des Beaux Arts, with its insistence on treating architecture as a matter of 
dramatic representation in drawings, had interrupted the direct relation between drawings 
and architecture. The Rationalists sought to restore it in their own way. As Henri 
Labrouste, who taught at the Ecole des Beaux Arts, wrote complaining about the situation 
at the school in 1840, there was no relationship between the designs of his pupils and the 
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constructions they were supposed to represent(104). About-half a century earlier, in 1789, 
J. B. Rondelet, attacking the Ecole des Beaux Arts for indulging in decoration, had pro- 
posed two new teaching posts at the school, those of planning and construction, as a bal- 
ance to the old ones which he saw as dealing only with ornamentation. Eventually, he was 
appointed professor of stereotomy, which gave him the opportunity to teach solid geometry 
applied to construction(105). In 1899, the Rationalists' attempt to reduce architecture to 
pure abstraction, as Reyner Banham has observed, culminated in the axonometric projec- 
tions of the engineer August Choisy as depicted in his Histoire de 1' Architecture (106)(Ill. 
5-38). This consideration of the design as a geometrical abstraction was handed down to 
the pioneers of Modem Movement architecture. 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Modem Movement architecture has been considered here as deriving from two, mutu- 
ally exclusive principles: aesthetics, through which it could gain autonomy as art, and 
economy, through which it could be integrated into the socio-political framework of 
Modernity. Both principles emerged from the secular, rational foundation of knowledge in 
this era. 
It has been argued that the art aspect of architecture prevailed in most of the major 
trends within the Modem Movement. In contrast to Classical antiquity, where the auton- 
omy of the work derived from its essence, in the Modem Movement aesthetic autonomy 
was referred to form per se, irrespective of the essence. Moreover, this autonomy was 
strictly bound to the subjectivity of the artist, who, by attributing aesthetic significance to 
forms that sprang from the new condition of knowledge - either directly through abstract 
geometry or indirectly through technology and function - takes their universal appeal for 
granted. In other cases, social imperatives gave the dominance to practical needs on the 
ground of economy. The Classical eidos was substituted by typification on the basis of 
rationalization of form. 
Hence, as a result of the secular origins of Modem Movement architecture, its auton- 
omy is defined in terms of the subjectivity of the artist and is independent of any qualita- 
tive or quantitative interest in Kant's sense, while unity is defined in quantitative terms. 
The definition of the work without reference to the work as such, seems to be the major 







6.1. ARCHITECTURE AS A POLITICAL PROCESS 
Every work of architecture has first and foremost to stand as an autonomous entity, 
expressing its own intrinsic character through its form. However, at the same time it should 
embody values which express the identity of its particular place and time. Autonomy and 
unity constitute the principles of existence of architecture within the historical political 
human environment. Nevertheless, the definition of these two notions in Modem architec- 
ture does not refer to the work per se. As a consequence, we confront the bizarre situation 
where the work stands without the work. 
An exposition of this situation was undertaken in the previous chapters of this thesis 
through a comparison of the Modem Movement with the Classical architecture. Each was 
interpreted on the basis of the principles of knowledge which determine its particular politi- 
cal milieu. 
In Classical Greece, the order of human society was the justice of the polls, which 
constituted an all-embracing, universal entity. Justice was two-fold, based on theos (god) 
and logos (reason). Religious knowledge representing tradition, and philosophical 
knowledge deriving from human reason, formulated in common the metaphysical frame- 
work within which everything in the polls acquired meaning and existence. The justice of 
the polis was grounded on two notions: equality and freedom. Interaction of the citizens on 
the basis of these principles determined their political life. Political dialectics stimulated by 
the autonomy of the individual became feasible only within the unity provided by the 
metaphysical origin of the polls.. Within the polis art is "a reasoned state of capacity to 
make"(1), and aesthetic pleasure is achieved in terms of knowledge through manthanein 
which implies re-creation of the essence of the work by the spectator. 
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Classical architecture enjoyed its existence within this context. Its autonomy as well 
as its unity in relation to its milieu were defined on the metaphysical level through the 
notion of the eidos. Thus Classical architecture was universal and immutable within its 
historicity. The metaphysical status of the essence of architecture in Classical times turns 
our investigation about the origin of its particulars towards the interpretation of the out- 
come of the generic function. The corporeal existence of a work of architecture in Classi- 
cal times was feasible due to mathematical relations prescribed by its essence. These rela- 
tions, that were in accordance with the eternal laws of truth and morality that governed the 
universe, unified architecture with the other aspects of life within the polls. The religious 
and political dimensions of the polls, related to its past and present, expressed themselves 
in architecture. 
In Classical architecture the work proceeds from its eidos in a way similar to that of 
reproduction by seeds. In this way, through its metaphysical foundation, architecture is 
integrated into life. "Life" is not understood here in the sense of simply biological life. 
As was discussed in Chapter One, "living" in Classical times meant "taking part in the pol- 
itical life of the city". In this sense, architecture within the city-state constituted a political 
process. The political interaction between the citizens on a moral, reasoned ground was 
expressed in architecture. The existence of architecture was absolutely dependent upon the 
notion of the polis as a metaphysical principle and end, and its evolution is understood in 
this thesis in this sense. 
The case is quite different in Modernity. Political order, far from originating in any 
metaphysical entity, derives from the quantification of all knowledge. Supra-empirical fac- 
tors focussed on economy in its general sense, motivate political interaction and thus for- 
mulate the unifying principles within modem society. Equality and freedom in the political 
field far from having any moral foundation operate in economic teens. In art, the auton- 
omy of the aesthetic refers to its emancipation as much from morality as from reason, and 
in this sense from both the divine and the empirical world. It does not concern the work 
per se, but is defined in terms of the attitude of "aesthetic disinterestedness" displayed by 
the human subject. As a consequence, anything - even everyday objects for instance - can 
be considered as art, while art criticism is insufficient to come up with a generally valid 
judgement. 
In the architecture of the Modem Movement neither autonomy nor unity refer to the 
work as such. If autonomy in the classical era was manifested through the potentiality of a 
work of architecture for an infinite number of distinct corporeal expressions prescribed by 
the eidos, in Modem Movement architecture it refers to a unique work considered as an 
aesthetic. entity independent of the essence. Autonomy is now depressed to the level of 
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form and correlated to the freedom of the personal visions of the artist. Furthermore, the 
subjectivity implied claims universality through a rational clothing in mathematics, function 
or structure. 
Modem Movement architecture is ultimately integrated into society through the prin- 
ciples of economy which determine political interaction in Modernity. Unity here refers to 
the uniformity imposed upon architecture by economy. Of course, as it emerges from the 
Modem conception of. the aesthetic, a work of architecture made strictly on the basis of the 
quantitative principles of modernity is not prevented from being an, object of aesthetic 
disinterestedness(2). This is what the Russian Constructivists, for instance, intended. What 
they actually did however was essentially different: they viewed the machine aesthetically. 
As a consequence, their work, stimulated by aesthetic visions of the machine, bears the 
meaning of a subjective symbolism rather than any universal aesthetic. 
Modem Movement architecture, essentially empty and formally dependent upon the 
architect's subjective visions, cannot claim that it is a carrier of life by its own merits. 
However, it participates in political life in the sense suggested by the supra-empirical 
imperatives of Modernity. Stressing the fact that the criteria of evaluation of architecture in 
Modernity are absolutely relevant, one may paraphrase T. S. Eliot's words from his preface 
to the "Sacred Wood": "I prefer the Classical architecture to that of the Modern Move- 
ment, (... ), because it seems to me to illustrate a saner attitude towards the mystery of 
life"(3). 
6.2. ARCHITECTONIC CREATION AS INTELLECTUAL OPERATION 
6.2.1. THE SOURCES AND MEANS OF ARCHITECTONIC CREATION 
IN RELATION TO THE ROLE OF THE ARCHITECT 
IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN SOCIETY 
The autonomy of architecture in the Modem Movement is strictly related to the free- 
dom of the architect. This freedom which essentially refers to the expression of a subjec- 
tive aesthetic or morality, prevents architecture from becoming an integral part of its 
society. Since this is more or less an unavoidable situation in Modernity, theory was intro- 
duced by the Modem Movement in order to support or complement the work in its funda- 
mental function of communicating within its environment. 
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In Classical times, knowledge about the work derives from the metaphysical princi- 
ples of reason and morality of the polls. The Classical architect is to bring into being a 
universal and unchangeable entity, the eidos of the particular work. He first "knows" what 
the work is and then he approaches it cognitively through mastering the rules of his techne. 
The personality of the architect is appreciated to the extent that he is the medium through 
which an eidos understood by everybody within the polls acquires corporeal existence. 
The treatises written by Classicäl architects had more or less a technical character and 
differ substantially from the new type of treatise introduced in the Renaissance in order to 
support the conception of art as an intellectual activity. The principles of art are known to, 
and accepted by, everyone within the polls without needing to be expressed in written 
texts. 
In Modem society, the principles of knowledge are conditioned by the exploration of 
the faculties of the human mind in terms of science. The Modem architect, convinced that 
reason could offer a foundation to itself on a universal scale and that his work following 
rational principles could stand by itself as an objective artifact, initially rejected all the 
literature which had been accumulated since the Renaissance, mainly within the institution 
of the academies. However, the utopian nature of the Modems' belief in reason was 
exposed through their work. In order to secure their individuality threatened by the quanti- 
tative principles which actually were brought forth by Modernity, they turn to ultimately 
subjective intellectual schemes and private moralities. 
This subjective world could not have any appeal to its social milieu, unless literature 
was re-introduced as a means to support architectural creation. Thus, every trend within 
Modem Movement architecture could not feel comfortable unless supported by some kind 
of theoretical explanation. Texts like the First Manifesto of De Stijl, 1918, or the Procla- 
mation of the Weimar Bauhaus, 1919, or Le Corbusier's Vers une Architecture, 1923, 
show the enthusiasm of the Modems to convince the public of the objective value of their 
work, while exposing their doubt as to whether a work apparently conceived as an expres- 
sion of the social principles of its time could actually stand by itself as such. 
We have extensively discussed in this thesis why it is that a work of architecture in 
the Modem Movement cannot stand by itself as an autonomous entity because it is not 
made as such. The ontological question about "What the work is" has been retired in 
favour of "What the architect visualizes". Since the foundational cause behind the work's 
existence is subjective and arbitrary, the articulation of this cause in terms of a theory 
could not make much difference to the public's understanding. Reason, confined within its 
limits in the modem sense, cannot convince anyone that private aesthetics or moral princi- 
ples are objective and true. Thus through a theory, the architect projects into the world a 
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subjective reality where truth is trapped within the closed system theory-artifact(4). In so 
doing, it presented Modem Movement architecture as reduced to mere "functional" 
oversimplified geometry. 
A contemporary critic, Tom Wolfe, in an article entitled "The Painted Word", 1975, 
argues that the mutation of art into text constitutes a continuously aggravating situation 
since the Modem Movement. We will borrow a few lines from this text referring to paint- 
ing: 
All of the major Modem movements except for De Stijl, Dada, Constnictivism, 
and Surrealism began before the first world war, and yet they all seem to come 
out of the 1920s. Why? Because it was in the 1920s that modem art achieved 
social chic in Paris, London, Berlin, and New York. Smart people talked about 
it, wrote about it, enthused over it, and borrowed from it(5). 
Compared to architecture, painting has the privilege of belonging to the sphere of the 
aesthetic alone and thus being free of any practical intentions. As with architecture, the 
aesthetic self of Modem painting is beyond the reach of any rational explanation. 
Apparently, writing about painting mainly serves the purpose of making a certain group or 
an individual artist more widely known and broadens the public to which their works are 
addressed. However, it seems that even in the case where a text is an integral part of a 
painting and in this sense suggests a different kind of art, we face the paradoxical situation 
where on the one hand painting by itself seeks for remoteness from the public's under- 
standing, while, on the other hand, it uses text as a means of communication. Thus paint- 
ing becomes a medium through which a certain category of "cultivated" people distinguish 
themselves from the rest of society and text is used to reinforce this elitism. In this way, 
the subjectivism of the artist comes out stronger than ever before. 
Nevertheless, immediately after the twenties, theory in architecture played the oppo- 
site role. The practical purpose architecture has to serve, brought forth by the economic 
imperatives of the thirties, held back Modem architecture from a similar self-indulgement 
to that of painting or at least reduced it in scale. Architectural theöry had an appeal to the 
public only after the twenties, when it urged Modem architecture to put aside the formal 
investigations of the first decades of the century and concentrate upon the social demands 
for economy on the basis of functional and technical requirements. 
The use of the term Functionalism in order to label Modem Movement architecture, 
first appeared in Alberto Sartoris' book Gli Elementi dell' architettura Funzionale, pub- 
lished in Milan in 1932. The word Functional was proposed to Sartoris by Le Corbusier 
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himself instead of the original Rational (6). With writers like Sigfried Giedion, the term 
Functionalism was established, while the presentation of the architecture of the twenties 
was limited to the work of some leading architects like Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Le 
Corbusier and Aalto(7). Although misleading as Reyner Banham argues, the term Func- 
tionalism seems to represent not so much the arbitrariness of some writers as the socially 
approvable face of Modem Movement architecture. In this way theory initially introduced 
to support the autonomy of Modem Movement architecture turns out to subsume this 
autonomy to functionalist reduction. 
Thus while in Classical times the work is integrated into society through the meta- 
physical principles of knowledge of the polis, in Modernity reason can of course produce 
secure quantitative theories on a supra-empirical basis but is inadequete to provide objec- 
tive support to subjective aesthetics or moralities. In this sense, the value of a theory can 
ultimately only be judged in pragmatic terms through the response of the-public to the 
architecture proposed by that theory. 
6.2.2. LIMITS AND PROSPECTS OF A CRITIQUE IN ARCHITECTURE 
Criticism is a new condition for art, which originated in the emancipation of human 
knowledge from metaphysics in the eighteenth century. An essential characteristic of criti- 
cism is that it is always posterior to the genesis of a work either as a corporeal entity or as 
a concept in the mind of the architect. It cannot affect creation as such, it can only propose 
standards of evaluation for a work before or after its realization in matter. In this sense, 
any theory, as far as it is based on critical statements cannot intervene in creation per se. 
However, in so far as criticism of a certain work can affect the next, an interplay between 
criticism and the work is suggested. 
In Classical times, knowledge about art referred to the work as such on a metaphysi- 
cal basis; it was shared among all members of the polis. The principles behind a work 
were absolute and universal, and as such they formed the common ground upon which any 
criticism of a work would acquire meaning within the city state. However, in so far as that 
meaning was more or less the same for everybody, criticism was, generally speaking, 
unnecessary, and practically did not exist. 
In Modernity, the domain of the aesthetic, detached from morality and reason, claims 
absolute autonomy. Nevertheless, this autonomy is defined in terms of the aesthetic attitude 
of the human subject. 
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Within the Modem Movement criticism aims to supply the notion of the aesthetic 
with some kind of objectivity. However, since the fields of reason and aesthetics are essen- 
tially distinct in Modernity, every basic principle upon which a critical judgement is built is 
subjective and in this sense arbitrary. The assertion, for instance, by Le Corbusier that the 
primary geometrical forms "as pure creations of the mind" are beautiful, cannot transcend 
the limits of intersubjectivity. 
In this respect, the evaluation of any work of art becomes a relative, open-ended 
activity. Anything can be considered as art to the extent that it is justifiable through a 
coherent argument on the basis of intersubjective principles. In these terms, an infinity of 
"legitimate" theories can be produced. However, as we previously discussed, a level on 
which criticism about Modem Movement architecture proved convincing was certainly that 
in favour of the supra-empirical quantitative unifying factors of the modem political field. 
The Modem Movement gained world-wide objectivity only after its reduction to pure func- 
tionalism. 
The fact that contemporary political reality remains faithful to the imperatives of 
Modernity, brings architecture to an awkward situation: To follow this , reality rather 
implies to deny its aesthetic self. In this sense it has no meaning to talk about architecture 
at all. On the other hand, as comes out from the discussion in this thesis, a unity between 
the aesthetic and the practical self of architecture presupposes that the artist would operate 
within a unified moral and reasoned framework. Unity between morality and reason in no 
way indicates here the moralization of rational concepts which the Moderns attempted: as 
Le Corbusier did in his project for the Ville Contemporaine, for instance. It is defined on 
the metaphysical level and implies reasoned dialogue on the ground of morality. If a cri- 
tique developed on such a basis has an appeal in any way, it has managed to go beyond 
the boundaries of the subjective and constitutes a political statement. Towards achieving 
such an objective, the role of the architect as a critic primarily of his own work is impera- 
tive as never before. 
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Ills 2-1,2 Vocabulary of the Doric and Ionic order (source: Coulton, pp. 190-1). 
, -152- 





one lower diameter 
IN. 2-3 Evolution of the Doric capital; Doric capitals scaled to suit a uniform lower 
diameter; (a) oldest temple of Athena Pronaia at Delphi, seventh century (source: 
Lawrence, p. 102); (b) temple of Apollo at Corinth, c. 540 B. C.; (c) temple of Zeus 
at Olympia, c. 470-460 B. C.; (d) Parthenon at Athens, c. 447-440 B. C. (source: Coul- 
ton, p. 103). 
-153- 
Ill. 2-4 Temple of Aphaea at Aegina, c. 
510-490 B. C.: capital profiles scaled 
to give a uniform abacus height: 
(a) outer colonade; (b) pronacs; 
(c) lower inner- colonade; (d) upper 
inner colonade (source: Coulton, p. 106). 
Ill. 2-5 In the archaic times precise 
regularity was not of overriding 
importance; temple of Athena at Assos, 
middle to late sixth century: two 
echinus profiles compared (source: 
Coulton, p. 104). 




M. 2-6 Ionic capitals compared; (a) "Aeolic" capital, early sixth century (source: 
Lawrence, p. 130); (b) capital from the first temple of Artemis at Ephesus, c. 560 
B. C. (c) capital from the inner colonade of the temple of Apollo at Bassae, c. 450- 
425 B. C. (source: Fletcher, pp. 226,224). 
(c) 
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Ill. 2-7 Ionic bases at Ionia and the mainland compared; temple of Artemis at 









5. a* 9 10 
12 13 14 15 16 17 16 19 20 21" 22 23 24 
Ill. 2-8 Ionic base profiles scaled to suit a uniform lower column diameter (* indi- 
cates diameter estimated, P1. indicates square plinth): 1 Naxian Column, Delphi, c. 
570'B. C.; 2 third temple of Hera at Samos, c. 560 B. C.; 3 fourth temple of Hera at 
Samos, c. 530 B. C.; 4 the same, Hellenistic phase; 5 Delos, early fifth century; 6,7 
Managros, Chios, second half of sixth century; 8 Athens, Akropolis, sixth century; 9 
archaic temple of Artemis at Ephesos, c. 560 B. C.; 10 archaic temple of Artemis, 
Magnesia, sixth century; 11 Klazomenian Tresury at Delphi, c. 540 B. C.; 12 temple 
of Athena at Paestum, c. 510 B. C.; 13 Stoa I at Kalauria, c. 420 B. C.; 14 Stoa of 
Athenians at Delphi, c. 475 B. C.; 15 temple by the Ilissos at Athens, c. 450 B. C.; 16 
Propylaia at Athens, 437-432 B. C.; 17 Agora columns, Athens, c. 450-430 B. C.; 18 
temple of Nike at Athens, c. 425 B. C.; 19,20 north and east porches of the 
Erechtheion at Athens, c. 420-415 B. C.; 21 West Stoa of the Asklepieion at Athens, 
fourth century; 22 Tholos at Epidauros, c. 350-330 B. C.; 23,24 temple of Apollo at 
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M. 2-9 Plan and restored elevation of the megaron at Tiryns 
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Ill. 2-10 Plan and elevation of the temple of Zeus at Olympia 
[sources: Coulton, p. 112(plan); Fletcher, p. 214(elevation)]. 
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Ill. 2-11 Archaic sculpture at Attica (abstraction), 
compared to that at Cyprus (naturalistic representation) 
[sources: (a) photo by author (at Samos museum), 
(b) Carpenter, Pl. IV. 
-158- 
a r1 
Ill. 2-12 Gold ring from Vaphio, depicting a tree-cult scene (source: Nilsson, p. 275). 
(a) 
(b) 
Ill. 2-13 Sacred columns from Mycenae, moulded on (a) a gold ring, and (b) a seal 
cylinder (source: Nilsson, pp. 250,257). 
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Ill. 2-16 Aphaea at Aegina, c. 490 B. C. (source: photo by author). 
-160- 
111.2-14 Basilica at Paestum, c. 530 B. C. 
(source: Goodyear, p. 135). 
111.2-15 Apollo at Corinth, c. 540 B. C. (source: 
Dinsmoor, Pl. XXII). 
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Ill. 2-17 The columns of the Parthenon are lighter and less tapered in comparison to 
earlier temples (source: photo by author). 
Ill. 2-18 The curvature of the std 
Goodyear, p. 15). 
'lobate at the East front of the Parthenon (source: 
-161- 
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Ill. 2-19 Curvature of the architrave of the Parthenon (source: The Acropolis of 
Athens, Pl. III. 12). 
Ill. 2-20 Exaggerated drawing of the curvatures 
of the stylobate and the architrave of the Parthenon, 
and the setting of the drums of the shafts (source: 
Goodyear, Fig. 9, p. 17; originally published in: 
Penrose, Fig. 3, p. 36). 
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Paris-Rome-Athenes, p. 236). 
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Ill. 2-21 The culmination of formal perfection represented by the Parthenon (source: 




Ill. 2-22 The blowing away from (a) the archaic austerity and simplicity; (b) represen- 
tation of a draped figure in motion: from the east architrave of the Parthenon 








Ill. 2-23 Pediments showing the evolution of their sculpture; (a) from the temple of 
Artemis at Kerkyra, c. 590 B. C. (source: Coulton, p. 42); (b) from the temple of 
Aphaea at Aegina, c. 490 B. C. (source: Fletcher, p. 211); (c) from the temple of Zeus 
at Olympia, c. 470-457 B. C. (source: Fletcher, p. 214); (d) from the Parthenon at 




















Ill. 2-25 The temple of Apollo at Bassae; (a) plan, (b) interior (sources: (a) Fletcher, 
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Ills 5-1 The attempt to discover the origins of architecture through a rational con- 
sideration of nature was an expression of the secularization of knowledge during the 
Enlightenment; (a) the "primitive hut" from the frontispiece of Laugier's Essai sur 1' 
Architecture, 1753; (b) a hypothetical evolution of the Doric order from the primitive 
hut, from Sir William Chamber's "Treatise" of 1759 (source: Sümmerson, ills 91, 
94). 
-168- 
Ills 5-2 The first application of the new principles on a monumental building. The 
church of Ste-Genevieve (Pantheon), which began been built in Paris, in 1756. An 
organization of single load-bearing columns was attempted, though not quite 
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Ills 5-3 Parthenon, regulating lines; plan and elevation; (a) by Moessel, (b) by Wolff 












Ills 5-5 Pablo Picasso, "Houses on a Hill", Horta de San Juan, 
summer 1909. Above the place photographed by Picasso at the 
same time (source: Fry, ills 14,15). 
Ill. 5-4 Paul Cezanne, Gardanne, 1885-6 (source: Fry, ill. 26). 
-172- 
Ills 5-6 George Braque, "Houses at 1' Estaque", 
summer 1908. Above a photograph of the place 
by Kahnweiler, 1909 (source: Fry ills 10,11). 
Ill. 5-7a George Braque, "Newspapers and Glass", 1913. Oil on canvas (source: 
Nash, ill. 17). 
Ill. 5-7b Juan Gris, "Sunblind", lk)i-1. !! on canvas, 
with some heightening in charcoal (source: Nash, ill. 23). 
Collage (source: Nash, ill. 24). 
-174- 
Ill. 5-8 Juan Gris, "Still-life with Fruit and Bottle of Water", 1914. 
(a) 
(bl 
Ills 5-9 Punst Compositions; (a) Charles-Edouard Jeanneret, 
Nature morte ä la pile d' assiettes, 1920; (b) Amedee Ozonfant, 









Ill. 5-10 Le Corbusier, Pavillion dc 1' Esprit Nou ea u, 









Ill. 5-1 la Le Corbusier and Pierre Jeanneret: a house, 1923; regulating lines (source: 
Le Corbusier, p. 81). 
-176- 
Ill. 5-11b Le Corbusier, Villa Stein at Garches, near Paris, 1926-7; front facade 
(source: Curtis, p. 115). 
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III. 5-13 From the Parthenon, photo by Le Corbusier (source Le Corbusier, p. 20 9). 
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III 5-12 Propylea, photographed by Le Corbusier (source: Lc Courhusici, pp 



















Ill. 5-14 Le Corbusier, the "Five Points of a New Architecture", 
1926. (Top) Diagrams comparing the potentials of the reinforced 
concrete and traditional masonry systems of construction. 
(Bottom) Four studies: 1 Maison La Roche / Jeanneret, 1923, 
2 Villa Stein 1927,3 Villa at Carthage 1927,4 Villa Savoye 
1929 (source: Curtis, p. 114). 
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Ills 5-16 "We are in the inexorable realm of the mechanical". Photos from the 
Parthenon, taken by Le Corbusier (source: Le Corbusier, pp. 211,217). 
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--- Ill. 5-17 Piet Mondrian, "Composition in Blue, A", 1917 
(source: Friedman, ill. 30, p. 59). 
C 
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Ill. 5-18 Theo van Doesburg, Cafe 1' Aubette, 







Ills 5-19 G. T. Rietveld, Schrader House; (a) upper floor plan with sliding and fold- 
ing partitions in the close position (source: Stangos, ill. 79); (b) photograph of the 




Ill. 5-20 Kasimir Malevich, "Black square on a 
white ground", 1913 (source: Stangos, ill. 65). 
Ill. 5-21 Kasimir Malevich, "Suprematist 
composition conveying a feeling of universal 
space", 1916 (source: Stangos, ill. 66). 
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Ill. 5-22a Constantin Melnikov, Project for the competition (1924) for the 
U. S. S. R. Pavilion for the Decorative Arts Exhibition, Paris, 1925 (source: 
Paris-Moscou 1900-1930, p. 287). 
-184- 




_r -'ý 7 
Ill. 5-22b Constantin Melnikov, Project for the competition for the Palace of Soviets, 
Moscou, 1931 (source: Paris-Moscou 1900-1930, p. 310). 
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Ill. 5-23 Gucorgui Kroutikov, Ville volante, 
immeuble d' habitations, 1928 (source: 





Ill. 5-24 Bruno Taut, Glass Pavilion, 
Werkbund Exhibition, Cologne 1914 
(source: Pevsner, ill. 181). 
111.5-25 Hans Pocizig, Grosse Schauspielhaus, 










Ills 5-26a, b H. Finsterlin, Sketches for an Arts Centre, 1919-1920 (source: Benevolo, 
ills 438,439). 
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Ill. 5-26d Wassily Luckhardt, still from the film Formspiel, 
1919 (source: M. Tafuri and F. Dal Co, ill. 190). 
-188- 
Ill. 5-26c Bruno Taut, fantasy landscape with glass 
architecture on mountaintops around Lake Lugano; drawing 
from the volume Alpine Architektur, 1917-19 (source: 












r GAI AU 
e-- -I 
111.5-27 Hugo Häring, Gut Garkau model farm, plan and perspective view, l924-215 
(source: M. Tafuri and F. Dal Co, ills 270,271). 
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Ill. 5-28 Le Corbusier, Maison Domino, 1915 (source: Le Corbusier, pp. 230-1). 
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Ills 5-29a, b Two versions of the Citrohan House, Le Corbusier, (a) 1')-0, (h) 1921 






Ill. 5-29d Le Corbusier, Pessac fuOu[SSiLLIgg estate, 
near Bordeaux, 1926, on opening day (source: 
Frampton, ill. 135). 
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Ill. 5-30b Le Corbusier and Jeanncret, 
Plan Voisin proposal for Paris, 1925; 
the hand points towards the new business 
centre of the city (source: Frampton, ill. 137). 
Ill. 5-30a Le Corbusier and Jeanneret, Ville Contemporaine, 1')22. Cellular perimeter 
block composed of Immeuble-Villa units (source: Frampton, ill. 133). 
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Ill. 5-31 Lyonel Feininger, woodcut from the First Bauhaus 
Proclamation, 1919; Zukunftskathedrale, the cathedral of the 
future as the cathedral of socialism (source: Bayer, Gropius 
W. and Gropius I., p. 16). 






















Ill. 5-33 Second Werkbund Exhibition, Weissenhofsiedlung, Stuttgart, Germany, 
1927; 1-4 Mies van der Rohe; 5-9 J. J. P. Oud; 10 Victor Bourgeois; 11-12 Adolf G. 
Schneck; 13-15 Le Corbusier with Pierre Jeanneret; 16-17 Walter Gropius; 18 
Ludwig Hiberseimer; 19 Bruno Taut; 20 Hans Poelzig; 21-22 Richard Docker; 23-24 
Max Taut; 25 Adolf Rading; 26-27 Josef Frank; 28-30 Mart Stam; 31-32 Peter 
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111.5-34 Mies van der Rohe, Apartment House, Weissenhofsiedlung, 




Ill. 5-35a Antonio Sant'Elia, Stazione 
Aeroplani, 1912: one of the sequence 
of sketches deriving from the problem 
of rebuilding Milan Central Station 
(source: Banham, ill. 42). 
Ill. 5-35b Antonio Sant'Elia, Central 
Station of the Sittä Nuova, 1913-14 
(source: Bahnam, ill. 43). 
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Ills 5-36 Le Corbusier and Jeanneret, 1924; mass-production Artisans' Dwellings; the 
plan as generator (source: Le Corbusier, pp. 254-5). 
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Ills 5-36 Le Corbusier and Jeanneret, 1924; mass-production Artisans' Dwellings; the 
plan as generator (source: Le Corbusier, pp. 254-5). 
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Ills 5-37 W. Luckhardt, Design for a Popular 
Theatre, 1921 (source: Benevolo. p. 402). 
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M. 5-38 August Choisy, axonometric projection 
of part of the Pantheon, Paris, 1899 (source: 
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